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Chapter 1. General Introduction and problem statement  
 
1.1. Introduction  
1.1.1. Towards world water shortage 
Water scarcity, in both its quantitative and qualitative manifestations, is now emerging as a major 
development constraint in many countries. In countries fast approaching their physical limits for 
fresh water mobilization, the quantity of water available is of key concern. In other countries 
where water availability is less of an issue, the quality of water for urban, industrial and other 
economic uses is a major concern. Considering the economic, environmental and social 
dimensions of water, its scarcity has to be viewed in a much broader sense as a significant threat 
to human wellbeing. Two people in five lack proper sanitation facilities, and every day, 3 800 
children die from diseases associated with the lack of safe drinking water and proper sanitation 
(UNESCO, 2006). In this sense, the complex interdependencies between water resources and 
food production have also been referred to, in recent years, as an evolving global food crisis 
(Hightower and Pierce, 2008; Lundqvist et al., 2008). In fact, the total world population is 
expected to grow by around 40% within the 50 next years (UNDP, 2005). During the same 
period, the average per capita income is also expected to rise. These two factors implicitly 
indicate a substantial increase in water and food demand due to more water-intense lifestyles and 
diets. 
Whilst the nature and severity of water shortages differ from country to country, one aspect is 
common to most countries: water scarcity (whether quantitative, qualitative, or both), is mainly 
the result of inefficient use and poor management (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). From this 
perspective, agricultural water management is the first to be suspected due to the large amount of 
water consumed by this sector for irrigation purposes.  
Agriculture uses around 70 percent of all freshwater withdrawals worldwide. According to the 
Northoff (2003), rain-fed agriculture accounts for 60% of food production in developing 
countries on 80% of arable land. Only 20% of arable land in developing countries is irrigated, 
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but it produces around 40% of all crops and almost 60% of cereal production. The contribution of 
irrigation to world crop production is expected to increase in future decades: the irrigated area in 
developing countries is expected to increase by 40 million hectares (20%) by 2030. This 
represents less than half of the increase over the past 35 years (99 million hectares). According to 
the same source, the reasons for this lower level of increase are principally due to the shortage of 
suitable areas for developing irrigation in some countries, in addition to the required increase in 
investment costs for irrigation infrastructure.  
Agriculture will also have to compete with other sectors, in terms of water use, if market 
mechanisms have free play. Most of the water savings needed to meet growing urban and 
industrial water demand would have to come from the agricultural sector, not only because 
irrigation uses the highest proportion of total water, but also because it has considerable potential 
for efficiency improvement. Modern irrigation schemes can achieve projected efficiencies of 
around 65%, whilst the currently abundant traditional schemes have an efficiency of only 35%. 
Assuming a typical situation, where 80% of total water use goes to agriculture, a 10% increase in 
irrigation efficiency would provide 50% more water for urban and industrial use (Abu-Zeid and 
Hamdy, 2002). This illustrates the potential for water savings in agriculture and their impact, 
thereby stressing the need to act in this direction. 
1.1.2. Water demand management  
Thus, the poor levels of water management observed in many developing countries, where water 
scarcity is a major constraint, raises our hopes that the crisis can be averted by improving water 
use and management. Nevertheless, achieving the necessary improvements is no easy task. It 
requires a deep consciousness and motivation by policy makers towards changing the way in 
which water resources are developed, allocated and managed. The design and implementation of 
these changes, in order to obtain an expected outcome in terms of sustainable water use, has been 
a major concern for research in the field of water economics during recent decades.  
The scale issues involved in the exploitation of water resources justified its public ownership and 
state involvement in its development, distribution and management. However, with the end of the 
water supply era, in most countries around the world, and the increase in mobilization costs for 
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new irrigation projects, this arrangement was shifted towards a more decentralized one. In fact, 
water scarcity becomes economically binding and the magnitude of water-related subsidies, 
including administrative overhead costs, becomes fiscally constraining (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). 
The social costs of public water management are beginning to exceed the corresponding social 
benefits. As a result, a trend towards a water demand management (WDM) approach, with more 
private participation in decision making for water allocation and management, is being instituted.  
Water demand management (WDM) emerged as a strong complementary alternative to the water 
supply policies of recent decades. WDM can be understood as a collection of technical, 
regulatory and market tools, including, to a lesser extent, non-market mechanisms designed to 
promote more efficient levels or patterns of water use (Wolfe, 2006). More explicitly, the 
objectives of WDM could be one of the following three things (Brooks, 2003): Improve the 
efficiency of water used to accomplish a specific task; Adjust the nature of the task or the way it 
is undertaken so that it can be accomplished with less water or with lower quality water; 
Minimize the loss in quantity or quality of water as it flows from source, through use, to disposal. 
Today economic incentives, water pricing policies, decentralization and public participation, as 
well as education and information strategies, are powerful WDM tools, making this option a 
more economically effective alternative to meeting increasing demand and resource scarcity 
(Westerhoff and Lane, 1996; Baumann et al., 1998; Mylopoulos and Mentes, 2000). 
Many irrigation management transfer programmes started in recent decades through government 
initiatives. The introduction of these programmes was intended mainly to stimulate the efficient 
use of the resource through user participation (Groenfeldt, 2003; Vermillion, 1997; Svendsen, 
1992; Ostrom, 1992). According to Vermillion (1997), the motivation often used to justify 
irrigation management transfer policies is that: (1) government bureaucracies lack the incentives 
and responsiveness, whilst farmers have a direct interest in increasing and sustaining the quality 
and cost-efficiency of irrigation management; (2) this will normally enhance the profitability of 
irrigated agriculture sufficiently to offset the increased cost of irrigation to farmers; (3) the 
government will also save money as it divests itself of the responsibility for financing the routine 
operational and maintenance costs of irrigation systems. The savings can be reallocated to other 
functions that cannot be handled or financed directly by the private sector.  
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The decentralization process requires most of the time some judicial, political and administrative 
reforms to establish formal user groups known as water users associations (WUAs). The reforms 
need to create formal rules and procedures for the allocation and collection of fees. (Knox and 
Meinzen-Dick, 2001). The WUAs constitute the heart of devolution programmes, where rights 
and responsibilities are transferred to a common local level, supervised and managed by a WUA. 
In a number of countries, WUAs are primarily concerned with the management of either entire 
small-scale irrigation projects, or local sub-systems within large-scale irrigation schemes. The 
main factors that have helped in the design of WUAs, have been drawn from research into 
traditional small-scale farmer-managed irrigation schemes during the 1980s (Ostrom, 1990; 
Wade, 1988). 
However, the actual outcomes of these devolution programmes in various countries have been 
mixed. The objectives of achieving positive impact on resource productivity, equity, full cost 
recovery and environmental sustainability are not always met. In fact, these associations 
disappear in many cases once the donor’s financing programmes come to an end (Vermillion, 
1997). In other cases, they are unable to achieve full cost recovery for the irrigation water to 
cover their operational costs or induce more efficient use of the resource. In some other cases, 
institutional reforms were established with the unique objective of collecting water fees and 
alleviating the charges supported by governments. For instance, Wilder and Lankao (2006) found 
that the outcomes of decentralization of water management in Mexico was context specific (neo-
liberal reform strategy) and marked by a limited benefit. It has not resulted in efficiency or 
sustainability gains1. This failure to ensure a better performance in resource sustainability could 
be due to many institutional failures. The main problems relate to the transfer of property rights 
and to the internal organisation and functioning of the associations. These factors are, in fact, 
amongst the main incentive elements for farmer participation and long term sustainability. 
                                                 
1
 In fact, whether governments truly engage in participation or use it simply as a part of symbolic policy is a key 
question in the literature on participatory governance (For more details see Saleth and Dinar, 2005; Larson and Soto, 
2008; Howard, 2008).  
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From this perspective, it would be interesting to look at the efficiency of the institutional reforms 
established and to provide recommendations as to their optimal functioning to maximize the 
social and economic value of water resources.  
1.1.3. Governance and water demand management 
Much of the recent literature has focused on the public response to changes in regulation and 
market tools (mainly pricing policies) of the WDM approach, whilst only a few studies have 
examined decision-makers’ ability and willingness to adopt, implement and sustain WDM 
initiatives (Wolfe, 2006). The effect of WDM non-market tools, which attempt to improve the 
efficiency of water use by providing information and instilling a sense of individual 
responsibility for conservation, was rarely covered in the WDM literature (Gumbo et al., 2003; 
Gumbo et al., 2004; Howarth and Butler, 2004). We know more about technologies for water 
demand management than we apply, and we have very little knowledge on how to best promote 
changes in habits and behaviour at the local level (Brooks, 2004; Wolfe, 2006) or on the effect of 
this behaviour on the implementation and effectiveness of WDM tools. 
Recent studies, call for a new approach which considers WDM tools as a larger part of the water 
demand approach and in which more emphasis is placed on improvements to the governance 
structure and decision making process, along with support for technical, economic and legal 
aspects. In fact, technical, economic and legal issues are determined by (not determinants of) the 
way in which water is governed (Brooks, 2004). Strong governance of water will then result in 
better monitoring of the various technical, economic and legal determinants of water 
management.  
Irrigation governance is a key concept in this dissertation. Particular focus is given to showing its 
importance in enhancing the outcome of water demand management institutions in Tunisia. The 
governance structure is considered in the dissertation as the set of systems that control decision 
making with regard to water management and water service delivery (Moriarty et al., 2007). It is 
assumed that it comprises the technical, economic, administrative, financial and social aspects of 
local irrigation water management (Brooks, 2004). 
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1.2. Looking at the water sector from an institutional perspective 
In this dissertation we investigate the efficiency of some WDM tools, and more specifically the 
institutional ones. We analyze the importance of institutional performance as key to the success 
of water resource management. The overall objective is to show that water management 
institutions not only exist, but also influence and shape the dynamic of the irrigation water sector.    
 This requires a well adapted and consistent theoretical framework, able to entrench the necessary 
concepts, definitions and hypotheses. Consequently, we intend to use the new institutional 
economics (NIE) framework as the theoretical basis for this study. The advantage of NIE over 
neoclassical theories is its aptitude to explain what institutions are, how they arise, what purposes 
they serve and how they evolve and can be reformed. Literature on NIE is increasing rapidly and 
combines economics, law, organization theory, political science, sociology and anthropology to 
understand social, political and commercial institutions and to accurately reflect human 
behavioural attitudes to resource management.  
1.2.1. Definitions and approaches 
1.2.1.1. Neo-classical and New Institutional Economic theories 
New institutional economics is an attempt to incorporate a theory of institutions into economics 
(North, 1992). Within the NIE framework, incomplete information and limited individual 
cognitive capacity by which the available information is processed, will determine the cost of 
transacting. “The costs of measuring the multiple valuable dimensions of the goods and services 
exchanged or of the performance of agents, and the cost of enforcing agreements determine 
transaction costs” (North, 1992). Transaction costs are a driving factor for the formation of 
institutions. 
Ronald Coase (1937, 1960) was the first to establish a direct and clear link between institutions, 
transaction costs, and neo-classical economics. According to the neo-classical theory, efficient 
market equilibrium could be obtained only in a situation where transaction costs are very low. 
When transaction costs arise, institutions become necessary components of the national economy. 
Hence, institutions (and specifically property rights as argued by Coase) are crucial determinants 
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of market efficiency. According to North (1992), NIE fits within neo-classical economics but also 
modifies or extends it. NIE starts from the fundamental assumption that scarcity leads to 
competition; it also views economics as a theory of choices subject to constraints; it employs 
price theory as the main approach for the analysis of institutions; and it considers changes in 
relative prices as a major force inducing institutional change. But, NIE modifies the rationality 
postulate which constitutes the basis of neo-classical economics; it adds institutions as a 
constraint and analyses the role of transaction costs, induced by this constraint, as the connection 
between institutions and production costs. Finally, NIE extends economic theory by 
incorporating ideas and ideologies into the analysis, modeling the political process as a critical 
factor for explaining inefficient markets. 
As the name indicates, institutions are central to all NIE theories. In fact, there is no universal 
definition of institutions in the literature. From a game theory perspective, institutions could be 
defined, for example, as the equilibrium of players’ strategies, or as the rules of the game itself. 
Many other definitions were based on the theory of transaction costs. We hereby seek to provide 
the main existing and more relevant definitions of institution.  
In a very restrictive and simplistic sense, institutions could be defined as an agreement between 
two agents (Ménard, 2003). Most research in the field of law and economics refer to the 
definition provided by North (1991) who considers institutions as the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. According to North, they 
consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Together with the standard 
constraints of neo-classical economic theory, they define the transaction costs of exchange as 
well as the production costs. From a game theory perspective, formal rules are the ones which 
cannot be changed or modified by players during the game, and need to be determined before the 
game starts. They give incitation to players who seek the best way to behave in order to 
maximize their revenue, given the formal rules. New rules will be demanded and will emerge 
when relative prices (payment functions) change. These rules will be negotiated and fixed on the 
“political market”, which is structured according to the political rules in a given country. 
Following this general definition of institutions, water institutions could be defined in this 
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dissertation as “rules that together describe the action situations, delineate the action sets, provide 
incentives and determine outcomes, both in individual and collective decisions relating to water 
development, allocation, use and management” (Saleth & Dinar, 2005). The state of resource 
sustainability is then dependant, amongst other things, on the state and performance of these 
institutions.  
1.2.1.2. Approach to the institutional analysis of water institutions 
The basis of NIE and of this dissertation is the three-layer scheme of institutions described by 
Williamson (1996). The first level of institution in the three-layer scheme operates as the 
institutional environment and is also called “the rules of the game”, the constitutional level, or 
“the governance framework”. The second level works as the institutions of governance and 
constitutes the locus of transactions. The second level is also called “the governance structure”. 
In the third level individuals make decisions as to the allocation of resources and individual or 
collective participation in the other levels. Decisions made by individuals on the third level of the 
three-layer scheme of NIE, are conditioned by their endogenous preferences and behavioural 
attributes and also by the environment in which these endogenous preferences are the product of 
social conditioning. 
In water resource management, it is very important to distinguish between these three layers since 
the institutional environment, which is generally designed by policy makers at the constitutional 
level, has a strong effect on resource access, allocation and use. It provides a set of incentives 
which deeply determine and affect the individual behaviour of irrigators. It is also important to 
study the governance structure for irrigated schemes at the local level where the main policy 
guidelines and individual preferences interact. Finally, it is crucial to consider the individual level 
where the final outcomes of the water management institutions are observed.  
1.2.2. Methods for analyzing the efficiency of water institutions 
In addition to the distinction between the three-layer institutions scheme discussed above, the 
analytical approach in this dissertation is based on three main successive stages: decomposition 
of the water institutions into components, selection of the efficiency criteria and, finally, the 
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application of an efficiency analysis to obtain a comparative institutional analysis.  
Institutions were sometimes treated as single entities but, in reality, they are made up of 
analytically and functionally distinguishable components and elements (Shalet and Dinar, 2004). 
This interaction between institutions makes it difficult to isolate and to evaluate the effect of 
separated institutional components from other interlinked and nested components. The analytical 
approach most used to overcome this problem is to decompose institutions into major 
components. In this dissertation, we adopt the institutional water sector decomposition provided 
by Saleth and Dinar (2004) which distinguishes water law, policies, and administration as the 
main three institutional components of the water sector. 
The concept of efficiency used in this dissertation is that of NIE, which relates efficiency to 
performance (Herrera, 2004). Our approach to the efficiency analysis starts with the identification 
of efficiency criteria against which the assessment is made. These “non-accomplished” criteria 
will allow us to qualify the competence of the particular institution under analysis. In the case of 
irrigation, Ostrom (1992) argues that the key criterion is sustainability. This can in turn open a 
range of criteria (e.g. efficient use of water, financial viability of irrigated systems, etc.) that may 
be considered for assessing the efficiency of specific institutions. In this dissertation, the focus 
will be on specific institutional aspects that are considered as the most important in a demand-
oriented water management strategy. These are the local administration and organization of 
irrigation water management, the price regulation, and the irrigation property rights.  
Concerning the efficiency analysis methodology, most of the studies use “comparative 
institutional analysis” (Coase, 1960) for the comparison of institutional environments and 
institutional arrangements. Comparative institutional analysis makes recommendations for the 
selection of the most efficient institutions and clarifies the required institutional design and 
change. In this dissertation, comparative water institutional analysis is used as the main 
foundation for the empirical validation.  
1.3. Research questions, objectives and hypothesis 
1.3.1. Research questions 
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Considering the importance of the topic, and the urgent need for solutions to manage water more 
efficiently in agriculture, many questions arise regarding the way in which irrigation institutions 
exist, function, shape and influence the performance of irrigation activity:  
• What can really be considered as an irrigation institution? 
• How can the performance of irrigation institutions be assessed? 
• What are the main institutional components and layers of the irrigation water sector?  
• How are these institutional components implemented, structured, and how do the 
interactions between them work?  
• How we can assess the effect of irrigation institutions on individual behaviour and 
performance of the irrigated systems? 
1.3.2. Objectives  
Having delineated the approach and the context of the study, we can now state its general 
objective as follows:  
• To show that an improvement of agricultural water use efficiency is possible if 
institutions for irrigation water demand management would perform better. 
According to this, and given our specific case study, we can state the following specific 
objectives:  
• To give an overview of the different notions of water institutions, their layers, 
components, aspects, and interactions;  
• To provide an overview of the most important frameworks for the efficiency analysis of 
water institutions; 
• To divide water institutions into their main layers and components; 
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• To analyze the implementation, functioning, and interactions between the main 
institutional components of the irrigation water sector; 
• To measure individual water use efficiency, water economic values, and water demand, in 
different contexts, as indicators of comparative institutional performance;  
1.3.3. Hypothesis  
The following is a list of hypotheses that are to be tested in the development of this dissertation:  
• Irrigation institutions such administrations, regulations, prices, and property rights 
institutions exist, matter, influence, and determine the performance of water management 
in agriculture; 
• Performance of these irrigation institutions could be assessed through “institutional 
decomposition” and “comparative institutional analysis” frameworks; 
• An improvement in the design, structure, and functioning of these irrigation water 
institutions can lead to a better valorization and sustainability of water resources; 
• Individual perceptions and outcomes can be used as indicators for the assessment of 
irrigation institutions’ efficiency; 
1.4. Research design and delimitation  
1.4.1. Case study: the Tunisian context 
Tunisia is a southern semi-arid Mediterranean country with limited and variable rainfall. 
Irrigation has been practiced in Tunisia since the Roman era. When new fruit species and 
substantial expertise was brought into the region by Arabs, irrigation was widely applied and led 
to a prosperous period (Ben mechlia, 2004). The development of large irrigation schemes 
increased sharply during the second half of the twentieth century. Since independence of the 
country in 1956, the objective in Tunisia was to develop irrigation infrastructure and to control 
renewable water resources to increase the stability of the water supply. Rapidly, it completed the 
mobilization of its renewable resources and stretched the use of irrigation water to the 
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maximum (Ben mechlia, 2004). In 2030, the overall water demand in the country is expected to 
exceed its supply (Ministère d’Agriculture et des Ressources Hydrauliques (MARH), 1998).  
Since the maximum water supply capacity has almost been reached, the objective of policy 
makers has shifted towards WDM in order to rationalize irrigation water demand and to improve 
the efficiency of water use at farm level. Many institutional and organizational changes have been 
introduced for WDM since the 70’s. Decentralization, through the creation of water users’ 
associations (WUA, also called in Tunisia: Goupement de développement agricoles ‘GDA’), 
pricing policies and encouragement of private participation were amongst the main reforms 
adopted by the government in this new context. With the current growing demand for irrigation 
water due to the extension of irrigated lands, and competition by other sectors for water 
resources, better performance in terms of agricultural water use efficiency and valorization in 
Tunisia are both needed. Despite the fact that the implemented institutions already contributed 
positively to significant results in terms of resource management, many (Chebil et al., 2007; 
Makkaoui, 2006; Ben salem et al., 2005; Chraga and Chemakh, 2003) believe that further 
progress could be achieved by improving their structure and functioning. Our work is then 
situated in this context, were, as stated in the previous section, we aim to show that a large 
potential for improvement of the irrigation water use efficiency exists in Tunisia if institutions for 
irrigation water demand perform better.  
In Tunisia, irrigation is the most highly developed in the governorates of Nabeul (North East of 
Tunisia), Kairouan (Center) and Sidi Bouzid (Central West). However, Kairouan and Sidi Bouzid 
are considered as agricultural-oriented governorates; whereas the tourism and manufacturing 
sectors are widely developed in the governorate of Nabeul, which increases pressure on water 
resources in this region. Also, agriculture in Cap Bon region is very diversified (tree crops, 
horticultural productions, cereals, etc.). For these reasons, we choose this region for the rest of 
our empirical applications. 
1.4.2. Delimitation of the study 
Water use efficiency could be enhanced in all sectors such the domestic, touristic, and industrial 
ones. The current work is only limited to the study of the usage of water in the irrigation sector in 
CHAPTER 1                                                                                                                                General Introduction 
 13 
Tunisia. 
Irrigation management institutions are widely different and include many aspects. In this study, 
although most of these institutional aspects will be described in first introductive chapters, we 
limit our empirical investigations on three main institutional aspects which are: water users’ 
associations functioning and governance, water pricing policies, and water property rights.  
1.4.3. Research methodology  
Specific methodologies were developed and used in each of the empirical chapters where we 
tested specific hypotheses. In each of these chapters, a methodology section describes the models 
used and their adaptation to our empirical validations.   
1.4.4. Data  
Two types of data are used in the research methodology of this thesis:  
• Secondary data concerning 45 WUAs, this constitutes all the WUAs operating in the Cap 
Bon region. This database is collected by and centralized at the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Hydraulic Resources of Tunisia. It contains information about technical, 
administrative, and organizational characteristics and costs of each WUA.  
• Primary data collected from 62 randomly selected farmers belonging to the Fondok Jdid 
and Lebna Barrage neighbouring areas in the Cap Bon region. Each area is managed by 
one WUA. The dataset includes 18.7 % (30 farmers) and 30 % (32 farmers) of the total 
adherent farmers to FJ and LB WUAs. This primary data was collected during the period 
March-May 2007. It is our main dataset and is used in most of the empirical chapters of 
this thesis. 
• Primary data collected from 47 farmers who own 16.2 % (97.6 ha) of the total irrigated 
land area and hold 13.8 % (276 greenhouses) of the greenhouses located in the region of 
Teboulba (2060) (Central East). This data was collected in October 2005, and is used in 
this study only for the calculation of water use efficiency. The reason of its use is to 
provide a more diverse overview of irrigation water use efficiency in different Tunisian 
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regions. 
1.5. Dissertation outline 
The dissertation consists of nine chapters, organized into three parts. The first part contains the 
second chapter outlining the conceptual and analytical approach used. In this chapter, the 
literature regarding institutional decomposition and performance analysis is discussed. We adopt 
the decomposition of water institutions into water law, policies, and administrations. We use this 
decomposition for the rest of the empirical applications by focusing on specific aspects from each 
of the latter components.  
The second part of the dissertation describes the governance framework and structure for the 
irrigation water sector in Tunisia. It is divided into three chapters: chapter 3, 4 and 5.  
Chapter 3 and 4 provides an overview of the water institutional environment in Tunisia from a 
formal and a macro perspective. In chapter 3, the availability of physical water resources, water 
uses and demands and the importance of the agricultural and irrigation activities in Tunisia are 
provided. In chapter 4, water laws, policies, and administrations supporting the irrigation sector 
in Tunisia are presented.  
Chapter 5 describes the study of the governance structure and more precisely the water users’ 
associations. The description is supported by a quantitative analysis of local WUA efficiency. In 
this investigation, overall, management, and engineering efficiencies of a set of 45 WUAs 
belonging to a homogenous agricultural region are calculated and interpreted. Determinants of 
these WUA efficiencies are also discussed.  
The third part of the dissertation is concerned with the implications of WUA efficiency on 
individual performance. Effects of WUA administration and organization, pricing policies and 
transfer of the “individual usage right” on farmers’ irrigation water use efficiency, irrigation 
water demand, and economic valuation of the resource will be respectively undertaken in three 
chapters.     
Two WUAs from this latter set identified in chapter 5 are selected. These are supposed to have 
the same physical and institutional governance framework, but differ in terms of their 
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governance structure - which is assumed in this thesis to be implicitly qualified by the 
performance of the WUA -. In fact, one of the selected WUAs is efficient with respect to 
technical management whilst it is very weak in terms of its management efficiency. The second 
WUA has opposite performances. These efficiency qualifications are estimated from WUA 
relative efficiency scores calculated in chapter 5. A set of randomly selected farmers was 
surveyed from each WUA.  
Chapter 6 of the dissertation discusses whether there is any relationship between the governance 
structure in each WUA, and the farmers’ water use efficiency calculated at the farm level.  
In chapter 7, pricing policy formulation and its effect on farmer’s input demand functions will be 
examined. The current pricing policy in Tunisia - based on increasing volumetric prices, whilst 
encouraging and subsidizing the adoption of water saving technologies in order to enhance the 
capacity of farmers to pay higher prices - will be discussed.  
Finally, chapter 8 investigates the efficiency of individual irrigation property rights. The effect of 
the quantification of individual “water access rights” and “water delivery rights” on farmers’ 
economic valuation of water resources in the study area, will be assessed. Chapter 9 concludes 
the dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: Analytical framework: Water Institutional 
Decomposition and Analysis (IDA) 
 
Abstract 
This chapter provides a discussion of the analytical tools that will be used for the decomposition 
and efficiency assessment of irrigation water institutions2 in Tunisia. A first analytical step in the 
institutional evaluation process is decomposition. Institutions have to be decomposed into their 
components, which can be studied separately, and between which links can be established. The 
second step concerns the investigation and analysis of the institution-efficiency relationship. In 
this analytical step, first, institutional performance criteria have to be selected. Then, appropriate 
methodologies are required that are able to use these performance criteria in an integrated 
evaluation process. In the dissertation, an analytical framework was developed based on the 
“Institutional Analysis and Decomposition” framework of Saleth and Dinar (1999, 2001, and 
2004). Water institutions are decomposed into three main components (water law, water policies, 
and water administration). Then, three institutional aspects (one for each component) were 
selected; these are: irrigation water property rights for the water law component, pricing policy 
and cost recovery strategy for the policy component, and functional, regulatory and 
accountability capacities of the local water organizations for the administration component. Also, 
in line with Williamson (1996), three institutional levels were considered in the framework: 
macro level, governance level, and individual level. The efficiency of the considered institutional 
aspects will be assessed at each of these levels. Special attention was given to the analysis of the 
individual level since we assume that the final institutional-performance outcome is “produced” 
at this level. 
 
                                                 
2
 In the remaining text, “irrigation water institutions” refers to the specific irrigation water demand management 
institutions. These will be identified and described further in this chapter.  
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2.1. Introduction 
The mobility of water, high measurement costs, distributional disputes, and public good claims, 
make it difficult to manage and structure usage (Libecap, 2005). Thus, water institutions are 
difficult to design and differ widely between countries and regions. This complexity and diversity 
of institutions within the water sector raises many questions that unfortunately, are not always 
resolved. For instance, institutional analysis and performance assessment remain the most critical 
issues for research.  Existing literature on the subject (both theoretical and empirical) provides 
little guidance to capture the various layers of institutional inter-linkages and institution-
performance linkages (Saleth & Dinar, 2005). According to the latter authors, the focus is either 
too narrow to consider water institutions as a whole, or too descriptive or anecdotal to provide 
any quantitative evaluation.  
Measuring institutional performance is related to the quantification of behaviour, rules, norms, 
and so on, and the analysis of their effects on individual and socially desired outcomes. Thus, the 
first question to arise here is: how rules or norms of behaviour perform? In fact, institutions do 
not directly make up for the efficiency of water resource management, but their presence and 
attributes influence its performance by drawing a general pattern of individual behaviour and 
collective choice. Therefore, the performance of institutions can be evaluated in an indirect way 
by analyzing their impact on the state of the resource, on the efficiency of the resource use and on 
individual/collective well being. However, institutions operate as a system characterized by 
intricate and multiple layers of relationships. Analyzing institutions as individual entities will 
provide biased information concerning their performance.  In reality, institutions are made up of 
analytically and functionally distinguishable components and elements (Shalet and Dinar, 2004). 
As a result, it is necessary to isolate and to evaluate the effect of individual institutional 
components from those of other interlinked and nested components. This remains, however, a 
difficult task. 
A next critical step in the evaluation process is the identification of appropriate performance 
criteria and methodology. Performance criteria could be considered as socially and individually 
desired objectives according to which the institutional efficiency assessment is done. A 
comparative institutional methodology is mostly used in the institutional economics literature. In 
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fact, the identification of characteristics of successful institutional settings through comparative 
institutional analysis is very relevant for institutional-performance analysis. However, this 
approach can also be questioned, since a successful institutional setting in a specific context can 
fail in another context. Therefore, the institutional comparative analysis is a risky exercise that 
has to be undertaken very carefully.  
This chapter’s purpose is to provide an adapted analytical framework which can be a foundation 
for the evaluation methodology of irrigation demand management institutions in Tunisia. It is 
divided into two main parts. In the first part a literature review is presented regarding institutional 
decomposition and performance assessment. In the second, we discuss the analytical framework 
designed for efficiency analysis of some selected-irrigation institutional aspects in Tunisia.  
2.2. Literature overview: water institutions decomposition and performance 
assessment 
2.2.1. Water institutions 
Following the general definition of institutions (Bromley, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990), 
water institutions can be defined as “rules that together describe action situations, delineate action 
sets, provide incentives and determine outcomes both in individual and collective decisions 
relating to water development, allocation, use and management” (Saleth & Dinar, 2005). 
According to our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive definition of “water institutions” 
found in the literature. Most of the studies concerning irrigation institutions generally relate to a 
unique specific institutional aspect, such as irrigation property rights, water organizations, 
decentralization, private participation, prices, etc. Such research does not consider the complexity 
of the institutional scheme and the various linkages existing between the different institutional 
components.  
Rules, mentioned in Saleth and Dinar’s (2005) definition, can be both formal and macro as well 
as informal and micro. They constitute a structurally linked configuration (institutional structure) 
embedded within a given social, economic, and cultural context (institutional environment) 
(Saleth, 2005). Water institutions are considered as part of a larger institutional system covering 
other resources and sector-specific institutions. They have intricate functional linkages with 
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land, agricultural, and environmental institutions and they could also be involved with other 
economic, political, and social institutions. 
The interface between institutional structure and institutional environment (what Wallis and 
North, (1986) called “transaction sector”) is a valuable indicator for the formalization level of the 
water sector (Shah, 2005). This level of formalization mainly depends on the degree of 
integration of the water sector in the economy. Informal water economies, for instance, are 
marked by heavy dependence of water users on self-provision (wells, streams, etc.) and informal 
community-based rules. In contrast, self-provision disappears as a mode of securing water 
provision in developed countries, and institutional structure (arrangements) emerges as a solid 
interface between users and the institutional environment (Shah, 2005). Diversity of institutional 
arrangements and level-interdependences show the importance and the complexity of the water 
institution performance analysis.  
2.2.2. Institutions performance assessment: some examples from the literature 
Since institutions are entities that emerge, evolve, and cooperate in the intersection of economic, 
legal, organizational, political, social, and physical spheres, no single model or theory can suffice 
for their evaluation (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). What is needed is a framework for organizing 
various theories, to gain both diagnostic and perspective insights into the subject of inquiry 
(Ostrom et al., 1994). This framework also has to be multidisciplinary in order to be able to 
integrate various theories. 
Eggertsson (1996) suggests decomposing the institutional economics analysis into two main 
analytical levels: (i) linkages between institutions and economic performance, and (ii) influence 
of the institutional environment on the governance structure and contractual arrangement. 
Eggertsson proposes that the first analytical level needs to focus on the effect of institutions on 
economic performance whilst considering both the institutional environment and institutional 
arrangements as exogenous. He focuses on industrial organizations and relies on a transaction 
cost perspective. On the second level, the effect of the institutional environment remains 
exogenous whilst the effect of the governance structure becomes endogenous. Ostrom (1990) 
generalizes the relationship between institutions and performance to a non-monetary framework 
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and incorporates some non-economic factors in the analysis (culture, ideology, etc.).  
Empirical works, which attempt to evaluate institutions and their performance, generally use one 
or more of the following methods: case studies, comparative method examining several cases 
together, and econometric analysis of cross sectional data (Alesina 1994; Alson, 1996).  
Remmer (1998) combines temporal and cross sectional data in order to analyze both general and 
specific aspects of the institutions-performance interaction and its effect on international trade 
cooperation for a given country. In his logistic regression, he considers democracy as a 
dichotomous variable. He evaluates the relationship between democracy and international 
cooperation in the Mercosur region between 1949 and 1985. Also, Adelman and Morris (1967) 
and Morris and Adelman (1988) show that capital and technology are major, but not the only, 
determinants of economic growth. They found that institutions are also relevant determinants and 
are linked to observed performance. Adelman and Lohmoller (1994) combine cross sectional and 
temporal data in order to simulate the impact of political structures and economic institutions on 
economic growth. They evaluate the effect of institutions on performance using a latent variable 
regression model where many latent or unobservable institutional variables are captured by their 
relationship with other observable variables.  
A major constraint for conducting a consistent evaluation of institutional performance relates, 
however, to the quality of data needed. In fact, in such quantitative empirical evaluations we 
always need to incorporate institutional features into regression models. However, these last 
characteristics are mainly subjective and require a high level of expertise for them to be 
developed (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). Combinations of subjective information with objective data 
are often found in the literature of institutional economic analysis. For instance, Knack and 
Keefer (1986), in their cross country study concerning institutions and economic performance, 
combine observable quantitative variables such as investment, gross domestic product, prices, 
etc. with a set of institutional variables that were subjectively evaluated, such as bureaucracy, 
level of corruption, quality of infrastructure, etc. Each of these variables was evaluated on a 
particular scale. Also, Clague (1997) evaluates how measures of property rights and contract 
enforcement explain differences in income, growth rate, and investment. Isham and Kahkonen 
(1999) evaluate how institutional aspects such as rules and practices, social capital, government 
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and non-government organizations affect the performance and the final outcome of rural water 
supply projects. The social capital index developed in their study was subjectively developed 
through the use of specific proxies. Cukierman et al., (1998) not only combined temporal and 
cross-sectional analysis but also sought to obtain institutional information from a cross-section of 
policy experts through banks’ custom-made questionnaire. Their aim was to obtain some 
perception-based institutional information to evaluate the relationship between the degree of 
central banks’ independence and the level of inflation.  
Other works evaluate institutional performance essentially from a descriptive analytical 
perspective. Ostrom’s approach is a good representative example of this kind of study. Based on 
a critical review of several formal and informal irrigation water institutions around the world, 
Ostrom (1990) identifies some key factors underlying their success or failure. She assesses their 
performance in terms of eight design principles relating to the nature of rules, monitoring, 
sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms, and institutional nestedness (Ostrom 1990). This 
framework provides some valuable insights for institutional decomposition into components and 
aspects.   
Concerning the water sector, institutional performance was theoretically and empirically studied 
by many researchers (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1972, Dinar and Latey 1991; Frederiksen 1992; Le 
Moigne, et al., 1992, 1994; Gazmuri and Rosegrant 1994; Hearne and Easter 1997, Herrera et al., 
2004, etc.). Ostrom and Ostrom (1972) studied the way in which water institutions (law and 
related-organizations) evolved when water realities in the California region changed. They 
investigated the way in which macro water institutions are crafted within the regional economic 
and physical environment. They also explored the role of private incentives on collective action 
provision. In line with the previous study, Yang (1997) described the interactions and the co-
evolution of water institutions with the resource system and economic and social interests of the 
population in the United States. Wade (1982) compared the performance of water control 
institutions between two countries using yield and employment as performance indicators. He 
used a descriptive approach and found that better performance can be explained by better water 
supply, small, decentralized, and demand-controlled systems, and good management structures. 
Dinar and Latey (1991) evaluated how water markets can improve irrigation water use efficiency 
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and reduce negative economic and environmental impacts in California. Herrera et al., (2004) use 
a Contingent Valuation method in order to assess the gap between current irrigation water value 
in Ecuador and its value when some institutional aspects of the farmers’ irrigation property rights 
change. His work reveals the usefulness of contingent valuation methods in the study of 
institutional performance. As we can see in the literature, most of the research is focused on the 
performance assessment of a specific institutional aspect; it is very rare to find an overall and 
integrated framework. To be able to provide such a framework, an appropriate institutional 
decomposition is needed.  
2.2.3. Institutional decomposition  
Institutions operate as a system characterized by intricate and multiple layers of relationships. In 
fact, institutions were sometimes treated as single entities but, in reality, they are made up of 
analytically and functionally distinguishable components and elements (Shalet and Dinar, 2004). 
As a result, it is difficult to isolate and evaluate the effect of individual institutional components 
from those of other interlinked and nested components. The analytical approach most used to 
solve this problem is to decompose institutions into their major components. The decomposition 
of institutions was identified by North (1997) as a very important issue in the New Institutional 
Economics studies. By doing so, one will be able to study the efficiency of each component and 
to establish the linkages between them. The decomposition method also allows a distinction to be 
made between endogenous and exogenous features of institutions. This rationale was followed in 
many institutional research frameworks - amongst them the Institutional Analysis and 
Decomposition (IAD) framework provided by Shalet and Dinar (1999, 2001, 2004).  
Decomposition attempts were often used in empirical studies of institutional economics. In the 
literature, much decomposition into varying levels of abstraction and/or into details of various 
components and subcomponents can be found. For instance, Adelman and Head (1983) 
decompose institutions into three categories: social mores and norms, law and regulations, and 
contractual arrangements. Clague (1997) also identifies three categories of institution: 
constitutional order, institutional arrangement, and cultural endowments. Coriat and Dosi (1998) 
distinguish three components of institutions: formal organizations (firms, state, economic and 
social organizations, etc.), shared patterns of behaviour (ethical codes, social behaviour, etc.), and 
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norms and constraints (moral prescriptions and formal laws). Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al. 
(1994) decompose institutions in terms of seven sets of rules: position rules, boundary rules, 
scope rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, information rules, and pay-off rules. They group 
these rules into three main sets: constitutional choice rules, collective choice rules, and 
operational rules.  
Also, Bromley (1989), North (1990) and Williamson (1994) distinguish, in a broader and 
systematic sense, between the institutional environment (or framework) and the institutional (or 
governance) structure. Williamson (1985) provides some advances in NIE, based on the 
interaction (transaction costs and organization) between these levels, stressing the importance of 
the decomposition exercise. The institutional environment and structure can also be divided into 
components and subcomponents as undertaken in other attempts at decomposition. Formal and 
informal rules, in addition to enforcement mechanisms could be the main components of the 
institutional environment (North, 1990). Social and economic organizations are, similarly, the 
main components of the institutional arrangements. Williamson (1985) separates organizations 
from the rules configuration in order to show the dynamics of these organizations and how they 
evolve according to these rules, i.e. how organizations interact and change the rules 
(environment) in which they are operating. 
Despite the growth and diversity of institutional economics analysis, a comprehensive taxonomy 
of institutions and a framework providing a clear distinction between institutional structures is 
still lacking in the literature (Johnson and Nielsen, 1998). Some attempts at decomposition of 
natural resource institutions exist (Oakerson, 1986, 1992: Model for the analysis of common 
property problems; Ostrom, 1994: Institutional Analysis and Development framework; Saleth 
and Dinar, 1999: Institutional Decomposition and Analysis framework; Hagedorn et al., 2002: 
Institutions of Sustainability framework) but there is hardly any framework, other than the one 
provided by Saleth and Dinar (1999, 2001, 2004), which provides a deep decomposition and a 
detailed description of the overall interaction process between institutional components and 
institution-performance in a broader and integrated manner for the water sector. General 
descriptions of the four above mentioned models (Oakerson, Ostrom, Hagedorn, and Saleth and 
Dinar) are provided as follows:  
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• Oakerson’s model 
Oakerson (1986; 1992) proposes a dynamic model of common property relationships, that can be 
used to decompose and compare problems and solutions across various common property 
situations. Oakerson’s model distinguishes between four inter-related components in a common-
pool resource system: (1) the technical and physical attributes of the resource; (2) the decision 
making arrangements and rules governing relationships between resource users; (3) patterns of 
interaction between users; and (4) outcomes or consequences (Fig.2.1). Oakerson decomposes 
each of these four components into various aspects (see Oakerson, 1986 for more details). 
Institutional arrangements, for instance, are those that “determine who decides what in relation to 
whom” (Oakerson, 1986) and could be decomposed into three categories: (1) rules and 
institutional arrangements which establish the ability of a group to act collectively and to make 
decisions together; (2) a further set of rules, called “operational rules”, that regulate the way 
common resources are actually used; and (3) external arrangements which affect decision 
making. These could be constitutional and legally enabling in character or involve bureaucratic 
decision making in respect of operational rules. Oakerson states that outcomes could be evaluated 
by using the efficiency and equity of the resource use and allocation as performance criteria.   
 
Fig 2. 1. Oakerson’s model for the analysis of common property management 
• Ostrom’s model 
For Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al. (1994), the policy process and outcome are assumed to be 
affected, to some degree, by four types of component. These are: (1) attributes of the physical 
world, (2) attributes of the community within which actors are embedded, (3) rules that create 
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incentives and constraints for certain actions, and (4) interactions with other individuals (Fig.2.2).  
The action arena is considered to be the unit of analysis and focus for investigation. An action 
situation is the “social space where individuals interact, exchange goods and services, engage in 
appropriation and provision activities, solve problems or fight” (Ostrom et al., 1994). It includes 
the following elements: (1) participants in position who must choose between diverse (2) actions 
given the (3) information they possess about (4) how actions are linked to the (5) potential 
outcomes and (6) the costs and benefits assigned to each action (Ostrom et al., 1994).  
The physical world varies from one situation to another and is affected by physical parameters 
and human interactions. The community also forms an important context that affects individual 
actions, including “the generally accepted norms of behaviour, the level of common 
understanding about action arenas, the extent to which preferences are homogenous, and the 
distribution of resources between members” (Ostrom et al., 1994).  
Rules are statements defining what actions are required, prohibited, or permitted and the 
sanctions authorized if the rules are not followed. They can be changed in the hope that new 
outcomes emerge. Ostrom (1990, 1994) decomposes the rules into three different categories: (1) 
constitutional choice rules, (2) collective-choice rules, and (3) operational rules. Thus, Ostrom’s 
IAD framework can be considered as multi-dimensional, describing three levels of actions: 
constitutional, collective and operational. At the constitutional level, the decision makers 
determine how collective choice participants will be selected and what type of relationships they 
should have. At the collective choice level, decision makers create rules framing the operational 
level activities. The operational level relates to the day-to-day activities that affect the managed 
system for the resource. For each level, one type of rule is used and enforced.  
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Fig 2. 2. The IAD framework 
• Hagedorn’s model 
Hagedorn assumes that the physical world (and the related physical properties of a transaction) is 
as important for institutional analysis as the social world (and the related physical characteristics 
of actors) and that both may substantially affect institutional change and institutional 
performances (Hagedorn, 2008). Accordingly, Hagedorn proposes an analytical framework called 
“Institutions of sustainability” (IoS) for the study of nature-related transactions (Hagedorn et al., 
2002; Hagedorn, 2003; 2005, 2008) in which he provides the main analytical elements that need 
to be taken into account to arrive at an understanding of institutions (Figure 2.3). 
  
Fig 2. 3. The Institutions of Sustainability framework 
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This framework is built on a pool of knowledge as to which institutional configurations perform 
better in terms of sustainability. It focuses on how to regularize human action that leads to 
transactions affecting the relationship between natural and social system (Gatzweiler and 
Hagedorn, 2003). The approach decomposes institutions to “sets of interrelated formal and 
informal rules, property rights and duties”. In line with Ostrom (1994), Hagedorn also 
distinguishes between constitutional, collective-choice, and operational rules. Institutions govern 
given aspects of society that are acknowledged (or sanctioned) by all or some members of 
society. He assumes that institutions and governance structures that make them effective emerge 
either spontaneously through self-organization or intentionally by human design (Hagedorn, 
2008). How these institutions and governance structures are socially constructed depends on the 
properties of the transactions and the characteristics of the actors involved in such transactions 
(Hagedorn, 2008). Such processes take place in action arena where actors are confronted in an 
action situation. Action arenas differ by field, scale and situation. The most important action 
situations are: actors’ constellations and orientations, forms of interaction, actors’ interests, 
mental models and identity. Institutions and action arenas determine a set of transactions with 
different properties. Hagedorn considers that these transactions can be simple, complex, visible, 
or hidden. 
Furthermore, the IoS framework considers that institution building should be described as 
evolution and co-evolution, a process which is dynamic, complex and a result of co-adaptation 
(Gatzweiler and Hagedorn, 2002). Institutional performance assessment and innovation are key 
elements in the dynamic and co-evolutionary nature of institutions.  
• Saleth and Dinar’s Institutional Decomposition and Analysis (IDA) framework 
Based on Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, Saleth and Dinar 
(1999, 2001, 2004) developed the “Institutional Decomposition and Analysis” framework, which 
they applied to the water sector in order to assess the institutional structure and the institution-
performance relationships from a wider and more integrated perspective. When we take a deeper 
look at the three hierarchically related categories of rules provided in the IAD, we can see that 
Saleth and Dinar decompose institutions into three main components and approximate the 
constitutional choice rules to “laws”, the collective choice rules to “policies”, and the operational 
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rules to “administration”. These are considered as main components of water institutions.  
Thus, Saleth and Dinar (2004, 2005) define institutions as “entities defined by a configuration of 
legal, policy, and organizational rules, conventions, and practices that are structurally linked and 
operationally embedded within a well-specified environment”. From this definition, they argue 
that decomposition of institutions is an essential step in their analysis. In line with Williamson 
(1975), they draw a distinction between the institutional environment for water (governance 
framework) and its institutional structure (governance structure). They also consider that since 
the institutional structure is embedded within the institutional environment, the evolution of the 
former is invariably conditioned by changes in the latter. Changes in the institutional structure 
also influence the governance framework (Williamson, 1996).  
- Institutional structure for the water sector 
Water institutional structure, as presented by Saleth and Dinar, is defined interactively by three 
institutional components, i.e. water law, water policy, and water administration (or water-related 
organizations) (Fig.2.4). These institutional components cover not only the formal and macro-
level arrangements, but also the informal and micro level arrangements such as those reflected in 
local customs, conventions, and informal contracts (Saleth, 2004). Also, as shown in Fig 2.4, the 
IDA highlights some key aspects under each of these three components. In this framework, 
Saleth and Dinar argue that there are two types of linkage that have to be captured in an empirical 
study of water institutions: (1) linkages between institutional components, and (2) linkages 
between institution-performance.  
Water law receives a central place in the functioning of water institutions since it provides the 
legal backing to water policy as well as the operational framework and enforcing power for water 
administration, including its regulatory arrangements (Saleth, 2004). In the water law component, 
the main institutional aspects accorded importance are: inter-governmental responsibility, water 
rights, conflict resolution, etc. For instance, the issue of water rights as a mechanism for 
allocation and accountability, gains importance in situations of water scarcity and conflict, both at 
the macro regional or sector level and at the micro level of communities and individual users. 
This aspect is interrelated with some administrative aspects, such as the structure of water 
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administration and the regulation/accountability modes that have to be used according to the type 
of rights in existence.  
3
 
Fig 2. 4. Simplified representation of the water institutional structure (Saleth & Dinar, 1999) 
Water policies relate to the government’s approach to water resource planning, development, 
allocation, and management. They do not only describe the overall policy framework but also 
some specific aspects such as project selection, cost recovery and pricing policies, users and 
private participation, etc (Fig.2.4). Finally, water administration covers the organizational, 
financial and managerial structures, including the regulatory apparatus and conflict resolution 
mechanisms, which are directly connected to the water sector (Saleth, 2004).   
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In this decomposition framework, Saleth and Dinar insist on two main points. Firstly, the overall 
performance of water institutions depends not only on the individual institutional aspects but also 
on the manner in which these are structurally and functionally inter-related. Some of these 
linkages are direct and immediate, whilst others are indirect and remote (Saleth and Dinar, 2005). 
Secondly, an assessment of these linkages, and the institutional channels through which their 
impact is transmitted, is a very important task for any reform and implementation process in the 
water sector.  
- Water institutional environment 
Institutional linkages and their performance implications are also subject to some exogenous and 
contextual influences. Water institutions exist in an environment characterized by the interactive 
role of many factors outside the strict boundaries of water institutions and the water sector (Fig 
2.5). Saleth and Dinar consider the institutional environment as characterized by the overall 
physical, cultural, historic, socio-economic, and political milieu of a country or region. In Fig.2.5, 
two analytical segments could be distinguished; the first captures the interaction between the 
water institutions and water sector performance and the second captures the general environment 
within which such interactions occur (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). Some of the exogenous 
environmental factors have a direct impact on water sector performance, whilst others affect it by 
determining the features and functioning of water institutions.  
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Fig 2. 5. Partial representation of the water institutional environment (Saleth & Dinar, 2004) 
- Water institution performance 
In order to evaluate the performance of the different institutional components, Saleth and Dinar 
developed a set of indicators dependent on the potential for expressing the institutional aspects, 
included in each component, in numerical terms. “Each of institutional and performance aspects 
is captured by one or more variables depending upon the desired level of detail… In this respect, 
three kinds of variables are used. They are: dummy variables taking a value of 0 or 1, scale 
variables taking a value between 0 and 10, and categorical variables taking an integer value in the 
range of -1 to N4. While the dummy variable indicates the presence or absence of an institutional 
aspect, the categorical variable captures the nature of an institutional aspect. Unlike these two 
variables that relate mostly to institutional aspects, the scale variable captures the judgmental 
perception on both institutional effectiveness as well as water sector performance” (Saleth and 
Dinar, 2004).    
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For instance, in one of their empirical applications, Saleth and Dinar (2004) selected the 
following institutional aspects under water law component: legal treatment of surface and 
subsurface sources (dummy variable), format of surface water rights (categorical variable taking 
a value within 0-6), effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms (scale variable), 
effectiveness of accountability provision (scale variable), and so on. Specifically, categorical 
variable related to surface water right takes 0 for no right, 1 for unclear/unauthorized/scattered 
rights, 2 for common/state property, 3 for riparian system, 4 for appropriative system, 5 for 
correlative (proportional sharing) system, and 6 for licenses/permits. Moreover, the conflict 
resolution mechanisms include bureaucratic systems, national water council and the like, 
tribunals, water court system, judicial/legislative mechanisms, river boards, basin level 
organization and the like, water user associations and the like, etc. Given the existence/or not of 
these mechanisms in a given country (region), specific score for the correspondent score-variable 
will be attributed.  
“Water cost recovery status” is one among variables reflecting specific institutional aspect 
belonging to the water policy component. It is considered by the authors as categorical variable 
taking a value within 0-3. Specifically, it takes 0 for non-response, 1 for full subsidy, 2 for partial 
recovery, and 3 for full-cost recovery. Finally, a set of “water administration variables” can also 
be considered. It includes some variables reflecting administrative institutional aspects such: 
spatial organization of water administration (categorical variable), effectiveness of accountability 
arrangements (scale variable), and so on (for more details see Saleth and Dinar, 2004).  
Using this decomposition in addition to the sets of variables described above, comparative 
assessment of water institutional performance between regions and countries in terms of their 
final outcome became a real possibility. As it is clear, this framework was applied by Saleth and 
Dinar (2004) at a macro level. Thus, only the decomposition standards provided by the IDA 
framework will be adopted in our dissertation where most of the empirical validations are done at 
an individual level.  
2.3. Analytical framework for the study of irrigation institutions in Tunisia  
Our theoretical position concerning the analytical decomposition of water institutions will be 
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largely based on a simplification of the IDA framework provided by Saleth and Dinar (1999, 
2001, 2004). This framework is itself based on the institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework furnished by Ostrom and her co-workers (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994) which, 
as indicated above, characterizes institutions in terms of three hierarchically related categories of 
rules. Using the IDA framework, a partial institutional analysis framework, was designed for the 
study of irrigation water demand management institutions in Tunisia, with a focus on the micro 
level (Fig.2.6). The simplifications and adaptations made to the IDA framework are discussed 
below.  
2.3.1. Adaptations to the IDA framework  
Starting from the IDA, and given the complexity and the amount of information needed for the 
study of all institutional subcomponents (aspects) and their inter-linkages, we decided to select 
three main institutional aspects (one from each component), limiting our empirical analysis to the 
selected aspects. These are: (1) irrigation property rights, (2) pricing policies and cost recovery 
strategy, and (3) functional, regulatory and accountability capacities of the local water 
organizations. 
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Fig 2. 6. Partial decomposition of water institutions considered in the thesis 
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and bring into line the activities of persons involved in a common outcome. Similarly, we assume 
that this second level of analysis corresponds to the water users’ associations that are supposed to 
apply “the rules of the game” at a local level. However, (1) these associations could have their 
own specific objectives (e.g. reaching a targeted cost recovery rate, providing a positive financial 
account at the end of the year, etc.) that may be different from the specific objectives of the 
government or the farmers. Thus, their performance could be evaluated separately according to 
their own targets. On the other hand, (2) performance at this institutional level also has a direct 
effect on farmers’ perceptions, which could be translated into decision making and affect the final 
outcome for the irrigated systems. Both effects will be considered in our analysis.  
The individual level is the level upon which most of our empirical applications are based. It is of 
interest to observe the impact of the selected institutional aspects on individual choices and 
behaviour. Some individual-based perception proxies were used in order to better enlighten the 
direct and indirect impact of institutions on individuals. We also sought to integrate this 
perceptional information within our quantitative models. At this empirical level, we incorporated 
the combined effect of the two remaining aspects (from the three aspects previously selected) 
when studying the effect of a given institutional aspect. The evaluation of institutional 
performance at this level is based on individual outcomes such as productivity, efficiency in 
terms of resource use, willingness to provide collective action, etc. One can argue that it is 
difficult to establish a direct link between institutions as a whole and individual outcomes. 
However, we believe that perceptional information could be very useful in this respect. Using 
various quantitative and statistical methods, this latter type of information could help in the 
identification of significant relationships between specific institutional aspects and individual 
outcomes. Specific institutional aspects and performance indicators for our empirical applications 
will be described in more detail in each corresponding chapter.  
2.3.2. Institutional efficiency 
After decomposing the irrigation water institutions, our second purpose will be to evaluate their 
efficiency. The concept of efficiency, used in this dissertation, is that of NIE, which relates 
efficiency to performance (Herrera, 2004). As indicated in previous sections, our analytical 
question is to understand how different institutions involved in the functioning of irrigation 
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systems would affect farmers’ decision making and the observed outcomes of these systems. 
Given the fact that we are in a situation of conflicting interests between actors (government, 
water agencies, and farmers), each institutional efficiency evaluation in this dissertation will be 
done to a unique and well-specified target. In other words, the efficiency of the institutional 
aspects will be evaluated for each actor according to his own objectives.     
Institutions and resource protection may be evaluated and compared in different contexts that 
take account of institutional performance and relationships (Wells 1998). Analyzing institutional 
performance can help policymakers evaluate alternative arrangements for natural resource 
protection and facilitate community participation in natural resource management (Agrawal and 
Gibson 1999). By the same token, we consider that local payments for the provision of water and 
water services are examples of institutional arrangements that may help to achieve water resource 
protection in Tunisia. The task is then how to evaluate the available institutional arrangements 
that are, or could be, applied in order to enhance provision and levels of protection.   
Schmid (2004) proposes the use of institutional impact analysis that allows for an analytical 
assessment of institutional performance. It provides a framework for predicting and comparing 
alternative institutions in terms of substantive performance measures (e.g., economic outcomes 
and distribution). Performance, in this context, is a relative measure associated with a given set of 
social goals (efficiency, equity, etc.). Predicted performance may be based on notions of social 
goals (benefits) based upon theory, data collected from interested parties, or lessons learned from 
cases with similar situations and structures. Evaluating presumed or actual performance allows 
for the articulation of conclusions and/or insights concerning the likelihood of alternative 
structures achieving targeted social goals (Kaplowitz, 2008). 
Schmid (2004) proposes two levels of institutional impact analysis. The first level attempts to 
explain how alternative formal and informal everyday institutions affect commodity transactions 
and substantive economic outcomes of wealth and their distribution. The second level, on the 
other hand, attempts to explain how alternative internal structures of economic organizations and 
contractual arrangements affect performance. 
Similarly to Schmidt (2004), the “rules of the game”, which are abstracted in our work by the 
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various institutional components and aspects presented in the previous section, will be assessed at 
two main levels. In the first one we try to see how these alternative aspects and their qualification 
individually affect farmers’ decision making, perceptions, and outcomes. In the second level, we 
focus on the combined interactive effect of these aspects. For the first level, we will need to 
specify for each evaluation process (1) the performance criteria according to which the efficiency 
assessment has to be done, in addition to (2) the evaluation method. 
2.3.2.1. Performance criteria  
Our approach to the efficiency analysis starts with the identification of the efficiency criteria to 
be used in making the assessment. These “non-accomplished” criteria allow us to qualify the 
competence of the particular institutional aspect under analysis. In the case of irrigation, Ostrom 
(1992) argues that the key criterion is sustainability. This can in turn open a range of criteria (e.g. 
efficient use of water, financial viability of irrigated systems, etc.) that may be considered for 
assessing the efficiency of each specific institutional aspect.  
Given the fact that our quantitative applications are mostly done at the individual level, then, for 
the most part, socially and economically desirable outcomes generated by the individual 
irrigation activities will be considered as assessment criteria. These chiefly relate to the efficiency 
of irrigation water resource use at farm level, farmers’ agricultural productivity, financial 
viability of the irrigated farms, farmers’ willingness to pay and/or to participate, etc. 
2.3.2.2. Evaluation method: comparative efficiency assessment 
To perform the comparative efficiency of water institutions assessment, we typically identify and 
use an indirect evaluation approach. In each application of this approach we rely on one (or more) 
out of the three following gaps: (i) gap between actual options and other hypothetical ones (that 
have to be realistic and already applied in other contexts: regions or countries. e.g. comparison 
between current property right system and a hypothetical one already applied in other contexts). 
It is however clear that contrasting the performance of an institutional setting currently in place 
with another desired structure, says nothing about how to put the alternative in place, (ii) gap 
between the best and the worst performing: comparing the same existing institutional structures, 
but applied in different contexts to each other (e.g. comparison between performances of 
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different WUA, comparison between effect of different governance structures on irrigation 
performances). Here, the effect of some environmental factors on the functioning of water 
institutions could be identified, and (iii) gap between actual and future options: comparing actual 
institutional options to other future options that are already planned for implementation as part of 
government strategy (e.g. comparison between current pricing regulation and other planned 
future options).   
2.4. Conclusion 
The basic idea in this chapter is to show how one can develop an analytical framework that allow 
assessing the performance of particular institution. In fact, institutions operate as a system 
characterized by intricate and multiple layers of relationships which makes difficult their 
analysis. The analytical approach most used to solve this problem is to decompose institutions in 
major components. Accordingly, the decomposition of water institutions into water laws, water 
policies, and water administrations components is considered in this dissertation. Each of these 
components can be decomposed further into interrelated institutional aspects. In this dissertation, 
only performances analysis of three particular institutional aspects (one from each component) 
are undertaken.  
In the institutional analysis process, it is as well crucial to distinguish between different layers of 
institutions. In fact, not only the institutional level targeted by the analysis has to be determined 
but the effects of the other levels should be also considered and taken into account. In our case, 
we mainly focus our analysis on the individual level but we also consider the effect of 
governance framework as well as governance structure on individuals.  
Finally, it is important for any type of performance assessment to have a set of performance 
criteria which should be considered as reference for the assessment process. In this dissertation, 
we opt for a set of socially and economically desirable outcomes generated at the individual 
irrigation level (e. g. efficiency of water use, financial sustainability of the irrigation activity, 
willingness to pay for collective action, etc). These will be used for comparative efficiency 
assessment of various institutional aspects considered. Explicitly, different irrigation institutional 
aspects are compared relatively to one or more performance criteria from the former set. 
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Chapter 3. Water resources availability, supply, demand and 
uses in Tunisia 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we shortly review the state of water resources availability, supply, demand, and 
uses in Tunisia. Many remarks can be drawn from this overview. First, water demand was 
continuously rising during last four decades. This increasing demand is mainly due to the 
extension and creation of new irrigated areas and to the enhancement of the intensification rate in 
the already existing ones. The intensification rate for existing areas and yields of irrigated crops 
are still below expectations. In fact, the current intensification rate is approximately 85% whilst it 
could reach 130% according to government expectations. Secondly, many private irrigated areas 
(from wells) in Tunisia experience critical situations due to the overexploitation of groundwater 
and to the salinisation of lands. Thirdly, water supply will soon reach its limit; imbalance 
between water supply and demand will have a critical effect on irrigated agriculture. In these 
circumstances, the cost of water will increase and the sustainability of irrigation activity will 
become questionable. Finally, free trade agreements signed by Tunisia and the new trade context 
that is currently being implemented in the Mediterranean region raise concerns regarding 
efficiency and competitiveness for Tunisian farmers, which can increase pressure on natural 
resources. 
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3.1. Introduction 
The North African countries in the Southern Mediterranean region are amongst those in the world 
facing severe water shortages. Most of these countries have a semi-arid climate with limited and 
variable rainfall. Moreover, the quantity of rainfall actually available for cultivation is very 
limited, due to very high levels of evaporation (Hamdy and Lacirignola, 1999).  
Irrigation has been practiced in North Africa since the Roman era. When new fruit species and 
substantial expertise was brought into the region by Arabs, irrigation flourished (Ben Mechlia, 
2004). During the past three decades, it has been common policy in these countries to develop 
irrigation infrastructure and to control renewable water resources with a view to increasing 
stability in terms of water supply (Ben mechlia, 2004). Renewable resources were rapidly 
mobilized and the use of irrigation water reached maximum levels. 
3.2. Tunisian context 
Tunisia is bound on the north and east by the Mediterranean Sea, on the south by Libya and on 
the west by Algeria. Of all the North African countries, Tunisia has the longest Mediterranean 
coastline, giving it sizeable fishery reserves in addition to the tourist attractions that draw 
millions of foreign visitors annually. Tunisia covers around 63,170 square miles, corresponding 
to approximately 16 million hectares. This total area comprises 30 % arable land, 27 % pasture 
and forests, and approximately 43 % of land that is unsuitable for agriculture (Lachaal et al., 
2005a). This means that only half of the country’s area contributes to agricultural production. 
Table 3. 1. Total land use (1000 ha) 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Agricultural area 8822 8644 9348 9551 9499 9763 9784 9830 9769 
Arable land and 
Permanent crops 4938 4851 4878 4990 4909 4908 4930 4945 4884 
Arable land 3070 2909 2842 2864 2774 2771 2790 2791 2729 
Agricultural area irrigated na na na na 346 359 348 356 361 
Source: FAOSTAT 
CHAPTER 3                                                                                                                        Water Resources in Tunisia 
 47 
 
Fig 3. 1. Bioclimatic zones in Tunisia 
The climate in Tunisia varies from Mediterranean to arid. The country is generally divided into 
the following naturally homogeneous sub-regions: humid, sub-humid, semi-arid, arid and Sahara 
sub-regions (Figure 3.1). Total rainfall and its distribution are highly variable from year to year 
and from north to south. Average annual rainfall is around 594 mm in the North, 289 mm in the 
Centre, and 156 mm in the South. In the extreme south of Tunisia the average rainfall is less than 
100 millimetres, whereas in the extreme northern part of the country it is more than 1000 
millimetres per annum (Zebidi, 1990). Average annual rainfall values can be multiplied between 
two and twelve times during short and intensive spells of rainfall, causing runoff and causing soil 
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erosion. Heading towards the northern part of the country, the topography becomes increasingly 
hilly, leaving relatively less cultivable land in the areas of high rainfall. The opposite is observed 
towards the southwest, suggesting a negative correlation between the availability of arable land 
and that of rainfall. This implies that in most areas agricultural activity is carried out under 
limited and highly variable rainfall. Temperature and wind are no less variable, frequently 
causing serious damage to agricultural crops. 
3.3. Land resource potential and constraints 
Fertile lands in Tunisia cover approximately 5 million hectares. More than half (57 %) of them 
are located in the centre, one tenth (11 %) in the south and one third (31 %) in the north of the 
country. Forests and rangelands extend over a total area of 5.5 million hectares. Most of the 
forests and rangelands (nearly 60 %) are located in the southern region, the rest being located in 
the central and northern regions of the country (23% and 17% respectively). There are no more 
than 3.5 million hectares of highly-fertile land, of which only 500,000 hectares are suitable for 
irrigation (Lachaal et al., 2005b). 
A major part (46 %) of the agricultural land, forests, and rangelands are situated on slopes which 
reduces their fertility and increases their sensitivity to erosion. Lands in Tunisia have been 
cultivated since ancient times i.e. almost three thousand years ago. The continuous cultivation of 
non-fertile lands, even under difficult climatic conditions, increases their risk of erosion.  
Table 3. 2. Areas of major soil constraints in Tunisia 
  Area (1000 km2) percentage 
Total area  164 100 
Salinity  13 8 
Sodicity  5 3 
Shallowness  46 28 
Erosion hazard  24 14 
Soils without major constraints  22 14 
Source: FAO, 2000 
Lands are subjected to desertification, mainly in the south of the country. 50 % of southern lands 
are moderately/deeply affected by this type of degradation.  Moreover, salinity also affects more 
than 30 % of the irrigated lands in Tunisia (almost 100,000 ha) (MARH, 1996).  
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3.4. Agricultural land use 
Lands are distributed into three large natural regions according to geo-climatic conditions and 
their sensitivity. The land distribution and occupation by region can be presented as follows: 
• The North: The north-east specialises in intensive mixed farming, cereals and fruit 
farming; whereas the north west region is allocated mainly to food grains and breeding 
animals ( intensive and extensive ); 
• The Centre: (i) Sahel zone is characterized by olive cultivation, market gardening and rain 
feed farming; (ii) the centre west and Kairouanais are allocated to mixed farming and 
extensive breeding; 
• The South arid region: (i) The south-east specializes in olive growing, and fruit tree 
cultivation (littoral oasis); (ii) the south-west has mainly arboriculture and extensive 
breeding; (iii) continental Oasis (Nefsaoua - Jerid and Région Maâtoug).  
It is clear from this distribution that the agricultural sector maintains an undeniable social and 
economic importance in all regions of Tunisia. It employs 28% of the active population and 
contributes 14 % of gross domestic product (GDP). However, these contributions face significant 
fluctuations due to climatic variability and changes in public agricultural policies (Lachaal et al., 
2005a). The main agricultural products of Tunisia are wheat, barley, citrus fruits, dates, olive oil 
and vegetables. Livestock production also contributes significantly to the total added value by the 
agricultural sector, i.e. by 1578.31 million TND (current price 2005). Horticulture and other 
industrial crops contribute with a value of 1249.71 million TND (current price 2005). They cover 
only 3 % of cultivated land and are concentrated in the northern areas. Dates, olive oil, and 
tomato paste are the main export products.  
Tree crops are ranked highest in terms of cropped area which is around 2.137 million hectares (54 
% of the cultivated lands), of which 65 % are established in the central and southern parts of the 
country. Southern and central regions do in fact specialize in this kind of cultivation where they 
represent respectively 75 % and 84% of cultivated land. The main tree crops cultivated in Tunisia 
are olives for olive oil, table-olives, dates, citrus fruits, grapes etc. Generally, olive oil is ranked 
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highest in terms of its contribution to the total agricultural value addition. It constitutes 42 % of 
the total Tunisian agro-food sector exports and approximately 25 % of the total world exports 
(fourth exporter country in the world in 2005).  
The food processing sector accounted for 5138 companies in the year 2002 (Lachaal et al., 
2005a). These are mainly related to cereals, olive oil, milk, tomatoes and fish. Fruit and 
vegetables are processed by 61 companies which are mainly located in the north of the country 
and in particular in the Cap Bon region. The food processing industry in Tunisia contributed 
almost 986.2 million TND in 2001 (17.6 % of the total value added for the manufacturing sector) 
(Lachaal et al., 2005b). Investments in this sector amounted to approximately 204.3 million TND 
in 2001 (20 % of the total investment in the manufacturing sector). 
3.5. Water resource potential 
Water resources in Tunisia are estimated to be around 4700 106m3 (Al Atiri, 2007) (Mcm) 
including 650 106m3 of non-renewable resources (13.8 % of the total water resources) (Table 
3.3). Groundwater resources account for 42.5 % of the total water potential. The per capita 
endowment is currently around 450 m3 per annum. This ratio5 will reduce to 315 m3 per capita 
per annum in 2030, according to the latest government studies (Ben abdAllah, 2007).  
Table 3. 3. Potential water resources in Tunisia 
 North Center South Total 
Total available 
water (106m3) 2801 848 1020 4669 
Percentage  60 18 22 100 
Source: MARH, 19986 
                                                 
5
 This ratio is higher in other Mediterranean countries such as Morocco (1083 m3/year) or Algeria (655 m3/year). 
6
 Values in this table are also cited by Ben AbdAllah (2007) 
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Fig 3. 2. Potential water resources in various Tunisian regions (MARH, 1998) 
3.5.1. Rainfall and surface water  
Surface water resources in Tunisia are characterized by problems in terms of  both quantity and 
quality. These resources are limited because of the semi-arid to arid climate found in most of the 
country, with episodic droughts, and a natural deterioration in water quality owing to the salty 
types of rock found within the country (Ben AbdAllah, 2007). Tunisia receives on average 230 
mm/year of rainfall; that equates to 36 109m3 of rainfall. However, this volume varies between 11 
109m3 during a drought year and 90 109m3 during a very wet year. Surface water resources are 
estimated at 2700 106m3. 
The north provides relatively regular contributions in terms of surface water resources and it 
accounts for 2190 106m3. It represents 82 % of the total surface water potential whilst covering 
only 16 % of the country. The central part covers 22 % of the area, and is characterized by 
irregular surface water resources. It provides 12 % of the total surface water potential. The 
southern part of the country which accounts for approximately 62 % of the total land area is the 
poorest in terms of surface water, providing very irregular resources of 190 106m3 which 
contributes only 6 % of the country’s total potential for surface water. 
The quality of surface water, evaluated by its degree of salinity, varies between regions. Given 
that a salinity of less than 1.5 g/l is acceptable, then approximately 72 % of the surface resources 
may be considered of good quality. Surface water quality also varies across the country with 
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82 % of the water resources in the north, 48 % of those in the centre and only 3 % in the south 
considered to be of good quality. 
These inequalities in quantity and quality make water management more difficult and explain the 
need to transfer surface water from the northern areas to the centre and south of Tunisia in order 
to improve the drinking water supply and to ensure equity between consumers. 
3.5.2. Groundwater  
The groundwater resources are estimated to be 2000 106m3, confined within 212 shallow aquifers 
(containing 719 106m3) and 267 deep aquifers. It is estimated that 650 106m3 of this resource is 
mainly located in the south and is non-renewable.  
Like surface water, groundwater is characterized by unequal allocation and variable quality in 
terms of salinity. Groundwater is distributed as follows (Ben AbdAllah, 2007): 
• The north has 55 % of the shallow groundwater resources and only 18 % of the deep 
groundwater resources 
• The centre provides 30 % of the shallow resources and 24 % of the deep resources 
• The south provides 15 % of the shallow resources and has 58 % of the deep resources. 
Good quality groundwater is found in only 8 % of shallow water and 20 % of deep aquifers. If it 
is assumed that salty water up to 3 g/l can be used in the agricultural sector and for the production 
of drinking water, then approximately 36 % of groundwater resources are unsuitable for these 
purposes. 
Another phenomenon, which has a significant effect on water quality, is drought. In periods of 
drought, the salinity of the water stored in shallow aquifers can reach 3.5 g/l due to over-
extraction, as resources are drawn down for both drinking and irrigation purposes. 
3.5.3. Non-conventional water  
Considerable efforts are made in Tunisia to develop non-conventional water resources, 
particularly desalinized and treated water, and to increase their mobilization. In fact, the 
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production cost for these resources is generally very high. Only 5 % (190 106m3) of the water 
mobilized in Tunisia in 2005 was from non-conventional sources although its supply is 
increasing annually by 8 % (Fig 3.3).  However, its use is limited to 24 %. Non conventional 
water is mainly used in agriculture (feed crops, industrial crops, forests, etc.), the urban sector 
(irrigation of natural parks, etc.) and the tourist sector (golf courses, hotel gardens, etc.). This 
limited use of non-conventional water is mainly due to (i) the existence of available conventional 
water next to the treatment plants (75 of which are currently operational) discourages users to use 
this source of water, and (ii) the limited storage capacity for non-conventional water in the 
irrigated areas makes its supply unstable over the agricultural seasons (Ben Hammem, 2006). 
However, the government plans to double the production of this water by 2030. Also, numerous 
incentives will be provided to encourage its use.  
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Fig 3. 3. Current and forecasted mobilization of non-conventional water (MARH, 1998) 
3.6. Water demand and irrigated agriculture in Tunisia 
3.6.1. Water demand by sector 
From 1990 to 2010 total water demand in Tunisia is expected to increase from 1920 106m3 to 
3165 106m3, representing an increase rate of 40 %.  As shown in table 3.4 below, this increasing 
demand is mainly due to the fast growing requirements for water by the agricultural sector (more 
than 80 % of total water consumption) in addition to improvements in income and the 
development of the tourist sector. Water use for domestic and tourist purposes has doubled 
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during the past two decades. 
Table 3. 4. Evolution of water demand in Tunisia 
1990 2010 Sectors 106m3 % 106m3 % 
Agriculture 1575 82.1 2540 80.2 
Urban 240 12.5 462 14.6 
Manufacturing 85 4.4 123 3.9 
Tourism 20 1 40 1.3 
Total  1920 100 3165 100 
Source : MARH, 1998 
From another hand, the irrigated sector is crucial for the national development since it occupies 7 
% of the country’s useful agricultural area, but contributes significantly to the development of 
agriculture. It accounts for 30-35 % of agricultural production value, 95 % of horticultural crops, 
30 % of dairy production, 70 % of tree crop production, 22 % of agricultural exports (mainly 
oranges and dates), and 26 % of total agricultural employment (Al Atiri, 2007).  
3.6.2. Evolution of the irrigated areas 
Irrigated areas have continued to increase in Tunisia during the past two decades (Fig 3.4). In 
2003, they accounted for around 400,000 hectares, of which 32 % was in the north-east, 31 % in 
the centre-west, 22 % in the north-west, 9 % in the south and 6 % in the centre-east of the country 
(Lachaal et al., 2005b; Al Atiri, 2007).   
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Fig 3. 4. Evolution of the irrigation areas during past decade (1986-2005) in Tunisia (MARH, 2006) 
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Despite this increase in irrigated land area, the intensification and occupation rates7 are still 
below policy makers’ expectations. The intensification rate was approximately 90% in 2005 (Fig 
3.5) which is much lower than the potential rate - estimated to be around 130 % (MARH, 2006).  
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Fig 3. 5. Evolution of the occupation and intensification rates of irrigated areas In Tunisia (MARH, 2006) 
In 2003, the volume of water used for irrigation was estimated at 1889 106m3, with average 
consumption per hectare of approximately 5500 m3/year. Consumption reaches 20000 
m3/Ha/year in the oasis. In the north the average consumption is 4000 m3/hectare/year (Horchani, 
2007). Water from shallow aquifers irrigates over 150,000 hectares, whilst deep groundwater 
irrigates around 70,000 hectares. Surface water (mainly from dams) irrigates 130,000 hectares, 
treated wastewater irrigates 7,000 hectares, and the rest is partly irrigated from direct pumping 
from natural storage (Lachaal et al., 2005b). 
3.6.3. Three modes for managing the irrigated areas 
Three regimes of management in the irrigated areas could be identified in Tunisia (Fig 3.6). 
These are the private regime secured by individuals, the administrative regime secured by the 
CRDA (Commisariats Régionales de Développement Agricole created in the 1990’s) and the 
collective regime secured by the WUAs (Thabet and Chebil, 2007). 
                                                 
7
 Occupation rate = irrigated area / irrigable area; Intensification rate = effectively irrigated areas / irrigable areas 
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Fig 3. 6. Distribution of the irrigated areas according to the management regime (MARH, 2004) 
• Private management applies to 40 % of the total irrigated area. It mainly relates to the 
areas irrigated from superficial aquifers, using a well or other techniques. Farmers in these 
areas are responsible for the investment and operational costs of their individual water 
systems. 
• Collective management concerns areas that are managed by WUAs. These areas have 
expanded to cover 36 % of the total irrigated land area in Tunisia. Collective irrigation 
networks are set up through public funds, but their management is delegated to the WUA, 
which fixes the water fees and is responsible for their collection. The WUA also assumes 
responsibility for investment and the development of irrigation in its areas.  
• Public management of large irrigated areas, which constitute around 24 % of the total 
irrigated lands in Tunisia. This management is still being secured by government agencies 
(CRDA). Under the Agricultural Reform Law, farmers participate in investment efforts in 
these areas and pay the total or a part of the O&M costs.  
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Table 3. 5. Distribution of irrigated areas according to the management regime and to the source of water 
(2003) 
Source of water Private irrigated perimeters (Ha) 
Public Management 
CRDA 
Collective 
Management GIC 
Surface - 84000 59000 
Tubewells 10000 8000 74000 
Shallow wells 145000 - - 
Springs and intermittent 
streams 10000 - 15000 
Reclaimed wastewater - 5000 2000 
Total 165000 97000 150000 
Source: MARH  (2004) 
3.6.4. Distribution of irrigated land areas between regions  
The Figure 3.7 below shows the distribution of irrigated land areas in 2004 between different 
Tunisian governorates. It is clear that irrigation is the most highly developed in the governorates 
of Nabeul, Kairouan and Sidi Bouzid. However, Kairouan and Sidi Bouzid are considered as 
agricultural-oriented governorates; whereas the tourism and manufacturing sectors are widely 
developed in the governorate of Nabeul, which increases pressure on water resources in this 
region. 
 
Fig 3. 7. Distribution of the irrigated areas between various governorates in Tunisia (MARH, 1995) 
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3.6.5. Distribution of irrigated land areas according to farm size and structure 
The average proportion of irrigated land (i.e. irrigated areas / total farm size) per farm in Tunisia 
was around 7.8 % in 2005 (Table 3.6). Most of the irrigated farms are between 10 and 50 hectares 
in size. Farms in this category hold 33 % of the total irrigated land in the country. Only 5.9 % of 
their total size is designated for irrigation. However, farms in the small size category (less than 5 
ha) irrigate an average 17.1% of the total farm size. Farmers in this category hold 24.4% of the 
total irrigated land in Tunisia.  
Table 3. 6.  Distribution of irrigated land areas in Tunisia according to farm size  
National survey 1994-1995 National survey 2004-2005 
 Irrigated farm size Total area 
(1000 ha) %  
Irrigated 
/cultivated area 
(%) 
Total area 
(1000 ha) %  
Irrigated 
/cultivated area 
(%) 
Less than 5 Ha 71.9 24.4 17.1 82.6 25.0 16.0 
5 to 10 Ha 52.3 17.8 9.7 65.6 19.8 9.8 
10 to 50 Ha 99.7 34.0 5.9 108.8 32.9 6.3 
50 to 100 Ha 19.0 6.5 4.2 20.9 6.4 4.5 
More than 100 Ha  50.9 17.3 5.7 52.6 15.9 6.4 
Total 293.8 100 7.5 330.6 100.0 7.8 
Source: MARH, 2005 
3.7. Water balance 
According to a previous study done by the MARH (MARH, 1998), a projection for future water 
demand and availability shows that a critical situation in terms of water balance is likely to occur 
within the next decade (year 2020-2030).  In 2030, water demand is estimated to be around 2760 
106m3, whilst available resources will only amount to approximately 2732 106m3 (Fig 3.8). The 
desalinization of brackish water is planned to reach 46 106m3/year whilst the treated water supply 
is expected to be around 350 106m3.   
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Fig 3. 8. Estimated water balance 1996-2030 (Source: MARH, 1998) 
The considerable increase in water demand in Tunisia can be explained by many factors, such as 
rapid demographic growth, diversification of economic activities, and significant improvements 
in income and quality of life. The Tunisian population increased from 3.7 million inhabitants in 
1956 to more than 10 million in 2001. Also, the urban population rate increased from 33 % in 
1956 to 65 % currently. The number of inhabitants is forecast to reach approximately 13 million 
by 2025 and the per capita water availability is expected to decrease. In addition to the urban 
water needs, the level of agricultural production also needs to be increased to improve food 
security. However, in such difficult climatic conditions, irrigated agriculture remains an essential 
option for policy makers.  
3.8. Water development: main future guidelines from the “Water Master Plan” 
Unlike other North African countries, Tunisia developed and adopted numerous laws and plans 
regarding its water resources many decades ago. Water Master Plans (WMP) have existed since 
1970. The first WMP was drafted for the northern part of Tunisia, as this is the region containing 
most of the resources and related activities. In 1977 and 1983 the centre and then the south 
followed by implementing WMPs. The MARH developed these plans and is also responsible for 
their implementation. 
The expected future water deficit made policy makers change strategic direction from increasing 
water production to demand management by focusing on financial means, water pricing, new 
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techniques, legal and institutional mechanisms. 
Currently, the Tunisian national strategy centres around three major points (Ben abdAllah, 2007): 
• The management of demand: a question of preserving the resource, ensuring economic 
efficiency and preserving social equity through good water distribution. 
• The integrated management of water resources: the use of groundwater during periods of 
drought, the recharge of groundwater to counteract problems of over extraction and 
degradation, and the use of treated waste water and brackish water. 
• Resource and environmental protection: quantitative conservation through reinforcement 
and improvement of water capture and storage capacities, qualitative conservation of 
water resources and ecosystems through reductions in pollution, monitoring, and cost 
evaluation. 
With regard to demand management, some reduction targets were set as objectives for the current 
decade. These objectives are (i) reduction by 30 % in water used in agriculture, by improving and 
modernizing irrigation systems and distribution networks, and by replacing some of the existing 
hydraulic infrastructures; (ii) reduction by 20% in water used in the industry by recycling, 
improving production processes and the introduction of clean technologies; and (iii) reduction by 
27 % in drinking water consumption, principally through modernization of current equipment. 
Goals regarding integrated water management and resource protection were as follows: 
• Make use of reclaimed water in the agricultural and industrial sectors 
• Evaluate groundwater recharge potential 
• Desalinate brackish groundwater for drinking 
• Promote the use of agricultural species tolerant to salinity and hydraulic stress 
• Protect water resources from pollution 
3.9. Conclusion: constraints on the development of the irrigation sector   
From this short discussion regarding the use and potential use of natural resources (land and 
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water) in Tunisia, it is important to summarize the following points:  
• Despite the considerable efforts made during recent years to develop new irrigated areas 
in Tunisia, the intensification rate for existing areas and yields of irrigated crops are still 
below expectations. In fact, the current intensification rate is approximately 85% whilst it 
could reach 130% according to government expectations. Also, yields are 50 to 60% 
below potential (MARH, 2006). According to Bachta et al. (2000) (quoted in Fouzai, 
2007), the increases observed in agricultural production are mainly due to the expansion 
of irrigated land areas and not to the intensification of existing areas. 
• Many of the private irrigated areas (from wells) experience critical situations due to the 
overexploitation of groundwater. The salinisation of soils in many of these areas, where 
groundwater is salty, is an illustration of degradation. In addition to the degradation of 
land and water resources, private management also provokes many conflicts between 
neighbouring farmers.  
• Water supply will soon reach its limit; imbalance between water supply and demand will 
have a critical effect on irrigated agriculture. In these circumstances, the cost of water 
will increase and the sustainability of irrigation activity will become questionable; 
particularly if farmers’ revenue does not improve in coming years. 
•  Free trade agreements signed by Tunisia and the new trade context that is currently 
being implemented in the Mediterranean region raise concerns regarding efficiency and 
competitiveness for Tunisian farmers. This is considered to be a further urgent issue 
which will increase pressure on natural resources.  
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Chapter 4. Water laws, policies, and administration in 
Tunisia 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter presents an overview of the main irrigation water institutional components in 
Tunisia. After presenting the main state of water resources availability, supply, demand and uses 
in the previous chapter, the current one describes water laws, policies, and administrative aspects 
currently implemented and operating in Tunisia. These will be discussed from a formal macro-
level perspective. Results, drawn from various literatures, show that many irrigation institutions 
exist in the country. However, some juridical, technical, financial and social problems related to 
their functioning also exist and have to be reviewed and analyzed further.  
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4.1. Introduction 
For a more precise treatment, our review of the formal macro-level water institutions in this 
chapter is relying on the analytical framework based on institutional decomposition. This 
framework distinguishes three main institutional components: water law, water policy, and water 
administration. It also highlights a few key institutional aspects under each principal component. 
The current chapter concentrates only on some of these key institutional aspects. This choice was 
depending on the availability of bibliographical and data resources 
4.2. Water laws8 
Water law assumes a central place in the functioning of water institutions as it gives the 
necessary legal basis to water policy as well as providing an operational framework and powers 
of enforcement for water administration and its regulatory arrangements (Saleth, 2004).  
From a historical perspective, legislation relating to water resources in Tunisia can be divided 
into four main contexts9:  
(1) From the first millenium BC until the arrival of Islam, particularly during the Roman period, 
water resources were managed by building aqueducts for domestic and agricultural use and for 
water transfer between regions.  
(2) During the Islamic empire, water was considered to be “God’s Gift”, and consequently it was 
declared to be collective property, known as "waqf". In this context, some of the water resources 
and wells were declared as "waqf" and the public had full access rights to them. However, Islam 
strongly urged moderation and thriftiness in the use of water, even when performing ablution. 
 (3) The French colonization period (1881-1956) was characterized by the first water Decree 
favouring the colonists. The Decree of 24 September 1885 defined a public surface water 
domain, without any reference to groundwater resources. On 24 May 1920, a water committee 
                                                 
8
 All documents relating to specific decrees and laws which will be cited in this section could be found at: 
http://faolex.fao.org/faolex  
9
 Based on Louati et al., 2005.  
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was appointed. The Decrees which were instituted in 1933, 1935, 1936 and 1938 provided 
regulations for water use and fixed the charges for this water use; the Decrees of 30 July 1936, 11 
January 1945 and 17 March 1949 introduced regulations relating to the Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGO) involved in water use.  
(4) The fourth period began with the independence of Tunisia. It was characterized by 
evolutionary water legislation which related specifically to resource mobilization and exploitation 
(urban, agricultural, industrial and tourist uses) whilst focusing on water quality and 
environmental protection of the resource. In order to satisfy water demands from different 
sectors, a national programme was established to bring into existence many types of hydraulic 
infrastructure. With the evolution of this plan, hydraulic planning was gradually transformed into 
an established legislative system. The objectives of this legislative system were to identify the 
rights and duties of all actors involved in the water field, to preserve water resources, and to 
ensure its equitable allocation. In 1975, all legislative water documents were updated and 
promulgated in the Water Code (Law n° 75-16, 31 March 1975).  
Since 1975, the Water Code has been continually updated by modifying some legislation and 
adding new regulations to address socioeconomic and technical requirements. The law n°75-16, 
31 March 1975, was largely modified and completed by laws n°87-35, 6 July 1987; n°88-94, 2 
August 1988; The law n° 2001-116, 26 November 2001; and law n°2004-24, March 15, 2004. 
In 2001, new reforms were introduced identifying water as a national resource that everyone must 
preserve, protect, and use in a sustainable manner, to satisfy both the needs of citizens and wider 
economic demand. For instance, the largest consumers (more than 5 million m3/ year in 
agriculture, more than 1000 m3/ year in the urban sector and 5000 m3/ year in the industrial 
sector) came under an obligation to audit their water use periodically. Consumption quotas are 
imposed during periods of scarcity. The development of non-conventional water resources 
(desalination and treatment of wastewater) was encouraged and individuals were permitted to 
produce water and distribute it. Thus, the new 2001 version of the Water Code reflects an 
increased awareness of the need for water conservation. It makes various stakeholders aware of 
the importance of water and the need to prevent its overuse. Also, it reflects the urgent need to 
manage demand for water in line with forecasts of decreasing availability. Under this new 
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legislation, improvements in water use efficiency in all sectors became the top priority for water 
management policies. Considerable measures were thus undertaken in order to promote water 
savings in agriculture by encouraging the adoption of water saving technologies. 
The specific areas of legislation relating to the irrigation sector are summarized in the following 
sections. 
4.2.1. Agrarian law 
Irrigated areas and water use in Tunisia were affected by the agrarian laws instituted for the 
agricultural sector. In fact, a special law framing land reforms in the public irrigated areas was 
established in 1963 and modified in 2000: Law n° 63-18, 27 May 1963 (modified by the law n° 
30, 6 March 2000). The reform is based on four major principles: (i) the limitation of property 
land size within a minimum and maximum range which could differ according to the cultural 
orientation of the irrigated area, (ii) the contribution of land owners to the development of their 
irrigated areas (e.g., investments in infrastructure), (iii) the obligatory agrarian reform which, if 
required, obliges a given farmer to provide part of his land ownership for the public interest (e.g. 
network location, other irrigation infrastructure - with the aim of achieving better valorization of 
irrigation water), and (iv) the obligation to valorize the lands (cultivation or other use) located in 
defined irrigated areas. In many cases, these rules are not well enforced.  
4.2.2. Water law and decentralization  
After the promulgation of the law n° 87-35, July 1987 and its related decrees, the decentralization 
process for water management in Tunisia could be declared officially underway. The 
responsibility for managing irrigated areas10 was attributed either to the CRDA or to the WUAs. 
The WUA organization, mode of creation, and functioning is set out by the decrees n° 87-1261, 
27 October 1987 and n°87-1262, 27 October 1987, respectively (Al Atiri, 2007). According to 
statute, WUAs have to be created in order to achieve one (or more) of the following objectives: 
                                                 
10
 Apart from those that are privately-managed 
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• Exploitation of public water resources at a local level;  
• Fulfilment of tasks relating to public water resource management under their jurisdiction. 
This means for instance, that they have to organize farmers in sub-districts, to ensure the 
delivery of irrigation water at farm level, to collect water fees from irrigators, to 
undertake investment in order to accomplish these tasks, etc; 
• Irrigation or sanitation of land in the perimeter through drainage or any other sanitation 
method; and 
• Exploitation of drinking water systems11. In addition to irrigation, WUAs can also have 
greater responsibility for managing the drinking water provision in very rural areas. 
These objectives were rectified by the law n°2004-24, March 15, 2004 which sets the following 
new objectives:  
• Collective management and protection of natural resources in their territories; 
• Endowment of their territories with the necessary agricultural and rural equipment and 
infrastructure; 
• Contribution to extension services in order to enhance farm productivity in their localities; 
• Cooperation and exchange of information. 
It is clear that these new objectives call for increased participation and collective involvement in 
water resource operation and management costs. In view of these objectives, it is also evident that 
WUAs have become a crucial component of the institutional scheme for water in Tunisia.     
According to sections 10 and 11 of the water code, each WUA has to be managed by an 
administrative council composed of 3 to 9 members belonging to its adherents and elected by the 
general assembly for a total period of three years (Hamdane, 2002). More details as to the 
organization and functioning of these associations will be provided in section 4.5.2 of this 
chapter.  
                                                 
11
 There are three types of GICs (called WUAs in this dissertation) (Groupement d’Intérêt collectif) which are: GICs 
for irrigation water management, GICs for drinking water management, and mixed GICs. GICs in Tunisia are also 
called GDA (Groupement de développement agricole) since 2007.  
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4.2.3. Property rights  
The property rights for water were also changed in Tunisia by the law n° 75-16, 31 March 1975 
from a full property right to a simple water usage right for a given volume that is generally 
relative to the area of land owned (Al Atiri, 2007). Water above this volume is then considered to 
be in public ownership.  
4.2.4. Promoting technology 
Water legislation is positive towards the development of water saving technology in the different 
sectors (industrial, tourism and domestic sectors). To achieve efficient water management and 
use, it is necessary to ensure that the technologies introduced are accessible, socially acceptable, 
and easy to maintain. In addition, conscious of the need to use water efficiently in agriculture, a 
Tunisian programme sets a direct financial subsidy for each farmer who invests in water saving 
technology.  
4.2.5. Water law and private participation 
Despite the fact that Tunisia has privatised many public services within the framework of the 
“privatization programme” which started in 1987, water supply and sanitation services are still 
wholly provided by government agencies. A previous study, carried out in 1999 by the ONAS 
(National Sanitation Utility of Tunisia), proposed that a number of tasks and services relating to 
water provision and maintenance could be contracted out under some specific forms of service-
contract arrangement (Chaibi, 2006). 
In order to promote the involvement of the private sector in the development of non-conventional 
water sources, a specific amendment to the Water Code was promulgated. The law n° 2001-116, 
26 November 2001 (mainly sections 87 and 88), allows private parties to produce and distribute 
water, either for themselves, or for third parties, provided that the water source is non-
conventional, e.g. desalination. A financial incentive programme was linked to this law, aimed at 
promoting the development of non-conventional water for different uses. 
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4.2.6. Irrigation pricing and water laws 
Water provision and pricing in irrigated areas is framed by section n°106, of law n° 2001-116, 26 
November 2001. According to this section, water fees used to exchange water between CRDA 
and WUAs, have to be fixed according to a “cahier de charge” which also has to be approved by 
a specific decree proposed by the minister of agriculture and hydraulic resources.   
General conditions for water provision and exchange between CRDA and farmers in the public 
irrigated areas are specified by the decree n°91-1869, 2 December 1991. This decree describes 
the contract which is put in place between CRDA and the irrigator, specifying the duties and 
rights of each party (e.g. operation and maintenance, and installation of water meters), the pricing 
method (e.g. volumetric, binomial, specific-case prices), the invoicing and payment modes (e.g. 
deadlines, sanctions in the case of non payment), etc..  
4.2.7. Quality protection 
According to decree n° 91-362, 13 March 1991, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
study is required for public and private projects likely to impact on the environment. Effects on 
hydraulic resources are also considered under this law. However the enforcement level for this 
law still needs to be increased (Chaibi, 2006).  
Restrictions on the quality of treated water used in agriculture were also framed and specified by 
decree n° 89-1047, 28 July 1989, modified by decree n° 93-2447, 13 December 1993, which set 
the conditions for reuse of treated wastewater in the agricultural sector. Decree n° 74-1062, 28 
November 1974 delegates this control and monitoring duty to the Ministry of Public Health 
(MPH). The quality of agricultural products produced in areas irrigated with reused treated water 
is also controlled by the MPH through Law n° 92-117, 7 December 1992, relating to consumer 
protection in Tunisia. 
4.3. Water policies 
Water policy relates to the declared statements as well as the intended approach of central 
government for water resource planning, development, allocation and management (Saleth, 
2004). It includes statements that not only relate to the overall policy framework but also to 
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specific policy issues such as investment priorities, water transfer, decentralization and private 
participation, field-level water conservation, and pricing and cost recovery policies.  
In Tunisia, the independence of agricultural production from the highly variable climatic 
conditions was a main objective of policy makers during the 1950’s. Accordingly, considerable 
public hydraulic investment was mobilized in order to control superficial water resources. 
Nevertheless, this water supply policy was not accompanied at that time by measures that sought 
to rationalize the growing demand for irrigation water.  Policy makers were also facing another 
challenge due to the increasing competition for water resources created by other sectors (urban 
water use, manufacturing, tourism). These are considered to be more competitive whilst irrigation 
water is still being subsidized. Thus, irrigation policies have been shifted since the 1970’s from 
supply towards an irrigation demand management perspective. New policies focus more on 
organizational and technical tools aiming to reach higher water use efficiencies in all areas of use. 
In this section, we first review the general, overall aspects of national irrigation water policy in 
Tunisia during the last three decades, and then provide a detailed description of pricing policies 
and cost recovery strategies.  
From all of the relevant programmes, the following guidelines can be deduced for current 
national policy in Tunisia: (1) Investment in projects that aim to improve water use efficiency, (2) 
enhancement of participation in collective water management, (3) Pricing of water and water 
services and (4) subsidies and incentives for farmers and the private sector.  
4.3.1. Water investment priorities  
Public investment in the water sector was always considerable. In fact, 27 % of the total 
agricultural investment during the period 1962 to 1971, and 41 % during the period 1982 to 1991 
was designated to the water sector (Mallek, 1988; Sghaier, 1995). In this sense, the major priority 
for the Decennial Water Resources Mobilization Strategy (1990 – 2000) was to increase water 
supply. The construction of more than 200 small and large dams and the drilling of more than 
1000 deep groundwater wells has led to an increase in the volume of water resources mobilized 
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from 60 % in 1990 to 87.5 % in 2004. The total budget for this strategy was around 2000 Million 
TND (constant price 199012). 
A Complementary Strategy (2001 – 2011) attempts to realize long-term objectives, in particular 
to ensure a sustainable balance between future demand and the availability of water resources. It 
partly consists of similar measures for continuing the Mobilization Strategy with the aim of 
reaching a mobilization rate of 95 %. Furthermore, this strategy places an emphasis on regulation 
measures between wet and dry years, water and soil conservation measures, and the recharge of 
aquifers. Thus, more attention is given to investment in technical, economic, and organizational 
aspects that should improve water use efficiency and cost recovery. Key strategic elements 
adopted in this respect are (MARH, 2006):  
• Improvements in the efficiency of the collective irrigation network (through maintenance, 
refurbishment, and modernization projects);  
• Improvements in the technology used at the plot level in order to increase water use 
efficiency by farmers;  
• Implementation of adequate pricing methods that are well adapted to the socioeconomic 
conditions in each region; 
• Generalization of collective management (through WUAs) across all irrigated areas13 and 
enhancement of user participation; 
• Overall mobilization of surface water resources    
As shown in table 4.1 below, the new government strategy in terms of hydraulic investment also 
seeks to encourage private investment in irrigated areas. This last figure increased from 19 % in 
1990 to 37 % of the total hydraulic investment in 2004.  
 
                                                 
12
 Equivalent of 1678 Million US $ 
13
 Except those that are privately managed.  
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Table 4. 1. Evolution of public and private hydraulic investment (constant price 1990) 
 Inv. Hydrauliques 
year Agricultural 
investments (103 DT) 
Hydraulic 
investments (103 DT) 
Part 
(%) 
Public 
(%) 
private 
(%) 
1989 328237 147452 45 81 19 
1990 401400 166842 42 81 19 
1991 425099 124833 29 68 32 
1992 459236 140810 31 75 25 
1993 489199 151873 31 76 24 
1994 515807 158021 31 76 24 
1995 596624 232709 39 76 24 
1996 782531 262734 34 75 25 
1997 735990 294410 40 82 27 
1998 824310 279110 34 70 30 
1999 860760 295760 34 66 34 
2000 890010 337770 38 67 33 
2001 930010 355190 38 68 32 
2002 821690 384120 47 65 35 
2003 861930 373580 43 65 35 
2004 939980 382140 41 63 37 
Source : MARH, 2004. 
4.3.2. Project funding 
The hydraulic sector in Tunisia is financed through national budgets and external loans largely 
provided by the World Bank. The international funds have a significant influence on water 
projects and on the implementation of new approaches to water management in Tunisia (Table 
4.2). The involvement of these agencies could help in achieving a comprehensive water 
management framework that integrates social, economic and environmental considerations. From 
another viewpoint, this involvement can also increase pressure on policy makers to implement 
the necessary reforms. 
Table 4. 2. Financing of the Water Sector in Tunisia 
10th Plan (2002-2006) 11th Plan (2007-2011) Financing Source 
Investments % Investments % 
National Budget 947 48 1300 45 
External Loans 808 41 1300 45 
Grants 150 8 200 7 
Self-financing 70 3 28 3 
Total 1975 100 2888 100 
Source : MARH, 2006 
CHAPTER 4                                                                                                                Water institutions in Tunisia 
 75 
4.3.3. Water transfer 
The Tunisian water transfer programme started in the early 1980’s by connecting large northern 
dams with other dams in the central part of the country (Fig 4.1). The objective of this 
programme was to improve the quality of water already distributed and to reinforce storage 
capacities in the central and southern parts of the country. Transfers from one dam to another in 
the same basin were also planned, depending on capacities and climatic conditions inside each 
basin, 
 
Fig 4. 1. Main dams and transfer canal in Tunisia 
CHAPTER 4                                                                                                                Water institutions in Tunisia 
 76 
4.3.4. Decentralization and farmer participation 
Water demand strategy in Tunisia calls for active participation by farmers and farmers’ 
associations in managing irrigation systems. The strategy developed to enhance this participation 
is based on:  
• Progressive disengagement of the government from tasks relating to the day-to-day 
operation and management of irrigation systems, and the transfer of these responsibilities 
to WUAs. The Government retains responsibility for maintaining and managing large 
infrastructures; 
• Reducing direct and indirect subsidies that were provided to balance the WUA budgets. 
This seeks to gain higher levels of irrigation cost recovery; 
• Enhancing the capacities of WUAs and allowing them to play a dynamic role in social 
and economic developments in agriculture. 
4.3.5. Water privatization 
Participation by private actors in maintenance and operational tasks in Tunisian irrigated areas 
commenced in 2001. In fact, at the start of the decentralization process, all operational and 
maintenance tasks were undertaken by the CRDA in each region. WUAs have to pay for these 
services via a specific invoicing procedure. A given WUA wishing to benefit from the services 
would submit an official demand to a specific department of their regional CRDA. Then, 
specialist CRDA staff would come out and complete the necessary fieldwork. Before 2001, 
payment for these services was not obligatory and they were perceived by WUAs, in many cases, 
as subsidies. However, from 2001, the CRDA began to inflate invoices for services provided to 
WUAs. The payment of these fees became obligatory. Those WUAs not paying ceased to benefit 
from the CRDA services. At the same time, the CRDA supplied a list of private companies in the 
region that could provide the same services at a lower price. The objectives of this strategy were 
twofold: firstly to raise WUA awareness as to the importance of maintenance and operational 
costs, and secondly to encourage the involvement of the private sector in the provision of 
irrigation services. Currently, more than 60 % of WUAs choose to contract with private 
companies for various types of service provision.      
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4.3.6. Field-level water conservation programme for irrigated agriculture 
Significant efforts have been made since the 1970’s to promote modern field-level irrigation 
techniques. However, traditional gravity irrigation has persisted throughout the irrigation 
schemes in Tunisia. In 1993, a new coordinated programme was developed, with several 
simultaneous components such as; a major awareness programme for farmers, specific training 
for advisory technicians and irrigation engineers, support for research and development into new 
irrigation techniques, establishment of new national and regional organizations, and 
encouragement of private sector involvement, etc. The “National Irrigation Water Saving 
Programme” was furthered by the political decision to increase the rate of subsidy for the 
adoption of modern irrigation water saving equipment. The programme sets out various other 
actions to be undertaken in irrigated areas. Most of them seek to improve the efficiency of 
irrigation networks and techniques.   
Actions undertaken within the framework of the “National Water Saving Programme” 
• Public and collective irrigated schemes: For this type of irrigated area, appropriate 
actions are mostly determined by the specific characteristics of the common existing 
irrigation network. Generally, these actions can be: (i) to improve the effectiveness of the 
irrigation networks through the implementation of operational and management 
programmes and the installation of water meters; (ii) to adjust and increase water delivery 
capacity in order to satisfy existing water demand whilst respecting system capacity; (iii) 
to charge higher water rates to farmers; and (iv) to prepare a background for collective 
management  
• Privately irrigated schemes: In these areas, private wells are the main source of irrigation. 
Some measures were undertaken to preserve the sustainability of the aquifers. Main 
measures are: (i) to identify the number of equipped wells in each privately irrigated 
scheme, in addition to the crop rotations and irrigation techniques used. This information 
will be used to set specific actions and rules for each scheme; (ii) in areas where aquifers 
are already overused, a prohibition on deepening existing wells or building new ones, in 
addition to the development of some awareness programmes to encourage farmers to 
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adopt more efficient techniques, reduce their irrigated area, or grow less water-demanding 
crops.  
• At the parcel level: Actions considered for the parcel level are as follows: (i) to guarantee 
substantial subsidies for farmers who invest in water saving technology, ranging from 40 
% to 60 % of the total amount invested in the purchase of modern irrigation equipment; 
(ii) to enhance the capacity of local administration to improve their knowledge concerning 
the physical characteristics of their irrigated areas (e.g. soil, optimal doses and timings for 
the irrigation of different crops); (iii) to increase the intensification rate for the existing 
irrigated schemes; (iv) to construct storage reservoirs downstream from wells; (v) to 
reinforce the capacity of the local extension services.  
Main results of the “National Water Saving Programme” 
An evaluation of the water saving programme showed a high rate for the adoption of technology, 
whereby 321,000 hectares (80 % of total irrigated land) was being irrigated with modern 
equipment in 2005 (Fig 4.2). This area has increased by 60 % since 1995. By the end of 2000, the 
programme had achieved an investment of 335 Million TND (254 Million US$), of which 167 
Million TND (123 Million US$) were in the form of direct subsidies to irrigators. , The following 
results concerning the efficiency of water use and crop yields were also recorded (MARH, 2005): 
• Irrigation field-level efficiency increased from 50-60 % in 1995 to an average of 
70-85 % in 2005; this was mainly due to the newly introduced techniques (e.g. 
sprinkler and drip irrigation). Efficiency improvements allowed savings of 
approximately 210 106m3 of water; which represents 10 % of the total water 
consumed for irrigation.  
• Increases of 70 % in yields were recorded in market gardening and tree crops. This 
results in an occasional over-production of certain commodities at the national 
level (especially in the case of tomatoes). On average, market gardeners’ profits 
increased by 97 % (from 2690 TND/hectare without water saving equipment to 
5310 TND/hectare with equipment), whilst citrus farmers also increased their 
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profits by 30 %. 
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  Fig 4. 2. Evolution of the areas equipped with water saving technologies  
According to Al Atiri (2004), results of the programme were somewhat mixed. In fact, water 
saving is not very substantial in volume (because irrigators have not yet fully mastered the 
modern technology). However, water resources are now better valorized both at farm and 
national levels. Al Atiri (2004) also considers that water savings have been mainly used to 
intensify the existing irrigated systems. The adoption of newer water saving technology is still 
limited to certain high-value crops that are mainly grown by large farms well integrated into the 
food market chain (Fouzai, 2007).    
It is also important to stress the high percentage (28.7 %) of areas equipped with “improved 
gravity techniques”. By this technique, water is not pumped in pipes but distributed through 
gravity flow. Water losses with these methods are high and the level of water use efficiency 
obtained is generally lower when compared to the efficiencies achieved with other irrigation 
technologies.     
4.4. Pricing and Cost recovery policies  
4.4.1. Water pricing during the supply phase 
Attempts to implement an adequate irrigation pricing policy in Tunisia started in the early 
1970’s. After the promulgation of the land reform laws in 1963, measures have been undertaken 
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to make farmers contribute more to public hydraulic investment. At that time, a water pricing 
project was adopted for public areas in which large investments were made. The method applied 
was based on an arbitrary fixed charge per hectare and aimed to constrain users developing 
irrigation within their schemes by contributing to the water charge. Also, the prices set aimed to 
guarantee a minimum cost recovery for water production, operation, and maintenance costs 
(Ministry of the Economy, 1971). During the same period, the ministry of agriculture published a 
study on irrigation pricing in which it was clearly stated that “Pricing has to give to the water a 
real economic value. The water charge per cubic meter must be judiciously calculated in order to 
raise the conscience of users about the need for improving water use efficiency (Ben khelil, 
1971)”. 
Following a liberal orientation, the four-year plan (1973-76) for economic and social 
development in Tunisia became more explicit as to irrigation objectives. In this plan, the 
following main irrigation policy guidelines were mentioned:  
• Producing water at a minimal cost, 
• Improving water productivity, 
• Intensifying the mobilization of renewable water.    
At the same time, the “Office for the Development of Medjerda Valley” (Office de Mise en 
Valeur de la Vallée de la Medjerda: OMVVM) made several studies aiming to implement pricing 
methods and to provide a first attempt at a real pricing policy. This policy had to ensure three 
main requirements: 
• Water is an important factor for wealth and those who benefit from it should pay its real 
price, 
• Pricing of irrigation water should not be a constraint for the development of the irrigation 
sector, 
• Pricing policy must be considered as an integral part of the global irrigation development 
strategy. 
Some pricing systems were proposed by the OMVVM and water charges were calculated 
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according to the time of irrigation flows. Farmers owning a total cultivated land area of less than 
two hectares were supplied free of charge.  
Other methods for pricing irrigation water have also been applied in the public irrigated areas of 
Nebhana, Lakhmès and Badrouna (in the ‘high valley of Medjerda’). Applied volumetric pricing 
methods took into consideration the soil quality, crop rotation and socio-economic conditions in 
each area.  
The OMVVM has also adopted two-part binomial tariffs in some of these regions with the aim of 
promoting water conservation without hindering irrigation development. These tariffs generally 
include two terms: (i) fixed charge intended to cover part of the fixed production costs for water. 
Users have to pay this amount independently from the level of their water use; and (ii) a variable 
charge depending on the volume of water consumed. However this method was difficult to 
introduce to farmers. The designer of the method concludes (OMVVM, 1976 quoted in Thabet 
and Chebil, 2007): “Currently, the increase of water prices could deteriorate the financial 
capacity of small farmers. It would be preferable that the State undertakes the whole basic 
investments at least during the next transition period. Although it is difficult to implement, the 
increase in water prices for the future years, when economic conditions become more favorable, 
will be possible insofar as the user is warned about the operation”. 
Several other pricing systems were implemented at the beginning of the 1980’s. These were 
implemented in the newly-created northern irrigation perimeters. A study done by the National 
Centre for Agricultural Studies (DEGTH, 1980) proposed a binomial pricing system for these 
areas, with some modifications: (i) taking into account farm characteristics and agricultural 
development objectives when proposing water tariffs; (ii) use of specific water prices during peak 
consumption periods.  
Parallel to these pricing attempts, an administrative reform was implemented in Tunisia and new 
regional administrations were created to manage the irrigated areas in their regions. The new 
Regional Development Agencies had to adapt pricing systems according to their specific regional 
conditions (e.g. farmers’ income, production systems, water availability). Recovery rates of 
variable costs, ranging from 19 % to 36 % of the total water cost were obtained after these 
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considerations had been taken into account. According to the World Bank (1980), only part of the 
operational and maintenance (O&M) costs were reimbursed and the investment costs were not 
recovered.  
4.4.2. Structural Adjustment Programme 
In the 1990’s, water pricing policy, initially applied for the most part in the Northern irrigated 
areas of the country, tended to spread to all the public irrigated areas managed by the regional 
government agencies, including oasis. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) constitutes a 
new shift in Tunisian irrigation policy. In fact, the objective of making farmers pay for equipment 
renewal in addition to the O&M costs was clearly declared by the VIIIth and the IXth national 
economic development plans. These plans were based to a large extent on the SAP 
recommendations (Ministry of Agriculture, 1997).    
Currently, the CRDA continues to fix and adapt pricing systems and levels within their 
administrative regions. After the creation of WUAs, also during the 1990’s, each association was 
authorized to fix water prices in its locality whilst considering its financial balance and local 
constraints. From 1995, water tariffs were increasing on average by 15 % per annum.  
4.4.3. Current pricing systems  
Different pricing methods and structures are currently being applied in Tunisia. These methods 
differ according to the type of management (private, public, WUA, CRDA, etc.), existing 
equipment, and “development objectives14” for each region:  
• Nominal pricing method: based on a fixed (variable between years) volumetric price per 
cubic metre of water consumed. This pricing method is applied in areas equipped with 
irrigation meters. It is currently being used in 285 irrigated areas15 covering 125,338 
hectares (65 % of the total public and collective irrigated areas).  
                                                 
14
 In areas where specific strategic crops are produced.  
15
 Publicly and collectively managed areas 
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• Specific nominal pricing: an alternative nominal method with reduced (subsidized) rates 
in some areas where the government is seeking to encourage the plantation of some 
strategic crops. 
• Per hour-charging: this pricing method is mainly applied in old irrigated districts where 
depreciated irrigation networks exist. These irrigated areas are currently being 
redeveloped to install a modern underground irrigation network with water meters. 127 
irrigated areas (34,116 ha: approximately 17.6 % of the total public and collective 
irrigated areas) are currently using the per-hour-charging structure in Tunisia.   
• Binomial pricing method: this pricing method is currently being tested and has only been 
introduced in 12 irrigated areas (17,550 ha: approximately 10 % of the total publicly and 
collectively irrigated areas). The binomial structure chiefly aims to improve the 
intensification rate. It is based on the assumption that water supply exceeds demand in a 
given scheme and that the intensification rate is low. It also aims to recover part of the 
fixed costs of water even if farmers do not use the whole available supply.  
4.4.4 Water cost structure  
In the absence of reliable and precise cost accounting in the CRDA, the total costs of irrigation 
water, including fixed costs, are unknown (Thabet and Chebil, 2007). The available information 
only covers water O&M costs. According to the MARH, Average O&M costs for irrigation water 
is composed of (Hamdane, 2002): 37.5 % labour costs; 17.6 % energy costs; and 10.4 % 
consumable products. The evolution of this cost structure for the period 1995-2003 is reported in 
table 4.3.  
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Table 4. 3. Structure of water operating and maintenance costs (1000 TND) 
Year Labor Energy Consumable 
products 
Others Total 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
5 663  
5 570  
5 653  
5 758  
5 828 
5 934 
6 030 
5 412 
5 725  
3 198 
2 306 
2 588 
2 581 
2 339 
2 983 
2 821 
3 131 
2 472  
1 592  
2 042 
1 586 
1 820 
 956 
2 411 
1 658 
1 320 
729  
3 399 
2 755 
4 469 
4 827 
5 666 
5 361 
6 153 
8 544 
6 245  
13 853 
12 675 
14 297 
14 988 
14 791 
16 690 
16 663 
18 409 
15 172  
Average 5 730 2 713 1 568 5 269 15 282 
Average share (%) 37.50 17.60 10.40 34.50 100 
Source : DGGREE  (various years) 
According to Thabet and Chebil, (2007), the O&M costs provided by the MARH can only be 
considered as ‘indicative’ because they are not computed with a high level of accuracy. The 
workforce, for instance, can be employed in several publicly irrigated areas at the same time. 
This also applied to the machinery, transport vehicles, and heavy tools.  
Taking into account the total volume of water invoiced by the CRDA in Tunisia, we can obtain 
the following average O&M cost per cubic metre as reported in table 4.4. 
Table 4. 4. Trend in annual average operation and maintenance costs   
Year Total water O&M costs  
(TND) 
Invoiced volume  
(Mcm) 
water O&M costs  
(TND/Mcm) 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
13 853 000 
12 675 000 
14 297 000 
14 988 000 
14 791 000 
16 690 000 
16 663 000 
18 409 000 
15 172 000  
175 017 
161 578 
186 371 
169 079 
174 417 
218 793 
196 706 
238 605 
158 757 
79 
78 
77 
89 
85 
76 
85 
77 
96 
Total 137 541 1679 2 46 0.082 
Source : DGGREE (various years); Thabet and Chebil, 2007.  
Table 4.4 shows that, for the period 1995-2003, average O&M cost per cubic metre of water was 
around 0.082 TND. However, these costs do not include provision for equipment renewal nor 
CHAPTER 4                                                                                                                Water institutions in Tunisia 
 85 
exceptional maintenance costs. The fixed cost of water production and distribution is not 
considered either. The long term purpose of water pricing is to achieve total recovery of these 
latter costs. 
4.4.5. Price levels and cost recovery 
Irrigation water prices are spatially and temporally variable. In 2000, they ranged between 0.116 
Tunisian Dinars per cubic metre (TND/m3) in the Central coast and 0.035 TND/m3 in the South 
(Hamdane, 2002). These prices have increased significantly during the past decade in order to 
take into account the inflation rate in addition to the O&M cost recovery. As mentioned above, 
the recommended annual increase in these prices was about 15 % in nominal terms (9 % in real 
terms). This rate of increase has been adopted since 1995. Consequently, average price per cubic 
metre, in the publicly managed irrigated areas increased from 0.060 TND/m3 in 1995 to 0.110 
TND/m3 in 2003, with some annual variability as reported by Figure 4.3. Figure 4.3 shows that 
recovery of a proportion of large equipment renewal costs commenced from 1999 (see also 
Figure 4.4). 
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Fig 4. 3. Trend in water subsidy regarding the O&M costs16 (TD/m3) (MARH, various years) 
                                                 
16
 The negative value of the subsidy means that the selling price covers the water O&M costs as well as a part of the 
renewal costs  
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Given that water prices and subsidies are fixed in each region according to its socioeconomic 
specific conditions, the recorded recovery rates consequently differ from one region to another 
(Fig 4.4).  
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Fig 4. 4. O&M costs recovery by region (Hamdane 2002). 
4.4.6. Future trends  
The government is seeking to combine and implement various pricing methods in addition to the 
monomial one currently used. In areas exploiting groundwater sources, the volumetric method 
could have the opposite effect on water exploitation, particularly when water prices increase 
(Hamdane, 2002).  Under these conditions, a trend to adopt a binomial pricing method is more 
effective in order to avoid over-exploitation of the resource from the same source.  
The government also tends to take into account the socioeconomic and specific physical 
conditions of each irrigated area when fixing water prices. In fact, in some regions, farmers’ 
revenue is still very low and their payment capacities should be considered before continually 
increasing water prices. The sustainability of irrigated activity in these areas could be threatened 
if accompanying development policies are not undertaken in parallel with the cost recovery 
objective.  
4.5. National and regional water administration 
4.5.1. National central administration 
At the national level, the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (MAHR), through its 
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various departments, is considered as the principal manager of the water sector in Tunisia. 
However, other ministries, such as the ministry of public health, ministry of public finance, 
ministry of interior affairs, etc. could also be involved in some management aspects. Main central 
departments of the MAHR that are directly involved in water sector management are:  
• General Department of Water Resources (Direction Générale des Ressources en Eau 
DGRE) which is responsible for monitoring and overall assessment of water resources at 
the national level;  
• General Department of Dams and of Large Hydraulic Projects (Direction Générale des 
Barrages et des Grand Travaux hydrauliques) which is responsible for the construction of 
dams (and other large hydraulic projects) and their exploitation in irrigation and other 
uses.  
• General Department of Agricultural Engineering and Water Exploitation (Direction 
Générale du Génie Rurale et de l’Exploitation des Eaux); This administration is 
responsible for: irrigation and drainage, rural equipment and development, and (irrigation) 
water supply for rural populations. 
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Fig 4. 5. Hierarchy of the national and regional administration involved in irrigation management in Tunisia 
(Al Atiri, 2003). 
Some other public departments belonging to the MAHR are also involved in resource 
management. For instance, the SECADUNORD (Fig 4.5) is responsible for the maintenance of 
large water pipes and water transfer between regions. The AFA (Agence Foncière Agricole) is 
charged with the implementation and enforcement of agrarian law reforms (which could in some 
cases be related to irrigation development issues). The National agency for the protection of the 
environment (ANPE: Agence Nationale de Protection de l’Environnement) is a government 
agency that belongs to the ministry of the environment and is responsible for water quality 
control and monitoring.  
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Fig 4. 6. Regional administration involved in irrigation water management (Al Atiri, 2003) 
(SHMPE: Service de l’Hygiène du Milieu et de la Protection de l’Environnement, GIH: Groupement d’intéret 
hydraulique, GIC: Groupement d’intéret collectif)  
At the regional level, there are the Regional Agricultural Development Commissions (CRDA), 
belonging to the MAHR (Fig 4.6).  These represent the central authority of the ministry. They 
have legal standing and financial autonomy and are divided into many regional administrative 
divisions (Fig 4.6). Their principal role is the implementation of government agricultural and 
water policies in their regions. They are responsible for the planning and development of irrigated 
areas. With the help of the AVFA (Agence de vulgarization and de la formation agricole: agency 
for agricultural extension and training), they also promulgate agricultural and irrigation 
technologies across the irrigated areas under their authority.  
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The main CRDA administrative divisions involved in irrigation water management are: The 
division of rural engineering, division of public irrigated perimeters (PIP) management, division 
of PIP maintenance, division of water resources, division of water and soil conservation, and 
division of incentives and encouragement.  
The CRDA undertakes all technical and financial tasks associated with the management of large 
irrigated areas: operation and maintenance of equipment, collection of water fees, organization of 
the irrigation systems, etc. However, in other areas that are managed with the participation of the 
WUA, the CRDA only manages large and costly tasks and continues to distribute water in bulk to 
WUAs for a fixed price.  
The “Associations of hydraulic interests” (Groupement D’Intêrets Hydrauliques: GIH) (Fig 4.6) 
are important regional administrations with regard to irrigation. These are consultative entities 
that are chaired by the governor of the region and are composed of representatives from each 
WUA, from professional economic organizations, and from the relevant division of the CRDA. 
They have the sole decision making power with respect to creating new WUAs or the dissolution 
of existing ones.  
Annual budgets and irrigation water tariffs are proposed by the CRDA and submitted to the 
MAHR for approval. The ministry decides on the level of subsidy and on the eventual financial 
allocation necessary to balance the CRDA irrigation management budget. Moreover, the CRDA 
receives specific allocations annually in order to undertake major maintenance or renovation 
tasks.  
4.5.2. Water users’ associations  
The dissolution during the 1990’s of the central “Office of Medjerda Valley Development17” 
(Office de Mise en Valeur de la Vallée de la Medjerda (OMVVM)) and the reinforcement of the 
CRDA role in regional irrigation development can be considered as major administrative reforms 
for the Tunisian water sector. Also, the revision, at the same time, of old judicial texts and the 
                                                 
17
 Central administration which was responsible of all irrigation management tasks at the national level. 
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implementation of new laws relating to collective water management are important elements in 
this policy shift. Within this context, various other actions were undertaken to improve regional 
and local management capacities - such as improvements in technical capacity, staff training, and 
so on. The creation of WUAs as an organizational entity, grouping together all farmers belonging 
to a given local irrigated area, was the main step in this decentralization process. The aim was to 
increase farmer participation in decision making and resource management. WUAs are 
established through government funding and are given responsibility for the collection of water 
fees as well as service related fees (infrastructure maintenance and so on). The number of WUAs 
for irrigation water management has risen sharply from about 100 in 1987 to 1142 in 2004 
(MARH, 2006) managing more than 150,000 ha of irrigated lands (Fig 4.7).  
 
Fig 4. 7. Evolution of the number of WUAs in Tunisia (GIC PI: WUA for irrigation purposes; GIC AEP: 
WUA for drinking water purposes) 
Many national and regional institutions are involved in the functioning of WUAs (Fig 4.8). The 
WUAs are monitored and framed by special regional administrative entities, belonging to the 
rural engineering division. This latter division provides them with important services, particularly 
in relation to the technical, administrative and financial training of their staff.   
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: National level 
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 : Services provided 
Fig 4. 8. Administrative framework of the Tunisian WUA (GIC) (Braham, 2005). 
The responsibilities shared in the irrigated areas between various actors (CRDA, WUA, and 
farmers) are specified by three types of contract: (1) membership contract: which frames the 
transactions between the WUA and irrigators. It contains details of the technical and economic 
dimensions of the irrigation transaction; (2) management contract: which has to be put in place 
between the WUA and the CRDA. This contract concerns the sharing of maintenance and 
investment tasks between these two actors; (3) maintenance contract: which can be entered into 
by any WUA and a private company for doing specific maintenance tasks.  
Each year, each WUA is responsible for establishing its own budget. The WUA also has the right 
to determine the water price and to decide whether the payment basis should be water volume in 
terms of production or distribution. Furthermore, they estimate the level of projected investments, 
and operational and maintenance charges. Financially, the WUA perform the following tasks: 
operation and maintenance of canals, repairs to various infrastructures, functioning of the 
association and investments (Table 4.5). The water charge established by the WUA comprises 
water buying charges, energy fees, labour charges and maintenance and management fees. 
 
 
MAHR Ministry of 
interior affairs 
Ministry  of 
Finance 
Ministry of 
public health 
CRDA and various 
Departments 
Governor 
President 
of GIH 
Financial 
controller 
- Main  policy 
guidelines  
- staff education  
1600 Drinking Water GIC; 1050 Irrigation 
Water GIC; 100 mixed GIC 
Water quality 
control, health 
education, etc.  
(Mainly for 
drinking water 
GICs) 
Creation and 
dissolution power 
Technical assistance ; 
budget supports 
CHAPTER 4                                                                                                                Water institutions in Tunisia 
 93 
Table 4. 5. Principal financial revenue and expenditure of the WUA  
Financial Revenues Financial expenditures 
1- Contribution of users for adherence to the 
association; 
2- Water selling; 
3- Revenues from other activities that the WUA are 
allowed to undertake;  
4- Conceivable subventions; 
5- Various incomes.  
1- Maintenance, reparations and functioning 
expenditures; 
2- WUA management expenditures; 
3-Refunding of loans;  
4- Eventual investments;  
5- Unexpected expenditures.  
 
Source: MARH, 2004 
 
 
Fig 4. 9. Internal structure of WUA 
WUAs are managed by an administrative council composed of between 3 and 9 members 
belonging to the adherents and elected by the general assembly for a total period of three years 
(Fig 4.9). The president of this administrative council is chosen from amongst these elected 
members. His main mission is to represent the interests of the WUA in its relationships with the 
public administration and other tiers. He can also choose a technical director (according to the 
needs and financial situation of the WUA) to ensure closer follow-up of various development and 
maintenance tasks. Financial aspects of the WUA are organised by a treasurer, appointed on the 
recommendation of the administrative council and approved by the governor. The accounts of the 
WUA are generally controlled by a regional financial agent belonging to the Ministry of Finance 
(Fig 4.8). 
4.5.3. Some failure factors of the administration and WUAs  
Some major failure factors of irrigation water administration and organizations can be drawn 
from empirical research and reports already made in the case of Tunisia. These can be divided 
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into three types:  
(a) Judicial factors: the management contract, that specifies the relationship between the 
WUA and the CRDA and describes the main responsibilities and tasks of both actors, is 
not well defined (Bied-Charreton, et al., 2004). In fact, according to the same author, 
specific conditions under which investment projects have to be undertaken by one or 
other of the actors, are not well specified. In addition, the contract duration is not 
specified and sanctions are not anticipated in cases where some of the contractual 
obligations are not met. It is broadly mentioned that large irrigation development projects 
have to be done by the CRDA whilst the “less important” ones are within the remit of 
WUA. This could be interpreted in different ways and thus lead to some confusion. 
Currently, the specialist departments of the MARH are working on another draft of this 
contract in order to clarify it.  
(b) Financial and technical factors: technical problems mostly relate to the WUAs and their 
functioning. WUAs that were created in old irrigated districts are adversely affected by 
the decay of their irrigation networks and infrastructures. Renovation places high charges 
on the WUA. In some other cases, maintenance tasks are neglected by the managers of 
the WUA, and this can have a negative effect in the medium to long term.  These 
technical factors generally affect the dependability, adequacy and efficiency of the water 
delivery systems. Problems and misunderstandings between irrigators and the WUA can 
emerge when these tasks are not well performed (Chraga and Chemakh, 2003).     
Another major problem concerns the limited management capacity of the WUAs’ 
administrative members (Ben Salem et al., 2005) who are for the most part, elderly, not 
well educated or trained (Bied-Charreton, et al., 2004). Indeed, the complexity of some 
tasks requires a higher level of competence and motivation, in addition to the full 
availability of managers.   
Also, the “Cellules de promotion des GDA” (CP) that support the functioning of the 
WUA do not have sufficient means at their disposal and are sometimes incapable of 
assisting all the WUAs in their regions. In fact, in each CRDA, only one CP is created and 
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is responsible for technical and management assistance for all the existing WUAs in the 
region. According to Bied-Charreton, et al. (2004) these CPs have around 90 technicians 
working across all the Tunisian territory and are responsible for supporting more than 
2000 WUAs around the country. This rate varies from region to region.  
(c) Social factors: many social problems hinder the improvement of WUA performance in 
Tunisia. The lack of mobilization and motivation of farmers is a major difficulty (Chraga 
and Chemakh, 2003; Bied-Charreton, et al., 2004; Ben Salem, 2005). It is not uncommon 
to find a WUA without a president of the administrative council (Chraga and Chemakh, 
2003; Bied-Charreton et al., 2004). Often, the lack of farmers’ confidence in their 
administrative staff means that collective decisions are not respected or applied (Bied-
Charreton et al., 2004). Furthermore, in most cases, the public authorities (CRDA) 
participate in the choice of WUA president, which makes its legitimacy for farmers weak, 
and leads to some erroneous perceptions about collective action and the principles of 
public participation. In some other cases, the social standing that large and rich farmers 
have in the association and the special treatment given to meet their demands for 
irrigation also negatively affect satisfaction and participation by small farmers (Chraga 
and Chemakh, 2003). 
In this thesis, most of these factors are assumed to be exogenous to irrigation institutions. Some 
of them will be considered as explanatory variables when studying the efficiency of specific 
institutional aspects.  
4.6. Conclusion  
In this chapter, some failures of irrigation institutions in Tunisia are drawn from available 
literature. These failures are mainly due to the lack of enforcement and/or to the low technical, 
organizational, and social performances of existing institutions. In this respect, the rest of the 
dissertation will be dedicated to further investigate about efficiency of some specific irrigation 
institutions in Tunisia, such as WUA and local administration and organization, effect of the 
governance structure on irrigation performances, water property right, and pricing regulation. 
Potential gain that could be acquired if these various institutions would perform better in addition 
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to main factors affecting their effectiveness will be analyzed. 
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Chapter 5. Efficiency of Water Users’ Associations  
 
Abstract 
Relatively speaking “Public administrations” will have no further responsibility for the local 
management of water resources in Tunisia. In fact, this responsibility is planed to be completely 
devoted in the near future to WUAs in all public irrigated areas. It is for this reason that our focus 
in the current chapter will be on the study of WUA functional, regulatory and accountability 
capacities. We analyse the efficiency of local WUAs in the Cap Bon region (central Tunisia) and 
study its main determinants. This latter analysis is performed in two stages. Firstly, efficiency is 
measured via the nonparametric ‘Data Envelopment Analysis’ (DEA) technique. The DEA 
models are constructed not only to assess the overall WUA efficiency but also to evaluate the 
separate efficiencies of the management and engineering sub-vectors through a mathematical 
modification to the initial DEA model. As a second stage, critical technical and organizational 
determinants of efficiency are assessed using a Tobit model. Results show that, on average, 
18.7% of the inputs used could be saved if the WUA were to operate on the frontier. The 
inefficiencies found can furthermore be attributed mainly to the number of years of experience in 
operating a WUA, in addition to the number of water pipes managed and the irrigation ratio. The 
average scale efficiency of the sample was around 71% indicating that many WUAs are not 
operating at an efficient scale. The scale inefficiencies result mainly from administrative and 
organizational variables. Sub-vector efficiencies show that, on average, the inefficiency of WUAs 
is linked more strongly to inefficiency in expenditure on their internal management and 
functioning, than to engineering inefficiencies.  
 
Part of this chapter is accepted as:  
Frija, A., Speelman. S., Chebil, A., Buysse, J. Van Huylenbroeck, G. (in press). Assessing the 
Efficiency of Irrigation Water Users’ Associations and its Determinants: Evidences from Tunisia. 
Irrigation and Drainage (in press/Published online) DOI: 10.1002/ird.446 
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5.1. Introduction and problem statement  
Decentralization processes in irrigation water management required judicial, institutional and 
administrative reforms to frame the organization of formal user groups known as water users 
associations (WUAs). These WUAs constitute the heart of the devolution programmes, where 
rights and responsibilities are transferred to a common local level, supervised and managed by 
WUAs. The actual outcomes of irrigation water management devolution programmes in various 
countries are somewhat mixed. The objectives of achieving a positive impact on resource 
productivity, equity, full cost recovery and environmental sustainability are not always met. In 
fact, WUAs often disappear after the cessation of the donor funding programme (Vermillion, 
1997). In other cases, they are unable to achieve full cost recovery for irrigation water delivery or 
to cover their operational costs. This can occur for many reasons - such as inappropriate bundles 
of transferred property rights18 and the internal organisation of the associations. These factors are 
incentives for farmer participation and determine long-term sustainability. 
Fro example, in Tunisia, in 2003 only 27% of WUAs succeeded in covering their entire 
operational and maintenance costs whilst 28% of them covered even less than 50% of those costs 
and were still subsidized by the government (Al Atiri, 2003). It is also clear that WUAs in 
Tunisia still face many challenges relating to technical, financial and social factors. Problems 
differ however, from one WUA to another, with only some associations considered efficient. In 
response to this observation, and taking into account the fact that the initial judicial and 
administrative basis of all WUAs is the same, this study aims to undertake a comparison between 
WUAs’ performance. Many methodologies can be used for this purpose, ranging from a simple 
visual comparison of performance figures to relatively sophisticated mathematical methods 
(Malano et al., 2004). In our case, the relative efficiency for a sample of Tunisian WUAs is 
analysed using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In fact, many studies have used DEA 
methodology to analyse organizations’ efficiency. The applications range from banks, health and 
educational administrations and forest organizations to airlines and railway companies (Luo, 
                                                 
18
 In some cases, only the responsibility for irrigation water management is transferred. However, a bundle of 
property rights should also be transferred to WUAs to enable the decentralization process to succeed. 
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2001; Kirigia et al., 2004; Siddharthan et al., 1999; Kao et al., 1993; Viitala, 1998; Joro and 
Viitala, 1999; Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007). However, the application undertaken in this chapter for 
assessing the efficiency of organizations specialising in water management is quite unique. To 
our knowledge, only Umetsu et al. (2005) have applied a similar DEA analysis of Turkish 
WUAs. One of the shortcomings in their paper was however, that, although they encountered 
significant effects for WUA size on the efficiency score, they did not consider a variable returns 
to scale specification. Furthermore, in the irrigation and drainage sector, DEA is often applied to 
estimate production efficiency for large irrigated systems and districts at regional level (Malana 
and Malano, 2006; Diaz Rodriguez et al., 2005; Malano et al., 2004; Diaz Rodriguez et al., 
2004). In our study, we assume that DEA is not only suitable for analysing the efficiency of 
water management associations, but moreover that the methodology used allows the calculation 
of overall efficiency in addition to the separate sub-vector efficiencies. Using the concept of 
subvector efficiency, we analyze management and engineering efficiencies. In fact, by assessing 
management efficiency we seek to express how well a given WUA allocates its expenditure for 
managing its internal organization and functioning, in comparison with the rest of the WUAs in 
the sample. In the same sense, engineering efficiency expresses the performance of a given WUA 
in allocating expenditure for maintenance tasks, relative to the rest of WUAs in the studied 
sample. Maintenance expenditure includes expenses for maintenance and repair of the irrigation 
network and the pumping stations. Energy costs (for WUAs that are pumping water from a 
borehole) and labour costs for performing maintenance tasks are also included. As a second step, 
a Tobit model is estimated, to provide insight into local inefficiencies and thus to determine 
potential factors affecting the functioning of WUAs. 
5.2. Methodology: Efficiency assessment of WUAs by DEA technique 
The Tunisian authorities plan to transfer all public irrigated areas to decentralized collective 
management in the near future; CRDA will then cease to have responsibility for the local 
management of water. It is for this reason that our focus in the current chapter is on the analysis 
of the functional, regulatory and accountability capacities of WUAs. The relative efficiency 
assessment of WUAs is performed by comparing the higher to the lower performing ones. DEA 
methodology, which is considered to be a sophisticated mathematical tool for performance 
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comparison, is used for this purpose. It is important to remember that, for the purposes of this 
empirical application, we consider the WUA as the independent decision making unit (DMU), 
with specific input and output vectors. WUA efficiency will then be evaluated against the set of 
objectives that are defined by the managers of these associations.  
Measurement of technical efficiency is based upon deviations of observed output or input vectors 
from the best production or efficient production frontier. If a production units’ actual production 
point lies on the frontier it is regarded as perfectly efficient. If it deviates from the frontier then it 
is technically inefficient, with the ratio of actual to potential production defining the level of 
(in)efficiency for the individual DMU. This means that our measure of technical efficiency 
provides an indication as to how all input use can be minimized in the production process for a 
given DMU, whilst continuing to produce the same level of output. Additionally, we consider the 
possible reduction of a subset of inputs whilst keeping other inputs, and the output, constant. This 
generates a “subvector efficiency” measure.  
Parametric and non-parametric methods are the two main approaches used to measure technical 
efficiency. The results from both methods are highly correlated in most cases (Wadud and White, 
2000; Thiam et al., 2001; Alene and Zeller, 2005), indicating that both methods are valuable and 
that the choice can be based on researcher preference. A major advantage of non-parametric DEA 
for this study is that the calculation of sub-vector efficiency for specific input use is relatively 
straightforward (Speelman et al., 2008). 
5.2.1. Standard DEA model 
Farrell (1957) introduces the relative efficiency concept, that permits efficiency evaluation for a 
DMU by comparing it to the other DMUs in a given group. This concept was extended by 
Charnes et al. (1978) who developed the first DEA model, called CCR (Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes), to incorporate many inputs and outputs simultaneously. In this way, DEA provides a 
straightforward approach for calculating the efficiency gap between the actions of each producer 
and best practice - inferred from observations of the inputs used and the outputs generated by an 
efficient DMU (Wadud and White, 2000; Malano et al., 2004; Haji, 2006). Explicitly, DEA uses 
piecewise linear programming to calculate the efficient or best practice frontier for a sample of 
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DMUs. The DMU on this technical efficiency frontier will have an efficiency score equal to 1. 
The DEA technique does not require the development of standards against which efficiency is 
measured. Derived ratings are estimated within a set of analysed units (less efficient DMUs are 
measured in relation to efficient ones). Moreover, different units of measurement for the various 
inputs and outputs can be combined within the DEA models. 
The DEA model defines efficiency as the ratio of the weighted sum of outputs for a given DMU, 
to its weighted sum of inputs. For each kDMU , a non-negative input vector 
N
kNk
k Rxxx +∈= ),...,( 1 is transformed to a non-negative output vector MkMkk Ryyy +∈= ),...,( 1 . In 
an input-oriented model of technical efficiency, the production possibility set (P), which also 
describes the technology, represents the set of all feasible input-output vectors: 
{ }yproducecanxyxP /),(=  
One of the analysis options in DEA is a choice between Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) and 
Variable Returns to Scale (VRS). CRS assumes that there is no significant relationship between 
efficiency and the scale of operation. Thus assuming that large WUAs are just as efficient as 
small ones in converting inputs to outputs. Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) suggested an 
extension of the CRS DEA model to account for variable returns to scale (VRS) situations. The 
use of the CRS specification when not all DMUs are operating at the optimal scale will result in 
measures of TE which are confounded by scale efficiencies (SE). The use of the VRS 
specification will permit the calculation of TE without these SE effects (in Coelli. Tim., 1996). 
However, we anticipate that the scale of activity (size of the organization) of the WUA has an 
important effect on its efficiency (Umetsu et al., 2005). Furthermore we assume that changes in 
the organization’s inputs can lead to disproportionate changes to its outputs. Therefore, the option 
of VRS has been chosen for this study. A second option is the choice between input-oriented and 
output-oriented DEA models. If the focus is to use different resources more efficiently (instead of 
increasing production), then the suitable model to use is an input-oriented one (Rodríguez Diaz et 
al., 2004). In our case, it is necessary, as a national objective for the decentralization process, that 
the WUAs recover their expenditure to ensure their sustainability. In addition, the volume of 
water that a given WUA purchases from the regional water management administration is 
planned and fixed at the beginning of the year. This is necessary to enable the WUA to 
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determine its water rates. Therefore, during the agricultural year, the WUAs will focus mainly on 
minimising their expenditure. For these reasons, it is proposed that an input-oriented model 
would be more suitable in our case. Recapitulating, we chose to estimate Variable Return to Scale 
(VRS) efficiencies through a BCC (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984) input-oriented model.  
Following the BCC model, if we consider K DMU (k=1,…,K), each of them uses N inputs 
variables nkx (n=1,…,N), for producing M outputs mky (m=1,…,M). Each DMU0 becomes the 
reference unit and then we have to resolve the following linear program (model 1) k times (one 
time for each DMU): 
θλθ ,Min  (1) 
s.t. 
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Where θ  is a variable representing the efficiency of the reference DMU0, and hence the 
percentage reduction to which each input must be subjected in order to reach the production 
frontier. kλ  is a vector of k elements representing the influence of each DMU in determining the 
efficiency of the DMU0. The term ∑
=
K
k
kmk y
1
,
λ indicates the weighted sum of outputs of all DMU, 
which must be superior or equal to the output of DMU0 (constraint 2). In constraint 3, θ  is the 
measure of technical efficiency and represents, at the same time, the minimized objective. Thus, 
constraint 3 indicates that the value of θ  assessed must shift the production factors toward the 
production frontier (for a given output level). Equation 4 consists of the convexity constraint, 
which specifies a variable returns to scale option. The DMU whose λ values are positive will be 
the reference set for DMU0 under study. In fact, it is the linear combination of those units, which 
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will formulate the situation objective needed to achieve efficiency.  
5.2.2. Subvector DEA model 
To calculate the efficiency score for the use of an individual input or subset of inputs, the ‘sub-
vector efficiency’ concept can be introduced. This measure generates a technical efficiency for a 
subset of inputs whilst remaining inputs are held constant (Speelman et al., 2007). The sub-vector 
efficiency measure looks at the potential reduction in the selected subset of inputs, holding all 
other inputs and outputs constant (Oude Lansink and Silva, 2004; Oude Lansink and Silva, 2003; 
Oude Lansink et al., 2002; Färe et al., 1994). Following Färe et al. (1994) technical sub-vector 
efficiency for the variable input (t) can be determined for each farm (i) by solving the following 
transformed model (2): 
t
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Where tθ is the input t sub-vector technical efficiency score for the DMU0 under study. The 
measure tθ represents the maximum reduction of variable input t holding outputs and all 
remaining inputs (n-t) constant. All other variables are defined as in model (1). Therefore, the 
input t sub-vector technical efficiency model involves finding a frontier that minimises the 
quantity of input t (Oude Lansink et al., 2002). The figure below provides a graphical distinction 
between both overall and subvector efficiency concepts.   
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Fig 5. 1. Overall and sub-vector, Input-oriented, technical efficiency (Oude Lansink et al., 2002) 
The overall technical efficiency for the WUA (A) is measured by the ratio OA0/OA (Fig 5.1). The 
measure of overall technical efficiency assumes that both x1 and x2 can be reduced radially 
(given by 1- OA0/OA). Subvector efficiency for a particular input x1 assumes it is possible to 
reduce x1 whilst holding x2 and the output constant. The subvector efficiency of WUA (A) 
relating to a given x1 input can then be measured by the ratio: O’A’/OA.   
5.2.3. Tobit model 
The technical structure, in addition to the administrative and organizational characteristics of 
WUAs, can be potential sources of inefficiency. Several variables are selected as potential 
determinants of their calculated efficiency levels19. The efficiency scores obtained in the first 
stage of the work are regressed on these WUA attributes. 
In this second stage, ordinary least squares estimations are inconsistent, as the values of the 
dependent variable (efficiency scores) lie in the interval [0, 1]. A censored regression or Tobit 
model can be used to get a consistent estimation. The model is defined in terms of an index 
function: 
                                                 
19
 By WUA efficiency (or efficiency scores) we mean the ‘technical efficiency’ in its standard meaning (as presented 
in section 3.4.1). This kind of efficiency is distinct from ‘allocative efficiency’ and ‘economic efficiency’. In our 
chapter, it is also distinct from ‘engineering efficiency’ and ‘management efficiency’ described above.   
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Where θt are the DEA overall, scale, management, and engineering efficiencies used as a 
dependent variable and Z is a (R*1) vector of independent variables relating to attributes and 
characteristics of WUAs in the sample. For Tobit estimates to be consistent it is necessary that 
residuals (ur) are normal distributed (Holden, 2004). The estimation is carried out by minimising 
a log likelihood function with a part corresponding to non-censored observations and  the other 
for the values equal to one. 
Many critics note that the use of Tobit model as a second DEA stage is invalid. In fact, it is 
argued that the efficiency scores are not generated by a censoring process but are fractional data 
(McDonald, 2009). It is also argued in other cases that complicated, unknown serial correlations 
exist among the estimated efficiency scores (due to the relative nature of scores generation 
process) (Simar and Wilson, 2007). In some other cases, the argument is that DEA scores only 
have a positive pile-up at one of the two corners of the interval ]0,1] (Hoff, 2007). Then, 
according to the latter author, as several other methods for modelling limited dependent variables 
exist, it is straightforward to ask whether one of these may give better predictions of the DEA 
scores than the tobit.  
Hoff 2007 has compared the within sample prediction performance of Two-limit tobit (2LT), 
Ordinary least squares (OLS), quasi-maximum likelihood estimation method proposed by Papke 
and Wooldridge (PW) (1996), and the unit-inflated beta (Beta) model using a case study from 
Danish fishery. In this study, the author found that OLS performed at least as well as the other 
methods. Tobit and the PW methods performed about as well, and the Beta model, poorly. From 
these results, Hoff (2007) advocates using tobit and OLS in second stage DEA. He concluded 
that “firstly, the tobit approach will in most cases be sufficient in representing second stage DEA 
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models. Secondly, it is shown that OLS may actually in many cases replace tobit as sufficient 
second stage DEA”.  
Mc Donald (2009) comes to a similar conclusion about OLS, but advocate not using tobit. He 
argue that tobit regression can be appropriate when the dependent variable data are generated by 
a censoring data generating process, but is inappropriate when the data is fractional. Main 
suggestion of McDonald is that efficiency scores are not censored values, the censoring model 
does not describe how their values were generated. Consequently, tobit is inappropriate.  
McDonald argues that the efficiency scores generating process can however better be described 
as a normalisation process. According to him, the DEA generates a production frontier using the 
DMU input-output data and the DEA assumptions (e.g., returns to scale and disposability of 
inputs). In output-oriented analyses, a DMU’s efficiency score is determined as its actual output 
divided by the frontier output corresponding to the unit’s input values. Thus, this process 
normalises the maximum efficiency score to be one and all efficiency scores to lie on or within 
the unit interval. Although there may be multiple scores of one, there is no censoring. The 
process generates, according to the author, a particular kind of fractional or proportional data. 
The two-stage method has been criticized as well by Coelli et al., (1998) and by Simar and 
Wilson (2000, 2007) who consider that results from this method are likely to be biased in small 
samples. Simar and Wilson (2007) considers that most of authors have argued that DEA 
efficiency estimates are somehow censored since there are typically numerous estimates equal to 
one, but they consider that no coherent account of how the censoring arises has been offered. 
They also consider that a more serious problem came from the fact that DEA efficiency estimates 
are serially correlated.  
Arguments of the latter authors are as follows: A perturbation to an observation located on the 
DEA frontier will shift that frontier toward a second very similar one. As a result, some DMU 
who are originally on the frontier will be only close to it. Also, other DMUs will find themselves 
closer or further to the frontier and their efficiency scores will change accordingly. This is called 
serial correlation between the efficiency scores. As the sample size increase, this serial 
correlation disappears slowly in the DEA context (Alfonso and Aubyn, 2006).  
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Another source of bias comes from the fact that some environmental variable (explicative 
variable of DEA scores) can be correlated to the error term of equation 12. This correlation 
derives from the correlation between these environmental variables from one side and the inputs 
and outputs used for the calculation of efficiency scores, on the other side.  
Simar and Wilson (2007) propose an alternative estimation and inference procedures based on 
bootstrap methods. The method is based on the introduction of a separability condition that 
implies that environmental factors (explicative variables) do not influence the frontier but can 
influence scores of DMUs (McDonald, 2009). Their data generating process does not allow for a 
two-sided noise term and the production unit efficiency terms are unit-specific truncated normal 
distribution. Their results show that a truncated regression estimates the correct model in their 
specific case. In terms of coverage of estimated confidence intervals, their double bootstrap 
procedure is shown to perform well. 
McDonald (2009) consider that Simar and Wilson (2007) advocate a very complex estimation 
procedure, which may be invalid given their chosen data generating process, but is not robust to 
plausible departure from it (in particular, that true efficiency scores in the second stage equation 
are unit-specific, truncated normal random variables). Given their unusual DGP, it is unclear 
what interpretation can be placed on Simar and Wilson’s simulation evidence (McDonald, 2009).   
Using the approach suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) requires that all variables are included 
in the whole two-stage DEA process (Hansson and Öhlmér, 2008). Further, an empirical 
comparison between the bootstrap approaches and the DEA–Tobit approach, by Afonso and 
Aubyn (2006) showed that the results were very similar across methods. Moreover, du to the 
small size of our sample, a truncation will reduces further the size of the sample and may results 
in non-accurate estimates of significant variables. For this reason, in this application we followed 
McDonald (2009) and Hoff (2007) and we also estimated an OLS function using the same 
explicative variables regressed in the tobit model. Results showed that there are no significant 
differences between both methods. Only results from tobit regression will be then exposed.  
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5.3. Empirical application 
5.3.1. Case study and data sample characteristics  
The database used for this analysis was collected by the Agricultural and Hydraulic Resources 
Ministry of Tunisia. This central database concerns 45 WUAs, which constitutes all the WUAs 
operating in the Cap Bon region (governorate of Nabeul). The Cap Bon is located in northern 
Tunisia and is bounded in the East by the Mediterranean Sea (Fig 5.2). The total agricultural area 
for the region is 256,500 ha, of which 183,000 ha are arable land and 41,000 ha are irrigable 
lands. Cereals occupy the greatest land area at 53,000 ha, vegetables 35,000 ha, olives for olive 
oil 23,500 ha, citrus fruit 13,450 ha and others 6,300 ha (CRDA Nabeul, 2006). In 2004 around 
22% of the total population in the Cap Bon region were employed in the agricultural sector. 
Agricultural production in Cap Bon contributes almost 15% to the total national agricultural 
production. The number of farms in the region is approximately 32,000 (6.6% of total Tunisian 
farms). Only 25,500 ha (92% of the total irrigated land) are equipped with a public irrigation 
network and the remaining area is irrigated from dams and other private sources. Currently, 
irrigated areas in Cap Bon represent about 13.3% of the total Tunisian irrigated lands and it is 
considered one of the most water-consuming regions in the country (Fig 5.2). 71% of the 
irrigated areas belong to small and average-sized farms.  
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Fig 5. 2. Map of Tunisia: Cap bon region as a main irrigation water consumer20 
5.3.2. Overall, management, and engineering efficiencies  
With regard to the selection of outputs and inputs, as a general rule of thumb, there should be at 
least three DMUs for each input and output variable used in the model, since with less than three 
DMUs per input and output too many DMUs will turn out to be efficient (Alfonso and Santos, 
2005). According to the database, the WUAs’ expenditure can be broadly divided into 
management expenditure, maintenance costs, water purchasing costs, labour costs, repayment of 
debts and other expenditure. Given that in our empirical application, we focus on the relationship 
                                                 
20
 Gray-stained zones on the map show the abundance of irrigated lands in a given region. 
Cap Bon 
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between inputs and outputs of the WUA, we have chosen to aggregate the main financial inputs 
of the water users associations into management expenditure, maintenance expenditure, and 
purchasing water expenditure. The management expenditure vector integrates expenses relating 
to the internal organization and functioning of the WUA. The maintenance expenditure vector, on 
the other hand, integrates the cost of labour used for maintenance and the energy fees spent to 
pump water from drilling, in addition to the typical maintenance costs. In fact, expenditure 
vectors were always used as inputs for DEA models to analyse the efficiency of organizations 
(Kirigia et al., 2004; Alfonso and Santos, 2005; Luo, 2003). However, given the multiple 
objectives of WUAs (equipment renewal, price minimization for socio-economic considerations, 
good maintenance and operational coverage rates etc.), some expenditure, such as investment, 
would in the short term have negative effects on the results for the WUA. In the long term, this 
input can have an inverse positive effect by decreasing the annual maintenance costs and 
increasing the total amount of the WUA return. In order to consider the investment vector as an 
input, more detailed panel data would be needed. Therefore, in this study, due to data limitation, 
it has been decided to calculate efficiency scores in a static framework and thus the investment 
variable is not considered. Nevertheless, this may have  
The chosen outputs considered are the annual irrigated area (ha), and the total annual irrigation 
water delivery per unit of irrigated area (m3 ha-1yr-1). The annual irrigated area is considered as 
key descriptor for irrigation and drainage scheme performance in the literature (Malano et al., 
2004) and the total annual irrigation water delivery per unit of irrigated area is also one of the 
most relevant service delivery performance indicators (Malano et al., 2004). It is used as a 
benchmarking indicator in many International Water Management Institute (IWMI) studies. 
These two outputs are the only constant and stable WUA outputs in the short term. The financial 
revenue of the WUA, which could be a relevant output for consideration, can always change from 
one year to another according to the association’s objectives. For example, in some cases where 
there is high investment in modernization, the revenue will quickly reduce during the studied year 
and consequently cannot be taken as an efficiency parameter to integrate it in such DEA models. 
Other data relating to some productive performance indicators (total gross annual agricultural 
production in the area managed by the WUA; total annual value of agricultural production; 
output per unit service area, etc.) are not relevant for our study, since we evaluate the efficiency 
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of WUAs (as decision making units) and not the efficiency of the national policy for water 
demand management. According to this input-output choice, an efficient WUA will be the one 
that has a lower Input/Output ratio (Expenditure/m3 and Expenditure/ha) and consequently which 
reflects better performance in minimizing water rates for farmers. 
In the management sub-vector efficiency only the efficiency of the individual management 
expenditure input is considered, whilst holding the rest of the inputs and outputs constant. 
Generally, management expenditure is stable over time (Terraux, 2002). The engineering sub-
vector efficiency considers only the inputs relating to the total expenditure on maintenance. 
The 45 WUAs in Cap Bon manage around 16,000 ha of lands (9% of the total arable land in the 
governorate) owned by 8,206 adherent farmers. The total volume of water distributed by those 
associations is around 87.5 million cubic metres and the average irrigated surface area per WUA 
is nearly 355 ha. Basic statistics regarding the selected WUAs are shown in Table 5.1.  
Table 5. 1. Basic statistics for the data used in the DEA Model  
Outputs Inputs  
Nbr of 
irrigated 
ha/year 
Vol of water 
Distributed/ha 
(m3) 
Management 
expenditure 
(TDN) 
Maintenance 
expenditure 
(TDN) 
Purchasing water 
cost (TDN) 
Average 3 090.7 346.9 3 940.2 35 214.5 49 302 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 595.9 286.2 3 363.7 24 416.3 56 618.8 
Minimum  491 15 103 2 873 0* 
Maximum  9 427 1 342 13 539 106 185 228 252 
* Water from drillings 
Several variables are hypothesized to affect the efficiency scores. Technical, administrative, and 
organizational characteristics of WUAs used in the Tobit Analysis came from the national survey 
of the structure and functioning of WUAs undertaken by the Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture 
and Hydraulic Resources in 2005. 
Technical characteristics include the number of years of experience operating a WUA (age of the 
association), the number of water pipes managed by the WUA, the irrigated area under the 
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control of the WUA and that equipped with water saving technology, the irrigation ratio21, and 
the ratio of water losses in water distribution operations. Organizational and administrative 
characteristics are also hypothesized to have an important effect on resource management inside a 
given WUA. In fact, the most organized WUAs are expected to be more efficient. Variables used 
are: ratio of adherent farmers to the WUA, number of technical salaried staff, number of 
members in the administrative council, and the existence (or not) of a technical director for the 
WUA (Table 5.2).  
Table 5. 2. Definition of variables used in Tobit regressions 
Variable Definition Mean value 
Technical characteristics of the irrigated district   
- N of years in function Years experience operating a WUA 8.5 
- N of water pipes Number of water pipes. Each pipe is used by a 
group of farmers 
178.4 
- Areas equipped by water saving 
technologies 
The irrigated area managed by WUA and 
equipped by water saving technologies (ha) 
257.7 
- Irrigation ratio  Area exploited, managed and irrigated 
/exploitable area 
62.8 
- Ratio of water losses  Initial quantity of water hold by the 
WUA/distributed quantity of water 
0.06 
   
Administrative and organizational characteristics of the WUA  
- Ratio of adherent farmers to the WUA Number of adherents/total number of farmers 
belonging to the WUA geographical limits  
70.9 
- N of technical salaried staff Number of technical staff working in the WUA 4.2 
- N of members in the administration 
council 
-  5.2 
- Existence of a technical director 1 for WUA with technical director  
0 for WUA without technical director 
- 
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Efficiency analysis 
Using the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) to solve the linear programming 
problems outlined above, the efficiency measures for the WUAs were estimated. Model (1) was 
solved 45 times to provide efficiency scores for each WUA under a VRS specification. 
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 Irrigation ratio corresponds to the  ratio of the surface area grown with irrigated crops to the total surface area 
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Management and engineering sub-vector efficiencies were also calculated for each WUA solving 
model (2). Table 5.3 gives the frequency distribution for the overall efficiency estimates obtained 
for the WUA under study.  
Table 5. 3. Frequency distribution of overall efficiency for the studied sample.  
 Overall VRS Efficiency 
Efficiency level (%) N° of WUA %  
0<Eff<=25 0 0 
25<Eff<=50 4 8.89 
50<Eff<=75 12 26.67 
75<Eff<=100 29 64.44 
Average Eff 81.34 
Scale Efficiency 0.71 
The average efficiency provides information as to the potential resource saving that could be 
achieved whilst maintaining the same output level. In our case, results show that overall 
efficiency of the WUAs in the Cap Bon region is around 81.3%. This implies that the same level 
of output could be achieved by using only 81.3% of the used inputs. Average scale efficiency, 
which can be calculated as the ratio between CRS and VRS efficiencies, is around 71%. This 
measure indicates that many WUAs are not operating at an efficient scale. 
Results also show that management and maintenance inefficiencies are greater than the overall 
inefficiency. The average management efficiency is around 65.7% whilst average engineering 
efficiency is 74.5%. Scale efficiencies for both sub-vectors are very low, indicating that almost 
40% of management and maintenance expenditure could be saved if WUAs were to operate at an 
efficient scale. The frequency distribution for the two efficiencies is reported in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3 shows that almost 6.7% of WUAs belong to the group showing weak management 
efficiency (between [0; 25%]) whilst 33.3% of them belong to the second group (between [25%; 
50%]) for the same criterion. In both groups we note that WUAs that are inefficient in terms of 
management occur more frequently than WUAs that are inefficient in relation to maintenance 
tasks. In fact, 40% of WUAs are inefficient (between [0; 50%]) for management whilst only 22% 
of them are inefficient (between [0; 50%]) for maintenance. From the same perspective, 77.7% of 
WUAs belong to the high efficiency group [50%; 100%] for the maintenance efficiency criterion 
whilst only 60% of them belong to the same group if we consider management efficiency. It is 
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clear that, on average, WUAs perform better in terms of allocating maintenance expenditure than 
in terms of expenditure on their internal management and functioning.  
 
Fig 5. 3. Frequency distribution of Management and Engineering efficiencies 
The pairwise correlation tests show that the weak performances of management and maintenance 
are highly positively correlated among them as well as to the overall technical efficiency (Table 
5.4).  
Table 5. 4  Results of correlation test « pairwise correlation » between overall and sub-vectors efficiencies 
 OE MSbvE ESbvE 
Overall Eff 1   
Mnagement Eff 0.848*** 1  
Engineering Eff 0.951*** 0.779*** 1 
Note: *** significant at 1% 
5.4.2. Factors affecting efficiency of WUAs: follow-up Tobit analysis 
The regressions in Table 5.5 represent the estimation results for factors affecting scale and overall 
WUA efficiency scores respectively. In Table 5.5, the regressions explain little as to the 
variations in the calculated efficiency scores with the pseudo R-square value ranging from 0.39 to 
0.5. Most of the independent variables have no significant effect on efficiency. Of the five 
‘technical’ characteristics used in this study, none has a significant effect on scale efficiency. 
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However, two organizational and administrative characteristics are of interest in explaining it. In 
fact, the WUA scale efficiency is positively affected by the ratio of adherent farmers, suggesting 
that higher ratios result in higher scale efficiencies. In addition, the number of members of the 
administrative council has a statistically significant negative impact on the scale efficiency (1% 
level). The other administrative characteristics (existence of a technical director and the number 
of technical salaried staff) have a negative but non-significant effect on the scale efficiencies. 
Table 5. 5. Factors associated with total and scale efficiencies: results of Tobit models. 
Explanatory variable Explained variable 
 Scale Efficiency Overall WUA efficiency 
 Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Technical characteristics of the irrigated district   
- N of years in operation 0.011 0.627 -0.125*** 0.005 
- N of water pipes 0.0003 0.303 -0.001** 0.076 
- Areas equipped by water saving 
technologies 
-0.0002 0.461 -0.0003 0.323 
- Irrigation ratio  0.001 0.964 -0.008*** 0.020 
- Ratio of water losses  0.751 0.189 0.504 0.440 
 
Administrative and organizational characteristics of the WUA  
- Ratio of adherents farmers to the WUA 0.004* 0.116 0.002 0.498 
- N of technical salaried staff -0.026 0.367 0.054* 0.108 
- N of members in the administration council -0.112*** 0.010 -0.048 0.313 
- Existence of a technical director -0.146 0.242 -0.101 0.521 
- Constant  0.955 0.014 2.695 0 
σ 0.261 0.035a 0.258 0.046 
Pseudo R222 0.501  0.396  
Log-Likelihood  -13.077  -14.906  
LR(χ2) 26.22  19.57  
P> χ2 0.0019***  0.020**  
Number of observations 44  44  
 *, **, ***
 = significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
a
 For σ the standard error is reported instead of the P-value. 
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 This is McFadden's pseudo R-squared.  Tobit regression does not have an equivalent to the R-squared that is found 
in OLS regression; however, many people have tried to come up with one.  There are a wide variety of pseudo-R-
square statistics.  Because this statistic does not mean what R-square means in OLS regression (the proportion of 
variance of the response variable explained by the predictors), interpreting this statistic should be done with great 
caution. For instance, a pseudo R² of 0.3 corresponds to R² linear of approx 0.6. (for more details see Hensher, et al., 
2005; see also: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/Stata_tobit.htm) 
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With regard to the overall WUA efficiency scores, it is mainly the technical variables that are 
statistically significant. In fact, we found that the number of years in operation, the number of 
managed water pipes, as well as the irrigation ratio, have a significant negative effect on the 
efficiency of the Cap Bon WUAs. Only the number of technical salaried staff has a positive effect 
(10% level) on this efficiency. 
Table 5.6 presents the results for the two Tobit estimates when the dependent variables are 
management and engineering efficiency scores respectively. For both regressions, the age of the 
WUA has a significant (1% level) negative effect on the regressed scores. In addition, 
management efficiency was also found to be negatively affected by the number of members on 
the administrative council. Remaining independent variables had no significant effect on either of 
the dependent vectors.  
Table 5. 6. Factors affecting management and engineering efficiencies  
Explanatory variable Explained variable 
 Management Efficiency Engineering efficiency 
 Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Technical characteristics of the irrigated district  
- N of years in operation -0.102*** 0.024 -0.113*** 0.003 
- N of water pipes -0.0002 0.620 -0.0003 0.304 
- Areas equipped by water saving 
technologies 
0.0004 0.354 0.0002 0.555 
- Irrigation ratio  0.0004 0.912 -0.003 0.257 
- Ratio of water losses  0.454 0.607 0.338 0.608 
 
Administrative and organizational characteristics of the WUA  
- Ratio of adherents farmers to the WUA 0.001 0.817 0.002 0.534 
- N of technical salaried staff 0.002 0.952 0.007 0.813 
- N of members in the administration 
council 
-0.1* 0.100 -0.063 0.172 
- Existence of a technical director -0.162 0.409 -0.040 0.785 
- Constant  2.072 0.002 2.176 0 
σ 0.385 0.057 a 0.289 0.042 
Pseudo R2 0.202  0.343  
Log-Likelihood  -26.065  -17.329  
LR(χ2) 13.27  18.11  
P> χ2 0.150  0.033**  
Number of observations 44  44  
 *, **, ***
 = significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
a
 For σ the standard error is reported instead of the P-value. 
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5.5. Discussion 
Results of the DEA analysis show that overall efficiency amongst water users’ associations in the 
Cap Bon region is around 81%, in average. However, efficiency could reach a minimum of 45% 
for some WUAs, indicating that almost 55% of financial inputs for these associations could be 
saved, whilst still maintaining the same output level. About 9% of the studied WUAs have an 
efficiency level below 50%. Additional resources allocated from the government to support these 
less efficient WUAs can then be saved or reallocated for other more productive activities in the 
irrigated districts. 
The average scale efficiency obtained shows that WUAs are not operating at an optimal scale. 
This finding confirms inefficiencies due to the WUA size reported by Umetsu et al. (2005). The 
latter authors have grouped 18 WUAs into 6 artificially created WUAs in order to observe the 
effect of a merger. Their results show that the average efficiency score improved slightly. 
However, Fujiie et al. (2005) found that collective action in local water management is difficult 
to organize when the size of the association (measured by its service area) is large. In our case, 
we can conclude that a scale adjustment could improve global efficiency and the use of financial 
resources in Tunisian WUAs. 
Thirdly, the results for some specific tasks undertaken by WUAs indicate that the studied sample 
of Cap Bon WUAs not only has a poor performance in terms of allocating resources for internal 
management and functioning activities but also in terms of allocating resources for maintenance 
tasks. Operation and maintenance are included within the main WUA expenditure. Deficits in 
these financial tasks could have negative implications, not only for the associations’ financial 
balance but also for the performance of the irrigated areas managed by these inefficient WUAs. 
Given that water rates charged to farmers are fixed according to the WUA’s financial balance, it 
will the farmers themselves who have to support and pay for the losses resulting from the 
inefficient functioning of their WUA. A better accountability and structuring of WUA 
management could help to reduce the recorded inefficiencies. However, we should not forget the 
fact that these inefficiencies could also be due to old irrigation network upon which a given 
WUA was initially installed. In this case, it would be legitimate for these associations to benefit 
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from government subsidies.  
 On the other hand, the number of members in the administrative council of the WUA had a 
negative and statistically significant impact on its scale efficiency. This suggests that a reduction 
in this number would improve the scale efficiency. This finding contradicts the logical 
expectation that a higher number of administrative staff would improve the accountability and 
governance of the WUA. We note also that this variable has a negative impact even on the global, 
management, and maintenance efficiencies, although only its effect on management efficiency 
was statistically significant. A positive factor on WUA overall efficiency is the number of 
technical staff employed. This may indicate that WUAs who have invested in technical staff do 
benefit from this expertise. In the same sense, Fujiie et al. (2005) proves that the staff quality in 
water users’ associations significantly affects collective action for local water management. 
These two latter results stress the importance of training and structuring services provided by 
regional administrations to the benefit of WUAs. This crucial role of public authorities is 
extremely important and has to be enhanced and generalized.   
The ratio of adherent farmers in a given WUA had a positive impact on its scale efficiency. This 
suggests that an improvement to this rate could lead to a more efficient scale of operation. 
However, farmers’ decisions’ on membership in a given WUA depends on many social, technical 
and economic factors (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). Conflicts within the association and the 
possibility of access to groundwater are amongst the negative social factors affecting this 
decision. However, it is also possible that WUAs manage a small district where the number of 
farmers is limited23. Considering this latter case, more detailed studies have to be undertaken to 
elucidate the potential benefits of merging WUAs that operate in neighbouring areas. In addition 
to its benefit on the scale efficiency of WUAs, the number of adherents of a given WUA can also 
be a factor in decreasing water rates.  
The number of years in operation for a given WUA has a negative and highly significant effect 
on overall and subvector efficiencies. In contrast, older associations are expected to be more 
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 Area under the authority of each WUA is determined by the public administration. 
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stable (Meinzen-Dick et al., 1994). Nevertheless, this result can be interpreted in two ways. Over 
time, the irrigation networks managed by the association will be older and thus need higher levels 
of funding for maintenance or replacement. For this reason older WUAs spend more money on 
maintenance and management tasks. This can influence their global efficiency and lead to 
resource deficits. Good network management and replacement strategies could be a solution for 
this kind of problem. However, in most cases the WUA administrative members or even the 
technical director are not well qualified. For them, developing an optimal global management 
plan is a difficult task. Help and guidance from government agencies will be needed in such cases 
(Legoupil et al., 2000). The second explanation for the negative impact of WUA ‘age’ can be 
attributed to a non-social sustainability between the members of the association. According to 
Meinzen-Dick et al. (1994), older organizations are more likely to be stable because their patterns 
of action and trust have had more time to become established. It is then clear that a lack of trust 
and the presence of social conflicts between members of the association can lead the WUA to 
become unstable over time. In the case of Tunisia, some specific studies (Makkaoui, 2006; Ben 
Salem et al., 2005; Chraga and Chemakh, 2003) report the existence of such conflicts and weak 
social relationships between farmers and members of the Tunisian WUA. 
Finally, the negative relationship found between the main technical explanatory variables 
(number of water pipes managed, areas equipped by water saving technologies, ratio of 
irrigation) and the calculated scores for overall efficiency, confirms the theoretical expectation as 
to the effect of the complexity of the irrigation system on the administration of collective action 
(see Benjamin and Bagadion, 2000). In fact, these technical attributes are important determinants 
of the stability and reliability of the water delivery performance of WUAs. Low performance in 
terms of water delivery could have a negative impact on farmers’ productivity and water use 
efficiency, particularly during peak irrigation periods. In fact, Chraga and Chemkh, (2003) and 
Chebil et al., (2007) showed that low water delivery performance for irrigation water, due to 
water scarcity and technical problems in some WUAs, does affect the perceptions and the 
willingness of farmers to pay for water.  
5.6. Conclusion 
Most results found this chapter were inline with WUA problems identified in other studies and 
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cited in chapter 4, section 4.5.3. Particularly, we show that managerial, financial and technical 
problems affect the performances of WUA in Cap Bon region. This may have deep repercussions 
on the socioeconomics of the farming systems. In the rest of the thesis, we will try to see how 
WUA performances affect the farmers’ behaviour and perception. 
More precisely, in this chapter, we have shown that an improvement in the organizational, 
managerial, and technical performance of WUAs could have significant benefits for the irrigation 
sector in Tunisia. Results observed have the following implications for the rest of our 
dissertation:  
• We believe that insecurity in water supply stimulates farmers to overuse water when they 
gain access to it. Thus, improvements to the technical attributes of the WUA, in order to 
enhance its water delivery performance will have a direct effect on water use efficiency 
at farm level. In addition, WUAs in Tunisia now have a new legal statute permitting and 
encouraging them to contribute to the technical extension of farmers in their regions. 
Accordingly, WUAs can play a crucial role in increasing the efficient use of water at plot 
level. 
• Low WUA efficiency is synonymous with the waste of financial resources that could be 
saved by the association.  Given the fact that water fees are calculated on the basis of 
WUA expenses, a reduction in these expenses will then result either in lower water prices 
(affecting the water demand functions of farmers) or higher irrigation cost recovery rates.   
• Improving WUA inefficiencies can also make farmers more willing to pay higher water 
rates in order to contribute to the recovery cost. Farmers realizing that their managers are 
wasting WUA resources will be far less motivated to contribute.  
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Chapter 6. Effect of local irrigation water governance on 
farmers’ water use efficiency 
 
Abstract 
This chapter is composed of two main parts. In the first part, we calculate irrigation water use 
efficiency (IWUE) at farm level for three different agricultural systems in Tunisia. Two irrigated 
systems from the Cap Bon region, in addition to the irrigated greenhouses horticultural system 
(Teboulba region in the central-coastal part of Tunisia), were selected for this purpose. In the 
second part, we empirically test the relationship between local irrigation governance and the 
various efficiencies calculated at farm level. We compare overall farming and IWU efficiencies 
between different groups of farmers belonging to two neighbouring irrigated areas in the Cap 
Bon region. The non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model was used for the 
different efficiency calculations. Statistical tests were then conducted to assess the significance of 
variability in farming efficiency and IWUE between governance structures. Furthermore, this 
variability was also assessed between groups of farmers who differ regarding their perceptions of 
some specific governance attributes. The purpose of this was to identify which attributes of the 
governance structure are the most important. The efficiency scores calculated reveal a weak 
(around 50% on average) IWUE level for all systems studied. Results also show that the local 
governance structure for irrigation management is a determinant of both overall and water use 
efficiency. This result was in line with literature attesting that the technical and economic 
performance of water management is determined by - and not determinants of - the way in which 
water is governed. The chapter concludes that good local irrigation governance is necessary to 
make other institutional aspects of water demand management more effective.  
Part of this chapter is submitted as:  
Frija, A., Speelman. S., Chebil, A., Buysse, J. Van Huylenbroeck, G. (submitted). Impact of local 
irrigation governance on overall and water use efficiencies of the irrigated agricultural systems: case study 
from Tunisia. Water international 
 
Part of this chapter is accepted as:  
Frija, A., Chebil, A., Speelman. S., Buysse, J. Van Huylenbroeck, G. (accepted). Water use and technical 
efficiencies in horticultural greenhouses in Tunisia. Agricultural Water Management, DOI: 
10.1016/j.agwat.2009.05.006 
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6.1. Introduction 
Governance structure is considered in this dissertation as the set of systems that control decision 
making with regard to water management and water service delivery (Moriarty et al., 2007). We 
assume that it comprises the technical, economic, administrative, financial and social aspects of 
local irrigation water management (Brooks, 2004). Since WUAs are considered as the gatekeeper 
for WDM at the local level, we can evaluate governance structures on the basis of how well 
WUAs perform with respect to their organizational and technical functions, and also through the 
perceptions of farmers regarding these functions. After assessing WUA efficiency in the previous 
chapter, it was clear to us that, even if the same administrative and organizational structure is 
applied to all WUAs, their performance would still vary significantly. This chapter tests 
empirically, the relationship between local irrigation governance and the efficiency of irrigation 
systems in Tunisia, in particular, the overall farming24 and irrigation water use (IWU) efficiency 
at farm level. Recent studies call for a new approach which considers WDM institutions as a 
larger part of the water demand strategy. From this perspective, more emphasis should be paid to 
the improvement of governance structures and decision making processes, alongside support for 
technical, economic and legal aspects. In fact, technical, economic and legal issues are 
determined by – rather than determinants of – the way in which water is governed (Brooks, 
2004).  “Good governance” of irrigation water will accordingly result in better performance of 
various technical, economic and legal determinants of water management. 
Our objectives in this chapter will therefore be twofold: Firstly, we intend to calculate the 
farming and IWU efficiency levels in our study areas in order to give some idea as to the current 
state of resource use in the Tunisian irrigated systems. Secondly, we aim to compare the effect of 
different “local irrigation governance structures” on the calculated farming and IWU efficiency 
scores. Our hypothesis here is that, with other factors held constant, the performance of 
individual water management could be linked to the quality and effectiveness of the local 
irrigation governance structure within which the farmer is operating (Tren and Schur, 2000) (Fig 
                                                 
24
 For the remainder of the dissertation, farming efficiency will refer to the overall technical efficiency of the 
agricultural production process at farm level.  
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6.1). Furthermore, using farmers’ perceptional information as to particular governance attributes 
(Fig 6.2), the key elements and characteristics of local irrigation governance that affect farming 
and IWU efficiency levels, can also be determined. 
 
Fig 6. 1. Governance structure and performance of irrigated systems 
Fig 6.2 presents a simplified conceptual framework for the current chapter. Accordingly, this 
chapter will be divided into two main parts. In the first one, we shall focus on the calculation of 
IWUE. Farming efficiency and IWUE for three agricultural systems will be calculated and 
discussed. In the second part, we select only Cap Bon’s neighbouring systems for the 
comparative institutional analysis, where we shall focus on the effect of the governance structure, 
and farmers’ perceptions, on their IWUE. 
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Fig 6. 2. Conceptual framework for the chapter (G denotes the group of farmers surveyed; V denotes 
the perception-based variables) 
6.2. Water use efficiency at farm level 
Concerns regarding the efficient use of water resources at farm level in Tunisia have been 
addressed in three ways (Al Atiri, 2004): (i) modernizing the management of collective irrigation 
systems by enhancing the role played by water users’ associations and by promoting user 
participation in all aspects of management (ii) reformulating the water pricing system by 
introducing a cost recovery objective and (iii) developing incentives to enhance and promote the 
adoption of water saving technology at farm level. However, results concerning the efficiency of 
water use at farm level remain low, according to MARH sources and some recent research 
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studies (Dhehibi et al., 2007; Albouchi et al., 2005).  
In this section, we contribute to the evaluation of water use efficiency in Tunisian agriculture by 
calculating the IWUE at farm level in three Tunisian agricultural systems: Lebna Barrage (LB) 
and Fondok Jdid (FJ) in the Cap Bon region (governorate of Nabeul; Fig 6.3) and small-scale 
irrigated greenhouse production systems in Teboulba region (governorate of Monastir; Fig 6.4). 
6.2.1. Methodology  
We used the same Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology, already described in chapter 
4. But in this chapter irrigated farms are considered as DMUs. Once DMU is defined, we shall 
specify input and output vectors in order to calculate their relative farming and IWU efficiency 
scores. Input and output specifications for each of the identified regions differ according to the 
data available. Farmers in Teboulba will be considered separately when calculating their 
efficiency scores. On the other hand, both farmer groups in FJ and LB will be considered together 
in the same sample simulation. We anticipate that different institutional, technical and physical 
attributes of both FJ and LB are homogenous because of their neighbouring locations (i.e. 
relating to the same regional administration). The concept of DEA subvector efficiency, 
presented in the previous chapter, will also be considered in this chapter for the calculation of 
IWUE scores (Speelman et al., 2008).  
6.2.1.1. DEA specifications 
In the agricultural sector, increasing the level of inputs does not always result in a proportional 
increase in the level of output produced (Speelman et al., 2008). For instance, when the amount 
of water used is increased, there is not necessarily a linearly proportional increase in crop 
volume. For this reason, a variable returns to scale option might be more suitable (than a constant 
scale specification) for efficiency measures in agricultural systems (Rodriguez-Diaz at al., 2004b) 
and will thus be used in this application.  
An input-orientation is chosen for the calculation of both farming and IWU efficiencies. In fact, 
in the context of increasing water scarcity, it is more relevant to consider possible decreases in 
water use, instead of increases in output (Diaz Rodriguez et al., 2004a). Besides, since farmers 
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have overall control of their inputs, recommendations on the input levels used are feasible and 
more appropriate. 
Recapitulating, it means that for the three selected systems, a BCC (Banker et al., 1984) input-
oriented DEA model, in addition to a BCC subvector DEA model will be used for the calculation 
of overall farming and IWU efficiency levels respectively (see chapter 5 for a standard form of 
DEA and subvector-DEA models25).  
6.2.1.2. Case study and data collection 
• Cap Bon region  
The study was conducted in the Cap Bon region. The decision to use this region is justified by its 
importance in terms of national production, crop diversification, extension of irrigated perimeters 
and water scarcity. The increasing competition for water between users (agriculture, industry and 
tourism) in Cap Bon clearly demonstrates the relative and increasing shortage of this resource.  
The total agricultural land area in the Cap Bon region is approximately 256 500 ha, of which 
183 000 ha comprise arable land, 22 500 ha forestry and 51 000 ha grassland. Cereals occupy the 
highest proportion, in terms of cropped area, with a land area of 53,000 ha, vegetables occupy 
35,000 ha, olive trees (for olive oil) 23,500 ha, citrus trees 13,450 ha and other crops about 6,300 
ha (CRDA Nabeul, 2006). 
The irrigated sector in the Cap Bon region has experienced considerable development. It 
represents 13.3% of Tunisian irrigated land, occupying second place at a national level in terms 
of irrigated land area. 71% of these irrigated areas belong to small and medium-sized farms. 
Intensively irrigated land amounts to approximately 47,600 ha - 12% of the total for the whole 
country, 19,100 ha of which are situated within public irrigation perimeters (DGEDA, 2006).    
                                                 
25
 See also Speelman et al., 2008; and Lilienfeld and Asmild, 2007 who use such subvector models for the 
calculation of water use efficiency. 
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Our data was collected, during the period March-May 2007, from 62 randomly selected farmers 
belonging to the FJ and LB neighbouring areas in the Cap Bon region. Each area is managed by 
one WUA. The dataset includes 18.7 % (30 farmers) and 30 % (32 farmers) of the total adherent 
farmers to FJ and LB WUAs, respectively (Table 6.1). Characteristics of both associations are 
presented in Tables 6.1. LB and FJ WUA were selected from the set of WUAs used in chapter 4, 
where we evaluated the efficiency of all WUAs operating in Cap Bon. Efficiency scores for both 
WUAs are also provided in Table 6.1.  
The questionnaire used in the LB and FJ irrigated areas consisted of the following sequences: (i) 
farmer identification (socio-economic and demographic characteristics); (ii) farm identification 
(cultivated crops, quantities and costs of inputs; quantities and values of outputs, etc.); (iii) 
identification of water use, source and quality; and (iv) evaluation of farmers’ attitudes and 
perceptions concerning local irrigation water governance (functioning of their WUA).  
Table 6. 1. Basic characteristics of LB and FJ WUAs 
 Fondok Jdid Lebna Barrage 
Province 
Rainfall (mm) 
Date of creation 
Irrigated surface (Ha) 
Source of water 
Distribution mode 
Price26 (TND/m3) 
Irrigation technology 
Main crops 
Engineering efficiency 
Managerial efficiency 
Number of members  
Sample 
Grombalia 
400-600 
1998 
1025 
aquifers, North water transfer 
on request 
0.048 
Drip, sprinkle, gravity 
Vegetables, cereals, Grapes 
51% 
32% 
161 
30 
Mida 
400-500 
1996 
409 
Lebna dam, north water transfer 
On request 
0.068 
Drip, sprinkle, gravity 
Vegetables, cereals 
18.6% 
84% 
108 
32 
Source: Groupements de Développement Agricole (2006). Rapports d’activités, GDA. 
Selecting cases for comparison in ways that help to isolate institutional factors is a very important 
consideration for comparative analysis. In our case, the two selected areas belong to the same 
governorate. A technological homogeneity is assumed to exist between them. Also, in both areas, 
                                                 
26Average exchange rate at the time of data collection 1 TND = 0.55 €   
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the main crops planted are the same and farmers have full rights to plant any crop they choose. 
Other characteristics, such as precipitation and soils, are also assumed to be the same between 
both areas. The main differences that can be distinguished are: land structure (Table 6.2 and Fig 
6.5), access to ground water, and local irrigation governance generated from the organizational 
and technical performance of the WUA responsible for irrigation demand management in each 
area. 
Based on the governance definition established in this dissertation, the two areas can be 
considered as clearly different in terms of the technical and organizational attributes of their local 
irrigation governance. In fact, the engineering efficiency of LB WUA was found in chapter 4 to 
be very low (18.6%), in contrast to its organizational and managerial efficiency, which was found 
to be around 84% (Table 6.1). FJ WUA has opposite performances; its engineering efficiency 
was around 52% whilst its managerial efficiency was only around 30%. 
 
Fig 6. 3. Location of FJ and LB irrigated systems: Cap Bon region 
 
One output and five inputs were chosen for the calculation of farming efficiency in FJ and LB. 
Output consisted of total farm income generated from irrigation activity, whilst inputs are: 
labour, volume of water consumed, fertilizers, land, and capital. Labour is assessed in terms of 
Map of 
Tunisia 
Lebna 
Barrage 
Fondok 
Jedid 
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the number of working days; water consumption is expressed in terms of cubic metres27; and 
fertilizers in terms of kg applied28. Land and capital are considered as fixed inputs. The amount 
of capital used for our calculation only includes the machinery and water saving installations 
existing on the farm. Basic statistics for the farmers’ inputs/outputs are shown in Table 6.2.  
Table 6. 2. Descriptive statistics of the inputs/outputs used in the DEA models (LB and FJ areas) 
  FJ area LB area 
Variable Dimension Mean SD Mean SD 
Output TND 17615.8 (1750*) 23982.5 5645.2 (2010*) 12163.4 
Land ha 10 19.7 2.8 4.6 
Capital TND 5798.3 7142.5 3619 2673 
Labor Days 225.1 391.1 93.5 188 
Water M3 19819.5 36736.8 13789.1 23683.7 
Fertilizers Kg 4890 7024.5 8589.8 37873 
* Average revenue per hectare 
SD: Standard Deviation 
• Teboulba region 
The decision to use the Teboulba irrigated system in the study is motivated by the socio-
economic importance of greenhouse production in this region, the constraints on water resources 
and the high price of irrigation water (triple the price for water in the LB area and one of the 
highest prices in the country). Another motivation for the decision of including Teboulba system, 
is to provide a more diverse overview of irrigation water use efficiency in different Tunisian 
regions. The Teboulba case study will not be considered in the second part of this chapter.  
In Teboulba, we collected our data from small-scale greenhouse farmers in the region, which is 
located in the eastern central area of Tunisia (Fig. 6.4). This region belongs to the Nebhana 
irrigation district where water scarcity is an important issue. The total agricultural land area in 
Teboulba is approximately 1914 ha, of which 600 ha are irrigated. The governorate of Monastir 
includes almost 39% (572 ha) of the total land area used for unheated greenhouses in Tunisia. 
                                                 
27
 The pricing method applied in the region is volumetric pricing. In each farm, water meters are installed and 
individual water consumption  is measured and charged by the water users’ association 
28
 Main fertilizers used in the study region are the ammonium nitrate and the Di-Ammonium-Phosphate (Dap). For 
the efficiency calculation, both quantities (in kg) used by a farmer were agregated and considered in a same vector.   
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Teboulba region provides almost one third of the total production for this governorate (Regional 
administration of Agricultural Development; Monastir, 2004).  
 
Fig 6. 4. Location of Teboulba region 
 
The agricultural sector in Teboulba is dominated by rain-fed olive plantations for olive oil 
production. Greenhouses, which can easily be integrated with olive plantations, were largely 
developed after the establishment of the water transfer programme that commenced in the early 
1980s. Water is transferred from the northern and central parts of the country to the southern and 
coastal areas, where fresh water resources are scarce. In view of its coastal situation, bordered in 
the east by the Mediterranean Sea, fishing is an important economic activity in the region.  
Irrigation water prices in Teboulba are some of the highest in Tunisia. The price is approximately 
0.15 TND m-3, whilst supplies in some other regions of Tunisia are priced at a minimum rate of 
0.04 TND m-3. Volumetric water pricing is applied in the region. A water meter is installed at 
each farm and individual water consumption is measured and charged by the WUA.   
In Teboulba, greenhouses are made from a plastic covering installed on metal ropes. Farmers do 
not use heating systems inside the greenhouses. Standard greenhouse covered surface area is 
between 420 and 540 m² (Agence de Vulgarisation et de Formation Agricole, AVFA, 2002). 
Each farm has a tank for water storage, which is normally supplied with water from a well or 
Map of 
Tunisia 
Governorate 
of Monastir 
Teboulba  
Mediterranean 
sea 
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a public source. The tank is either directly connected to the greenhouses using plastic water pipes 
or drip irrigation systems, or connected through a fertigation unit, which allows irrigation water 
to be mixed with liquid fertilizers. Within our survey, all farmers who own a fertigation unit 
connect it using drip irrigation. According to our findings two main types of “irrigation systems” 
can be distinguished in the region.  These comprise either a drip irrigation system linked to a 
fertigation unit, or a system using only plastic pipes and without any specific technology for 
conserving water.   
We collected data in October 2005 from randomly selected 47 farmers who own 16.2 % (97.6 ha) 
of the total irrigated land area and hold 13.8 % (276 greenhouses) of the greenhouses located in 
the region of Teboulba (2060). Farmers mainly produce tomatoes, melons and peppers. Our 
questionnaire contained two main sequences relating to farmer and farm identification 
(production structure and input use). To limit the number of inputs/outputs used in the DEA, total 
output (production quantity) was converted into monetary values. The inputs considered are: land 
(hectares), irrigation water (m3) and labour (number of workers present on the farm during one 
year). Basic statistics for the sample are shown in Table 6.3. 
Table 6. 3. Basic statistics for data used in the DEA Models in Teboulba region29 
Inputs  Total Output  
(Tunisian Dinars) Land (ha) Water (m3) Labour (man/year) 
Average 7863.75 0.294 4008.5730 5.697 
Standard Deviation 5577.14 0.178 2920.80 4.713 
Minimum  1309 0.05 350 0.5 
Maximum  24923 0.85 10000 22 
Source: survey 
                                                 
29
 Data from Teboulba system was collected in an earlier research project using different questionnaire. For this 
reason, we were not able to use the same inputs/outputs vectors in both Cap Bon and Teboulba regions.   
30
 Average water use per ha, for main cultivated crops under green houses, in Tunisia is between 7000 and 10000 m3. 
This is in average a volume between 350-500 m3 /greenhouse (APIA: see 
http://www.tunisie.com/APIA/broch%20sous%20abri.pdf) 
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6.2.2. Results  
6.2.2.1. Cap Bon region  
• Descriptive results: socio-economic and structural differences between the FJ and LB 
areas 
With regard to land structure, our survey shows that in the selected sample, the average size per 
farm is much lower in LB in comparison with the FJ area. Most of the farms in LB (72%) are 
small farms (less than 2.5 ha in size) whilst 38% of the farms in FJ are medium and large sized 
farms (Fig 6.5). The effect of size on farming and IWU efficiency levels will be tested (in the 
second part of this chapter) together with some other socioeconomic variables.  
 
Fig 6. 5. Aerial photos taken from the same altitude for FJ (left) and LB (right) showing differences in farm 
structure (Source: Google Earth) 
 
In FJ the survey shows that 98% of farmers have a well which they can exploit. When water is 
needed urgently, some farmers in FJ can pump water from their aquifer, whilst those of LB do 
not have this option (public water distributed by the WUA is the unique source of irrigation water 
in LB). Of the farmers in FJ, 26% do not use their well for various reasons, such as the salinity of 
the water or high pumping costs. Therefore, we decided to divide farmers from FJ into two 
different groups: FJ1 and FJ2. FJ1 contains 22 farms (73% of total FJ sample) in FJ who use both 
ground and public water, whilst FJ2 comprises 8 farms (27% of total FJ sample) that use only 
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public water purchased from the WUA. By drawing this distinction, more appropriate 
comparisons between regions and groups can be provided, since the difference between LB and 
FJ relating to the conjunctive use of water will be removed by using the FJ2 group for this 
comparison. 
In line with both WUAs’ efficiency scores, as measured in chapter 5, our survey reveals that in 
LB 84% of the surveyed farmers are satisfied with the internal functioning of their association, 
whilst 76% of the farmers in FJ are not satisfied in respect of this last point. In the same sense, 
100% of the LB farmers estimate that they have a good relationship with the administrative 
members of their association, whilst less than 80% of farmers in FJ indicated that they have a 
similarly good relationship. This shows that some problems occur in FJ WUA between farmers 
and WUA managers.  
With regard to perceptions concerning the technical attributes of water management, 36.4% of 
the surveyed farmers in LB were not satisfied with the irrigation network in their WUA, whilst 
almost 93% of FJ farmers were satisfied concerning this point. Extension services, providing 
technical information, were also found to be insufficient according to 76% and 24% of LB and FJ 
farmers respectively.  
• Overall farming and water use efficiency 
Farming and IWU efficiency scores for the selected areas were calculated using the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) to solve the DEA models described in section 6.2.1. All 
farmers from LB and FJ were considered in the same set and a common frontier was drawn for 
all of them. 
Table 6.4 and Figure 6.6 present a comparison of average farming and IWU efficiency levels 
between FJ1, FJ2, and LB. It shows that all FJ2 farmers, who only use public water from the 
WUA, are located on the efficient frontier with regard to their farming efficiency when assuming 
a VRS. Their average IWUE is also the highest for all groups. 
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Table 6. 4. Overall farming and IWU efficiency scores per group of farmers in the Cap Bon region 
 Average FE Average IWUE 
 CRS VRS SC CRS VRS SC 
FJ1 0.570 0.814 0.512 0.436 0.569 0.585 
FJ2 0.592 1.000 0.592 0.500 0.693 0.807 
All FJ  0.581 0.852 0.670 0.437 0.579 0.800 
LB 0.344 0.546 0.640 0.131 0.290 0.781 
Average (all 
sample) 0.459 0.694 0.661 0.282 0.432 0.790 
For all following tables, SC denotes scale efficiency, FE denotes Farming efficiency and expresses the technical 
efficiency of farmers calculated from standard DEA model; IWUE, denotes Irrigation Water Use Efficiency. 
Farming efficiency scores in Table 6.4 indicate that, under the VRS assumption, farmers in our 
sample could reduce their input use by 30%, on average, whilst producing the same observed 
output quantity. Also, the average IWUE was found to be around 43% under the VRS 
assumption. This implies that the observed output level could be maintained whilst using the 
currently observed values of other inputs and 57% less irrigation water. Results also indicate that 
some scale inefficiencies occur in the studied systems. These inefficiencies affect the farming 
efficiency to a larger extent than the IWU efficiency. 
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Fig 6. 6. Distribution of individual farms according to their farming and IWU efficiency scores 
 
CHAPTER 6                                                                       Local Irrigation Governance and Water Use Efficiency 
 141 
In order to determine the relationship between IWUE and technical efficiency, we used a 
pairwise correlation test to investigate equality between both efficiency vectors. The test was 
statistically significant. Table 6.5 shows that under both CRS and VRS assumptions, technical 
efficiency and IWUE are highly and positively correlated. This finding proves that efficient water 
use could lead to an improvement in overall farming efficiency.  
Table 6. 5. Results of correlation test « pair-wise correlation » between farming and IWUE efficiencies (Cap 
Bon sample) 
 FE (CRS) FE (VRS) IWUE (CRS) IWUE (VRS) 
FE (CRS) 1    
FE (VRS) 0.702*** 1   
IWUE (CRS) 0.835*** 0.579*** 1  
IWUE (VRS) 0.625*** 0.779*** 0.642*** 1 
***: significant at 1% level  
6.2.2.2. Teboulba region 
The frequency distribution for the obtained efficiency scores calculated using the Teboulba’ 
farm-sample is reported in Table 6.6. 
Table 6. 6. Frequency distribution of technical and irrigation water use efficiency levels in Teboulba 
 Farming efficiency IWUE 
 CRS VRS CRS VRS 
Efficiency 
level (%) 
Number 
of farms 
% of 
farms 
Number 
of 
farms 
% of 
farms 
Number 
of 
farms 
% of 
farms 
Number 
of 
farms 
% of 
farms 
0<E<=25 0 0 0 0 24 51.1 14 29.7 
25<E<=50 13 27.6 5 10.6 10 21.2 12 25.5 
50<E<=75 19 40.4 19 40.4 4 8.5 4 8.5 
75<E<=100 15 31.9 23 48.9 9 19.1 17 36.2 
Average  67.3 75.6 41.8 52.6 
Scale 
Efficiency 0.88 0.949 
E denotes efficiency level. 
Table 6.6 shows that many farms are operating at an overall farming efficient level with regard to 
their overall production process. Under the VRS assumption, more than 89% of farms have a 
technical efficiency higher than 50%. Scale efficiency is approximately 0.9, indicating that the 
majority of farms operate at an efficient scale. On the other hand, the average IWUE score in the 
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sample was only 41.8% and 52.6% under the CRS and VRS assumptions respectively. The IWU 
scale efficiency is also quite high, showing that IWUE in the study area is not affected by the 
scale of the operation. Results regarding IWUE suggest that farmers could save substantial 
amounts of water by improving their IWUE. 
Table 6.7 illustrates the farming efficiency level and the IWUE for three groups of farmers 
identified as follows - (i) the most efficient overall (i.e. farming efficiency between 75% and 
100%), (ii) the next most efficient (farming efficiency between 50% and 75%), and (iii) the least 
efficient (farming efficiency between 0 and 50%). The Table shows that the average IWUE is 
always lower than the average farming efficiency for production as a whole. In fact, whilst the 
average farming efficiency is around 92% for the most efficient group, the average IWUE for this 
group is only around 80%. For the least efficient group, the average farming efficiency obtained 
is 45%; however, the IWUE for this group is only 11.4%.  
Table 6. 7. Average efficiency levels for selected farm groups (Teboulba) 
  Farming efficiency (CRS) 
(average) 
IWUE (average/CRS) 
Group 1 (75%<FE<100%) 92.5% 79.9% 
Group 2 (50%<=FE<75%) 63.3% 30.4% 
Group 3 (0<=FE<50%) 45% 11.4% 
FE denotes farming efficiency under CRS assumption 
Figure 6.7 depicts the cumulative efficiency distributions, confirming that under CRS and VRS 
specifications, the proportion of farmers with poor IWUE scores is always higher than the 
proportion of those having poor scores for overall farming efficiency. 
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Fig 6. 7. Cumulative efficiency distribution for both farming and irrigation water use efficiencies 
A pairwise correlation test investigating the level of equality between both efficiency vectors was 
also made for the Teboulba sample. The test was statistically significant (Table 6.8) under both 
CRS and VRS assumptions. It shows, once again, that overall farming performance and use of 
water resources are highly and positively correlated.  
Table 6. 8. Results of correlation test « pair-wise correlation » between farming efficiency and IWUE 
(Teboulba sample) 
 FE (CRS) FE (VRS) IWUE (CRS) IWUE (VRS) 
FE (CRS) 1    
FE (VRS) 0.858*** 1   
IWUE (CRS) 0.845*** 0.704*** 1  
IWUE (VRS) 0.821*** 0.935*** 0.754*** 1 
***: significant at 1% level  
6.2.3. Discussion: weak water use efficiency level in irrigated areas of Tunisia  
Average IWUE calculated for both of the Cap Bon irrigated systems was around 43% under the 
VRS assumption. This shows that, on average, 57% of irrigation water could be saved by farmers 
without reducing current output levels. Also, contrary to expectations, farmers in FJ are, on 
average, more efficient in terms of irrigation water use. These farmers pay lower water rates than 
LB farmers and have access to private groundwater sources with sometimes lower prices than 
public water. Farmers in FJ who only use public water (FJ2 group) are the most efficient in terms 
of farming and irrigation water use efficiency. They draw the frontier for efficient farms in the 
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sample. This shows that the source of water and the pricing tool are not sufficient to induce 
higher performance for water use efficiency.  
The low value of IWUE, and its variability between various groups in the Cap Bon region (Fig 
6.6) show, however, that there is considerable scope for increasing water conservation. This 
result also shows that, even if the same formal administrative and organizational directives are 
applied in similar areas, the results in terms of farming and IWU efficiency levels can be 
different. Many authors identified similar variability in water use between neighbouring irrigated 
schemes. Some of them attribute these differences to institutional design and local irrigation 
management (Tren and Schur, 2000; Hermans et al., 2006, etc.).  
Assuming a VRS, the average IWUE in the greenhouse production systems of Teboulba region 
was around 52%, which is also very low. This implies that the observed quantity of marketable 
fruit and vegetables produced in greenhouses could be maintained in the area by using the 
observed values of other inputs, whilst using 48% less irrigation water.   
Substantial water inefficiencies in Tunisia (47%) were also reported by Dhehibi et al., (2007) for 
irrigated citrus production systems in Cap Bon. Albouchi et al., (2005) found that IWUE in the 
Kairouan region (the main agricultural area in the central part of Tunisia) was approximately 
53%. Chebil et al., (2007), using the same sample of Teboulba farmers as we used in our study, 
found that farmers are willing to pay higher prices for irrigation water if this were to improve 
distribution and delivery services. Thus, Tunisia still has much to do in order to improve the use 
and sustainability of its water resources, starting at the farm level.  
Considering the difference in water prices between the Teboulba and Cap Bon systems, the 
pricing tool seems to be insufficient as a means of increasing water use efficiency.  
As shown in Tables 6.5 and 6.8, farming efficiency for the farms in our sample is positively and 
highly correlated with IWUE at farm level. Thus, apart from the impact on water conservation, 
efforts made to rationalize water use also had an important impact on the sector’s productivity. In 
addition, our results demonstrate that the potential exists to improve IWUE, both on farms with a 
high level of technical efficiency and those with a low level of efficiency (see Table 6.7 for the 
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Teboulba case).  
The “National Irrigation Water Saving Programme”, introduced in 1995 to encourage irrigators to 
invest in water saving technology, generated higher measures of IWUE and improved farmers’ 
incomes in Tunisia (Al Atiri, 2004). This programme, which provides subsidies ranging from 
40% to 60% of the purchase price of modern irrigation equipment, has been an inducement for 
many farmers to invest in water saving technology (Ministère d’Agriculture et des Ressources 
Hydrauliques, 2004). In 2004 the areas equipped with water saving technology in Tunisia 
represented only around 75% of the total irrigated area (Agency of Agricultural Investments 
Promotion, 2004). However, an effort should be made to encourage farmers with limited 
resources to adopt these techniques (Albouchi et al., 2005). In addition, more research is needed 
to evaluate related factors that could enhance the effects of IWUE-improvement policies (e.g. 
pricing policies, technology adoption, participation, etc.). In this sense, the next section will focus 
on the study of the relationship between local irrigation governance, approximated by WUA 
performance, and farmers’ efficiency. 
6.3. Local irrigation governance and IWUE 
As introduced in section 6.1, recent studies call for a new approach which considers WDM 
institutions as a larger part of the water demand strategy. From this perspective, more emphasis 
should be paid to the improvement of governance structures and decision making processes, 
alongside support for technical, economic and legal aspects. Brooks (2004) argue that technical, 
economic and legal issues are determined by – rather than determinants of – the way in which 
water is governed. Accordingly, “good governance” of irrigation water will result in better 
performance of various technical, economic and legal determinants of water management. In the 
current section, we try to investigate if there is any significant statistical relationship between the 
local irrigation governance and the individual farmers’ performance in our study area. 
Enlightenment of this relationship could have a lot of benefit on how to manage efficiently water 
at the local level (enhancing the effectiveness of local water demand management tools).  
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6.3.1. Methodology 
This section is mainly based on some statistical tests (Kruskal-Wallis) and on the application of 
the Tobit model presented in the previous chapter. The aim is to identify relevant and significant 
variables, including local irrigation governance, which can explain the variance in efficiency 
scores observed between groups of farmers in the Cap Bon region. Farmers will also be grouped 
based on their perceptions concerning some attributes relating to the functioning of their WUA. 
Some of these attributes are technical whilst others relate to the internal management of the WUA 
and to the relationship between the farmers and the managers of their WUA. The Kruskal-Wallis 
test will be used to identify any significant variability in farming and IWU efficiency levels 
between perception-based groups.  
6.3.2. Results 
6.3.2.1. Socioeconomic determinants of farming and water use efficiency 
Several socioeconomic variables are expected to affect the technical efficiency of farmers. 
Hereby, we regressed a Tobit model in order to explain both the farming and IWU efficiency 
scores calculated for Cap Bon farmers. Table 6.9 below lists the explanatory variables (i.e. those 
relating to farmer characteristics and farm structure) tested in this regression.  
Table 6. 9. Definition of potential explicative variables of farming and IWU efficiency scores in Cap Bon 
region  
Variable  Definition of the variable LB 
(Mean) 
FJ 
(Mean) 
Total 
- Age of the manager 
(years) 
In years 37 57 41 
- Education level (% 
secondary or higher)  
- 1 for secondary or higher level,  
- 0 otherwise 
30 73 55 
- Experience (in years) Date of starting irrigated activity 12 19.5 16 
- Agriculture is a 
unique source of 
revenue (%) 
1 if agriculture is unique source of 
revenue 
0 otherwise 
88 67.7 88 
- Land size  Size of the farm in ha 2.8 10 6.1 
Source: survey 
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The results of this regression show that almost none of the selected socioeconomic variables 
could be considered as a determinant of irrigation water use efficiency at farm level in the Cap 
Bon systems (Table 6.10). The weak pseudo R2 also shows that the variables used in this 
regression explains little the variability in the explained variables. Farming efficiency is only 
partly explained by the farmers’ level of education.  
Land structure, which is one of the main differences between the FJ and LB systems, was also 
integrated into the Tobit regression as an explicative variable. However, its effect on both 
farming and IWU efficiency vectors was not significant.  
Table 6. 10. Effect of socioeconomic variables on farming and IWU efficiencies: Tobit model results 
Explained variables# 
FE IWUE 
Explanatory socioeconomic variables 
Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
- Age 0.008 0.083* 0.110 0.116 
- Schooling 0.020 0.040** 0.005 0.678 
- Experience -0.0001 0.990 0.003 0.851 
- Main activity 0.119 0.309 0.322 0.082* 
- Land size 0.0023 0.959 -0.066 0.316 
- Constant 0.186 0.354 -0.048 0.867 
σ
 a
 0.344 0.042 0.516 0.062 
Pseudo R2 0.181  0.083  
Log-Likelihood  -32.86  -51.05  
LR(χ2) 14.42  9.08  
P> χ2 0.013**  0.106  
Number of observations 62  62  
*, **, *** = significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
a For σ the standard error is reported instead of the P-value. 
# VRS scores are used in this test 
6.3.2.2. Variance in efficiency between LB and FJ 
Average values of farming and IWU efficiency were shown to be clearly different between FJ1, 
FJ2, and LB. Here, we statistically test this variability. The statistical significance of differences 
in farming and IWU efficiency between the three farm groups is assessed using a non-parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis (K-Wallis) test. The K-Wallis statistical test belongs to the “Tests for Several 
Independent Samples Procedure” category, which compares two or more groups of cases for one 
variable, in order to see if they belong to the same population. A non parametric test is required 
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because the technical efficiencies are effectively censored between zero and one (Oude Lansink 
& Bezlepkin, 2003). In our case, from K-Wallis one-way analysis of variance, we might learn 
that the three selected groups of farmers do or do not differ in terms of average efficiency scores.  
The statistical significance of differences in average efficiency scores between farm groups is 
presented in Table 6.11. It shows that all P-values are below 0.01, which indicates that the 
efficiency of different groups significantly differs in terms of farming and IWU efficiencies under 
both CRS and VRS assumptions, at the critical 1% level. Further analysis with regard to potential 
governance-related factors that could explain these differences is presented below (Table 6.12). 
Table 6. 11. Kruskal-Wallis tests for differences in farming and IWU efficiencies between FJ1, FJ2, and LB 
Test Hypothesis Test result P-Value 
FE 
CRS 
VRS 
H0: 321 FEFEFE θθθ ==  
 
H1: 321 FEFEFE θθθ ≠≠  
 
8.792*** 
23.184*** 
0.010 
0.000 
IWUE 
CRS 
VRS 
H0: 321 IWUEIWUEIWUE θθθ ==  
 
H1: 321 IWUEIWUEIWUE θθθ ≠≠  
 
15.352*** 
13.966*** 
0.000 
0.000 
FE 
CRS 
VRS 
H0: 321 FEFE θθ =+  
 
H1: 321 FEFE θθ ≠+  
 
7.914*** 
17.928*** 
0.004 
0.000 
IWUE 
CRS 
VRS 
H0: 321 IWUEIWUE θθ =+  
 
H1: 321 IWUEIWUE θθ ≠+  
 
12.381*** 
10.967*** 
0.000 
0.000 
Subscript i in this Table refers to farm type, with i=1,...,3 referring to FJ1, FJ2, and LB types, respectively; 1+2 
refers to all FJ farmers taken together within a unique group  
6.3.2.3. Variance in efficiencies between farmers’ perceptions-based groups within whole sample 
Here we use farmers’ perceptions on criteria relating to irrigation water governance in their 
localities as proxy variables in order to elucidate the effect of main governance attributes on 
farming and irrigation performance. Explicitly, we seek to test whether there is any significant 
variability in the calculated efficiency scores between groups of farmers who are differentiated by 
their level of satisfaction regarding the organization of and services provided by the WUA to 
which they belong.  
Stakeholders’ perceptions were widely used as important information for the empirical analysis 
of institutional performance (see Knack and Keefer 1986; Cukierman et al., 1998; Gray and 
Kaufmann 1998; Barrett and Graddy 2000, etc.). Relevant information drawn from this type of 
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data is used regularly both by individuals and society to make important social, economic, and 
political decisions (Saleth and Dinar, 2004).  
The surveyed perceptions taken into consideration in this application are:  
- V1: Satisfaction concerning the collective irrigation network of the WUA (Binary 
variable: satisfied / non-satisfied);  
- V2: Perception as to the farmer’s relationship with the WUA managers: (Binary 
variable: good/bad); 
- V3: Satisfaction concerning the technical services (mainly extension) provided by the 
WUA (Binary variable: satisfied / non-satisfied);  
- V4: Satisfaction with regard to the internal functioning and organization of the WUA 
(satisfied / non-satisfied).  
V1 and V3 are “technical-oriented perceptions” whilst V2 and V4 are “organizational and 
managerial-oriented perceptions”. Results of the statistical K-Wallis test concerning the 
variability of farming and IWU efficiency scores between these perception-based groups are 
presented below. 
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Table 6. 12. Kruskal-Wallis tests for differences in farming and IWU efficiencies between different farmers’ 
perception groups (whole sample considered) 
Test Hypothesis Test 
Result 
P-
Value 
H0: 11 'V,CRSFE
V,CRS
FE θθ =  H1: 11 'V,CRSFEV,CRSFE θθ ≠  2.452 0.117 
H0: 22 'V,CRSFE
V,CRS
FE θθ =  H1: 22 'V,CRSFEV,CRSFE θθ ≠  2.810* 0.093 
H0: 33 'V,CRSFE
V,CRS
FE θθ =  H1: 33 'V,CRSFEV,CRSFE θθ ≠  3.429* 0.064 
CRS 
assumption 
H0: 44 'V,CRSFE
V,CRS
FE θθ =  H1: 44 'V,CRSFEV,CRSFE θθ ≠  1.844 0.174 
H0: 11 'V,VRSFE
V,VRS
FE θθ =  H1: 11 'V,VRSFEV,VRSFE θθ ≠  10.613*** 0.001 
H0: 22 'V,VRSFE
V,VRS
FE θθ =  H1: 22 'V,VRSFEV,VRSFE θθ ≠  0.021 0.886 
H0: 33 'V,VRSFE
V,VRS
FE θθ =  H1: 33 'V,VRSFEV,VRSFE θθ ≠  4.015** 0.045 
FE 
VRS 
assumption 
H0: 44 'V,VRSFE
V,VRS
FE θθ =  H1: 44 'V,VRSFEV,VRSFE θθ ≠  2.669 0.100 
H0: 11 'V,CRSIWUE
V,CRS
IWUE θθ =  H1: 11 'V,CRSIWUEV,CRSIWUE θθ ≠  2.452 0.117 
H0: 22 'V,CRSIWUE
V,CRS
IWUE θθ =  H1: 22 'V,CRSIWUEV,CRSIWUE θθ ≠  0.161 0.688 
H0: 33 'V,CRSIWUE
V,CRS
IWUE θθ =  H1: 33 'V,CRSIWUEV,CRSIWUE θθ ≠  2.281 0.131 
CRS 
assumption 
H0: 44 'V,CRSIWUE
V,CRS
IWUE θθ =  H1: 44 'V,CRSIWUEV,CRSIWUE θθ ≠  3.202* 0.073 
H0: 11 'V,VRSIWUE
V,VRS
IWUE θθ =  H1: 11 'V,VRSIWUEV,VRSIWUE θθ ≠  8.930*** 0.002 
H0: 22 'V,VRSIWUE
V,VRS
IWUE θθ =  H1: 22 'V,VRSIWUEV,VRSIWUE θθ ≠  0.161 0.688 
H0: 33 'V,VRSIWUE
V,VRS
IWUE θθ =  H1: 33 'V,VRSIWUEV,VRSIWUE θθ ≠  1.897 0.168 
IWUE 
VRS 
assumption 
H0: 44 'V,VRSIWUE
V,VRS
IWUE θθ =  H1: 44 'V,VRSIWUEV,VRSIWUE θθ ≠  0.353 0.552 
Subscripts V1 to V4 refers to farmers groups with positive perception according to a given criteria (presented 
below), Subscripts V’1 to V’4 refers to farmers groups with negative perceptions, 
The results presented in Table 6.12 show that average VRS farming and IWU efficiencies are 
significantly different between the satisfied and the non-satisfied farmers with regard to the 
technical functioning of their WUA’s irrigation network. It also shows that VRS farming 
efficiency is significantly different between satisfied and non-satisfied farmers concerning the 
extension services provided by their WUA. This implies that farming and IWU efficiencies are 
statistically linked to the “technical-oriented perceptions” of farmers.   
6.3.2.4. Variance in efficiency scores between farmers’ perceptions-based groups within each 
WUA 
In order to go into further detail, we performed the same test as above (for VRS scores) whilst 
considering each WUA group separately. Results are presented in Table 6.13.   
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Table 6. 13. Kruskal-Wallis tests for differences in farming and IWU efficiencies between different farmers’ 
perception groups within each WUA 
Test(#) Hypothesis Test 
Result 
P-Value 
H0: 1111 'V,FE
V,
FE θθ =  H1: 1111 'V,FEV,FE θθ ≠  - (##) - 
H0: 2121 'V,FE
V,
FE θθ =  H1: 2121 'V,FEV,FE θθ ≠  2.713* 0.099 
H0: 3131 'V,FE
V,
FE θθ =  H1: 3131 'V,FEV,FE θθ ≠  3.645* 0.056 
FE  
H0: 4141 'V,FE
V,
FE θθ =  H1: 4141 'V,FEV,FE θθ ≠  1.753 0.1855 
H0: 1111 'V,IWUE
V,
IWUE θθ =  H1: 1111 'V,IWUEV,IWUE θθ ≠  - - 
H0: 2121 'V,IWUE
V,
IWUE θθ =  H1: 2121 'V,IWUEV,IWUE θθ ≠  2.326 0.127 
H0: 3131 'V,IWUE
V,
IWUE θθ =  H1: 3131 'V,IWUEV,IWUE θθ ≠  1.125 0.288 
FJ group 
IWUE  
H0: 4141 'V,IWUE
V,
IWUE θθ =  H1: 4141 'V,IWUEV,IWUE θθ ≠  4.141** 0.041 
H0: 1212 'V,FE
V,
FE θθ =  H1: 1212 'V,FEV,FE θθ ≠  1.336 0.247 
H0: 2222 'V,FE
V,
FE θθ =  H1: 2222 'V,FEV,FE θθ ≠  - - 
H0: 3232 'V,FE
V,
FE θθ =  H1: 3232 'V,FEV,FE θθ ≠  - - 
FE  
H0: 4242 'V,FE
V,
FE θθ =  H1: 4242 'V,FEV,FE θθ ≠  1.460 0.226 
H0: 1212 'V,IWUE
V,
IWUE θθ =  H1: 1212 'V,IWUEV,IWUE θθ ≠  0.594 0.441 
H0: 2222 'V,IWUE
V,
IWUE θθ =  H1: 2222 'V,IWUEV,IWUE θθ ≠  - - 
H0: 3232 'V,IWUE
V,
IWUE θθ =  H1: 3232 'V,IWUEV,IWUE θθ ≠  - - 
LB group 
IWUE  
H0: 4242 'V,IWUE
V,
IWUE θθ =  H1: 4242 'V,IWUEV,IWUE θθ ≠  2.026 0.154 
# VRS scores are used in this test; ##: V is not binary variable within the group; Subscripts V1 to V4 refers to farmer 
groups with positive perceptions according to a given criterion (presented below), Subscripts V’1 to V’4 refers to 
farmer groups with negative perceptions, Subscripts 1 and 2 refers to the FJ and LB areas respectively.  
An interesting finding in this Table 6.13 is the average VRS-IWUE which is significantly 
different between satisfied and non-satisfied farmers in FJ with regard to the internal functioning 
of their WUA. Unfortunately, V1 which is significant in Table 6.12 can not be used as binary 
variable inside the FJ group because almost all farmers are satisfied. 
6.3.2.5. Variance in efficiency scores according to individual investment in water saving 
technology within each WUA 
Here, we consider each group of farmers separately, and then we divide each group into two sub-
groups according to the binary variable: “investment done in water saving technology”. A K-
wallis test for studying the variability of farming and IWU efficiencies between these sub-
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groups was conducted (Table 6.14). Results show that whilst perception-based data did not 
explain the variance between various efficiency vectors inside LB, farming and IWU efficiency 
scores for LB farmers showed significant differences between farmers according to their 
investment in irrigation water saving technology. The effect of this variable inside the FJ group 
was not highly significant.    
Table 6. 14. Kruskal-Wallis tests for differences in farming and IWU efficiencies between farmers according 
to their investment in water saving technology (within each WUA)  
 Test Hypothesis Test result P-Value 
FE 
CRS 
VRS 
H0: 21 FEFE θθ =  
 
H1: 21 FEFE θθ ≠  
 
5.947* 
0.291 
0.014 
0.589 FJ 
group IWUE 
CRS 
VRS 
H0: 21 IWUEIWUE θθ =  
 
H1: 21 IWUEIWUE θθ ≠  
 
3.880* 
0.141 
0.048 
0.707 
FE 
CRS 
VRS 
H0: 21 FEFE θθ =  
 
H1: 21 FEFE θθ ≠  
 
3.056* 
8.036*** 
0.080 
0.004 LB 
group IWUE 
CRS 
VRS 
H0: 21 IWUEIWUE θθ =  
 
H1: 21 IWUEIWUE θθ ≠  
 
1.888 
5.813* 
0.169 
0.015 
Subscript i in this Table refers to farm type, with i=1,2 referring to farmers who have invested in water saving 
technology during the past three years and those who have not invested. 
6.3.3. Discussion 
Table 6.10 shows that socioeconomic differences between farmers in our sample do not 
significantly explain the calculated IWUE. Even land structure, which is one of the main 
structural differences between the FJ and LB areas, was not found to be significant when 
integrated into the Tobit model. Even though, Table 6.11 shows that average (both CRS and 
VRS) farming and IWU efficiency scores are significantly different between the selected groups 
FJ1, FJ2, and LB. Although the three latter groups are located in neighbour areas, they still are 
different from each other regarding the sources of irrigation, the dependence on public provision 
and WUA monitoring, the performances of WUA managing their areas, the water price charged 
to farmers, etc. Thus, combined results from tables 6.10 and 6.11 show that IWUE is at least 
partially dependent, on the local institutional context in which farmers are operating.  
The perception-based information used in our statistical tests (Tables 6.12 and 6.13) identifies 
some of the local irrigation governance attributes that can further explain the variability of 
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farming and IWU efficiency levels between farmers in our sample. In fact, taking the entire 
sample together, we found that the average IWUE is highly and significantly different between 
the satisfied and the non-satisfied farmers with regard to the technical functioning of the 
irrigation network managed by their WUA. Furthermore, average farming efficiency was 
significantly different according to both technical-oriented perceptions V1 and V3. Organization 
and managerial-oriented perceptions of farmers do little to explain these differences when all of 
the samples are taken together. However, when considering the FJ groups separately, the results 
of the same test reveal that the average IWUE for farmers belonging to this latter WUA 
significantly differ according to farmers’ satisfaction as to the internal functioning and 
organization of their WUA. It should be remembered that the FJ WUA has a very low managerial 
efficiency whilst its engineering efficiency is high. Combined results for these two tests again 
stress the significant relationship between local irrigation governance and individual performance 
in managing water resources at farm level. It also shows that both technical and organizational 
attributes of governance are important for improving the IWUE at farm level.  
Further analyses are necessary in order to further explain the causality effect between farmers’ 
perceptions and their performance on the one hand and the WUA performance on the other.  
6.4. Concluding remarks 
A number of concluding remarks can be drawn from the current chapter.  
Firstly, IWUE in Tunisia was found to be low compared to the efforts made for improving it. 
Two important implications of this latter result can be discussed. On the one hand, hope is raised 
that important water conservation in Tunisia can be achieved if more efforts are mobilized in 
order to further improve this index. On the other hand, the highly significant correlation found in 
our study between IWUE and overall farming efficiency indicates that such efforts will have a 
considerable positive effect on the overall competitiveness of Tunisian agriculture.  
Secondly, the hypothesis concerning the possible overuse and waste of water by farmers in 
situations where insecurity of water supply exists was proved in this chapter. In fact, farmers 
belonging to the LB WUA, which has the lower engineering efficiency score and where problems 
of water reliability are frequent (according to our survey), were the least efficient in terms of 
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water use. Thus, we can confirm that improvements in the technical attributes of WUAs to 
enhance their water delivery performance will have a direct effect on water use efficiency at farm 
level.  
Thirdly, in Table (5.4) we showed a highly significant correlation between engineering and 
managerial efficiencies for the WUA. In addition, Table 6.13 shows that groups of FJ farmers, 
classified according to their perception as to the internal functioning of their WUA, were 
significantly different in terms of IWUE. These combined results prove that managerial 
efficiency of the WUA and its internal organization and functioning can also have a direct, as 
well as an indirect, effect on the IWUE at farm level.  
Finally, a considerable amount of money is spent in Tunisia on various programmes intended to 
improve IWUE at farm level (e.g. subsidies for the adoption of irrigation water saving 
technology). However, as mentioned in chapter 3 (section 3.13.3, b), the “Cellules de promotion 
des GDA” which support the functioning of WUAs do not have sufficient resources and are 
sometimes incapable of assisting all the WUAs in their regions. From the current study, we 
conclude that a reallocation of a proportion of the financial resources towards strengthening the 
structure and training of WUA staff and managers could also have a high impact on improving 
the IWUE at farm level. Also, similarily to Zekri and Easter (2007), the current study 
recommends the reform of WUA according to new models that can ensure efficiency and 
transparency.   
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Chapter 7. Pricing policies and impact on water demand in 
the study area: A DEA-Based methodology for the estimation 
of individual input demand functions 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter estimates individual demand functions employing the information hidden in 
individual producer’s technical efficiency. This information is extracted through the development 
of an inverse DEA model. The empirical results for Tunisia show that farmers who are more 
technically efficient have less elastic irrigation water demand functions; these farmers would 
adjust demand only to a limited extent and they can afford the water price. In contrast, water 
pricing significantly affects those that a least efficient. These farmers shift towards a different 
cropping pattern using significantly less water and more land when the price of water increases. 
Thus higher water prices would threaten this category’s livelihood if their efficiency is not 
improved. Incentives and support policies need to be provided in order to help them shifting 
toward more productive pattern and non toward an extensive one. This shifting is not always easy 
task for least efficient and small size farmers who face a lot of constraints. However, if the 
technical efficiency of these farmers were to improve, then water saving objectives will be 
difficult to reach since their demand will also become highly inelastic. The findings have 
important implications in view of the objectives of Tunisia water policy which include:  full cost 
recovery, continuity of the irrigation activity, and water saving at the national level. 
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7.1. Introduction 
According to the neoclassical economic theory, a farmer in an irrigated area would respond to an 
increase of water prices by reducing his consumption (Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004). This 
results in a negatively sloped demand curve. Saved water could be either used by other more 
productive farmers, or reallocated to more productive agricultural and non-agricultural uses. 
Theoretically, such reallocation of the resource would certainly contribute to an increase in the 
overall fficiency of its use. In this respect, the apparent misuse and waste of irrigation water, in 
the context of low and subsidized water prices, causes many authors to advocate a more 
prominent role of economic incentives in encouraging efficient water use (Russell et al., 2007; 
Bar-Shira et al., 2006 ; Becker and Lavee, 2008; Perry, 2001; Speelman, 2008). Irrigation water 
pricing is then often regarded as a main tool to achieve a better level of water resource 
valorization (Singh, 2007). The importance of irrigation water prices can be twofold. Firstly, 
farmers will be more aware about the economic importance of the water and its scarcity and 
secondly, they provide incentives to farmers to think about shifting their crop pattern towards a 
more productive one (Easter and Liu (2007); Perry (2001).  
The foregoing topic has received considerable attention in the applied literature. The practical  
importance of the price tool has been reviewed and criticized in many empirical studies of 
irrigation water demand functions, especially in arid countries (e.g., Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 
2004; Berbel and Gómez-Limón, 2000, Varela-Ortega et al., 1998). These studies show that 
water pricing would not always stimulate the desired changes in water use due to the low 
elasticity of demand for irrigation water. A reduced effect is also expected if the cost of water is 
small relative to total costs. Besides, the implementation of the pricing instruments could also 
probably engender collateral effects such as a decrease in agricultural income and labor demand 
in rural areas.  
More specifically, Gómez-Limón and Berbel (2000) show that volumetric water pricing is an 
inadequate single instrument for managing the demand of irrigation water as it does not  
significantly reduce demand. Based on empirical irrigation water demand functions for three 
Spanish irrigated areas, these authors point out that consumption is not reduced significantly until 
prices reach such a level that farm income and agricultural employment are negatively affected. 
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In a similar vein, Berbel and Gómez-Limón (2000) argue that for water pricing to work properly, 
the revenues collected from farmers need to be used for environmental and water saving 
technologies. Supported by empirical evidence from three large irrigated Chinese districts with 
different socioeconomic and physical settings, Liao et al. (2007) find that water pricing as such is 
unlikely to be a successful instrument for improving the irrigation efficiency and the financial 
sustainability of irrigation systems. They however indicate that pricing reforms can improve 
water management when it is tailored to fit with the specific contexts of irrigation systems and is 
coupled with improvement in management transparency. In the same respect, Molle et al. (2008) 
show that “while operation and maintenance costs can be recovered, higher water prices have 
limited potential for achieving gains in irrigation efficiency”. They also argue that “substantial 
increases in water prices can be expected to raise overall economic efficiency by motivating 
farmers to intensify cultivation, adopt higher value crops, improve technology, or rent out their 
land to investors. However, such strategies are constrained by the lack of capital and credit, and 
pervasive risk, notably regarding marketing. Pricing policies, thus, are best implemented together 
with positive incentives that reduce capital and risk constraints, and offer attractive cropping 
alternatives or exit options with compensation”.  
All results mentioned in this brief literature review stress the necessity of a set of parallel policies 
to help improve the productivity of irrigation water to go in tandem with water pricing. Purpose 
of these parallel policies is to improve the technical efficiency of farmers making them able to 
pay higher water rates. From a policy perspective this means that improved insight is required in 
the interaction of (a) economic incentives (water pricing), and (b) additional programmes to 
support the adoption of best management practices and water saving technologies.  
This chapter addresses the issues discussed above for Tunisia. In Tunisia, the government first 
started to implement water pricing in the irrigated areas in the 1970’s. The main objective was to 
cover the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of the irrigation systems as a first step and to 
cover the full production cost of water in a later stage. Other more general objectives were to 
improve the valorization of the irrigation water by inducing a more efficient use of the resource, 
and to reduce the total volume of water consumed by the agricultural sector (80% of the total 
water consumption in the country) in order to face the forecasted imbalance between water 
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supply and demand at the country level. However, the low level of farmers’ revenue at that time 
was a main constraint for the introduction of water pricing. Thus, the government has developed 
a set of policies intended to improve the technical capacities and the productivity of farmers in 
parallel to the pricing policy. Subsidies for water-saving-technology adoption and enhancement 
of the extension services are the main examples. By 2004 the areas equipped with water saving 
technologies in Tunisia represented about 75% of the total irrigated area (Agency of Agricultural 
Investments Promotion, 2004). However, these subsidies have not resulted in significant water 
saving at the national level.  In fact water saved was used to intensify the existing irrigated 
system (Bachta et al., 2000; Al Atiri 2007). 
This chapter contributes to the literature in three ways.  First, we develop a framework of the 
irrigated farm where inefficiency in production prevails and several production practices are 
available. The micro-economic framework shows the impact of water pricing and educational 
assistance to farmers on water demand in the situation of inefficiency. From the framework we 
hypothesize that improvement of farmers’ technical capacities will lead to a more inelastic 
demand of irrigation water. This is in line with findings by many authors in the field of irrigation 
economics (Varela-Ortega et al., 1998; De Fraiture and Perry, 2002) who find most efficient 
farmers valorize irrigation water to the best and will be more able to support higher irrigation 
prices than the less efficient farmers. In addition, we hypothesize that small size farms face more 
constraints to improve their technical performances and will be negatively affected by increases 
of irrigation prices. Consequently, when small scale farms are predominant, water pricing could 
threat the sustainability of the irrigated activity in a specific region or country. 
The second objective of this chapter is to present an empirical analysis to test our hypotheses for 
Tunisia. We build a normative inverse Data Envelopment Analysis model in order to estimate the 
differential impact of higher water prices on water and other inputs. The advantage of the inverse 
DEA model is its capacity to estimate individual demand functions by using the information 
hidden in the technical efficiency score of a particular farmer. We use our model in order to 
estimate water and other inputs demand functions for farmer groups distinguished by their 
technical efficiency level. We then test the differential impact of the increasing prices of 
irrigation on demand of water and other inputs for different types of farmers. The results are 
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aggregated by different farm sizes and by different regional Water User Associations (WAU).    
7.2. Methodology 
From the exposition in previous section, it follows that farm specific difference in technology and 
in efficiency are crucial to evaluate impacts of water pricing. Past studies however commonly 
assume producers behave rationally in terms of profit maximization in accordance with 
neoclassical economic theory (e.g., Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004; Liao et al., 2007).  
According to the normative mathematical approach, farmers would use their water allowances 
depending on the productivity (marginal value of water) that water generates in their farms taking 
into account the soil and climate conditions.  Such models mainly provide prediction of changes 
in cropping patterns resulting from different water pricing policies. Most of these models use 
predetermined fixed ratios between inputs and outputs, assuming that substitution between 
different production factors is minimal or even non existent. This drawback can be overcome by 
using non-linear methods incorporating some production functions (or engineering production 
functions estimated from biophysical models) in the mathematical model (see for instance Zekri 
and Herruzo, 1994; Mimouni et al., 2000). This remains a complicated task which needs large 
amount of data.  
In this study, we provide a novel data-driven methodology which takes into account the previous 
models’ disadvantages and develop a normative inverse-DEA model that allows estimating the 
effect of water pricing on various inputs demand at the level of the individual farm. Moreover, 
the model allows for changes in the relative-use of the production factors (including factors 
substitution and complementarily) when the irrigation water price changes. Furthermore, the 
model does not need any prior functional or parametric specification. All results are provided at 
an individual level allowing case-by-case information for policy and decision makers. 
The model application consists of following three steps: (a) calculation of the efficiency score for 
each farm using a standard DEA model, (b) calibration of an inverse DEA model for each farm 
based on the individual efficiency measures as a representation of the production technology in 
order to, and (c) application of the inverse model to simulate the impact of water pricing policies 
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on farm specific water demand.  
7.2.1. Inverse DEA model 
In recent years there have been a number of papers written on various “inverse optimization 
problems” mainly in the fields of geophysical sciences, medical imaging, and traffic equilibrium 
development31 (Ahuja and Orlin, 2001). When dealing with an inverse optimization problem, we 
need to use an optimal solution to determine parameters’ values. More precisely, we calculate the 
parameter values of a system that create a feasible but not optimal solution and we adjust these 
parameter values as little as possible so that the feasible solution becomes the optimal one (Wei 
et al., 2000). This principle of “inverse optimization problems” is often applied in the broad 
literature of calibrated or positive mathematical programming (See Buysse et al., 2007). Zhang 
and Cui (1996) were the first to inverse a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) optimization 
model. By doing so, they tried to answer the following question: if the kth DMU shall continue its 
operation in the next period, no matter whether it is efficient from a DEA viewpoint, and if the 
unit plans to increase its outputs by ∆yk and asks for an increment ∆xk of input, the supervisor of 
this and other parallel DMUs must decide how much additional resource to give to the unit k 
such that an increment ∆yk can let the unit at least maintain its current efficiency status. 
Despite its use in various domains, the DEA model was never applied, to our knowledge, in the 
economic field for solving problems of performance forecasting or of resource allocation. The 
current work is a second application of the inverse DEA model for the estimation of irrigation 
water demand functions (see Speelman et al., 2008).   
Based on Wei et al., (2000) we present our inverse input-oriented DEA model as follows:  
Suppose a set of n DMUs,{ }n1,2,...,j:DMU j = , which produce multiple outputs 
s)1,2,...,(ryrj = , by utilizing multiple inputs m)1,2,...,(ixij = . Let the inputs and outputs for 
DMUj be )x,...,x,(xX mj2j1jj and )y,...,y,(yY sj2j1jj , respectively. 0>jX , and 0>jY for all 
                                                 
31
 see Ahuja and Orlin 2001 and Tarantola 1987 for more details about applications of the inverse optimization 
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n1,2,...,j = . When a DMU0, { }n1,2,...,0 ∈ , is under evaluation, then we can consider the 
following generalized BCC (Banker et al. (1984)) DEA model (1):  
n1,...,j,0λ
yλY
θxλXs.t.
θMin
j
n
1j
0jj
n
1j
0jj
=∀≥
=
≥
≤
∑
∑
∑
=
=
=
n
j
j
1
1λ
   (1) 
Suppose now that we solve the model (1) for each DMU and obtain a value of technical 
efficiencies (θ ) for each of them. Then we may consider the following question: if the efficiency 
index θ for a DMU0 remains unchanged, but the DMU0 is obliged to decrease its output level, by 
how much should the inputs of the DMU0 decrease? To reply to this question suppose the outputs 
of DMU0 are decreased from Y0 to 000 ∆YYβ −= , where the vector 0>0∆Y . We need then to 
estimate the input vector 0∆x,∆x-x)α,...,α,(αα 000*m0*20*10*0 ≥== provided that the efficiency 
index of DMU0 is still θ .  
Suppose DMUn+1 represents DMU0 after changing the inputs and outputs. We can then consider 
the following mathematical program (2) in order to calculate the efficiency of DMUn+1: 
0
1
1
1
10
10
≥=∀≥
=
≥+
≤+
+
=
=
+
=
+
∑
∑
∑
n
n
j
j
n
n
λ
λ
βλβ
αλα
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θMin
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0jj
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*
  (2) 
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If the optimal value of the problem (2), tθ , is equal to the efficiency index of DMU0 calculated in 
program (1), θ , we say that the efficiency index is unchanged when the outputs are decreased to 
0β and the inputs are decreased to 
*
0α . We can then write Eff ),(α 0*0 β = Eff )y,(x 00 . 
As discussed in model (1), θ represents the relative efficiency of the DMU0 under the present 
technology. Such technology conditions are not supposed to change within the short term. Using 
this technology information in addition to model (2), we can then present the following model (3) 
(adapted from Wei et al., 2000; Yan et al., 2002). Model (3) provides estimation about the 
needed changes in the inputs combination when a reduction of the output level is expected. 
 n;1,...,j,0λ
xα
βλY
θαλXs.t.
)α,...,α,(αMin
j
00
n
1j
0jj
n
1j
0jj
m,02,01,0
=∀≥
≤
=
≥
≤
∑
∑
∑
=
=
=
n
j
j
1
1λ
  (3) 
Where 0β and 0α are defined as before, and θ represents the technology of DMU0 already 
estimated from program (1).  
7.2.2. Specification of the Inverse DEA model for an input demand estimation 
Assume )p,...,p,(pp m21i = the prices of the mth input and 0p ≠ . Suppose also that y0 is 
expressed in a monetary term as being the net revenue of farmers. Then we propose the following 
weighted sum model (4): 
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 n;1,...,j,0λ
pp,xα
αpyλY
θαλXs.t.
.αpMin
j
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  (4) 
The two unknown variables in this model are i,0α  and jλ . The rest of parameters are known or 
calculated before simulation. ip and simp  are the original and the simulated input price vectors 
respectively and y0 is the farmers net revenue expressed in monetary term. The rest of parameters 
are defined by models 1, 2 and 3. The weighted sum model assumes a fixed technical efficiency 
while allowing the DMU to adjust its allocative efficiency when input prices change (Figure 7.1 
and 7.2). The output constraint indicates that we would like to obtain at least the total amount of 
revenue that is currently being obtained (by the farmer) minus the extra cost due to the change in 
the input combination. The input constraint can be read as if we would be prepared to radially 
reduce inputs in order to achieve the amount of revenue (described above), This reduction would 
be done according to the same way described by the farmer technology. Of course, this 
technology is initially determined by reference to a set of peer DMUs weighted according to an 
optimal jλ  combination. This set of peer DMUs can change when Psim changes, indicating that 
when relative prices change, another DMU could be more useful in describing the optimal 
behavior of the farmer (under simulation) while preserving his initial technology frontier.      
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Fig 7. 1. Efficient technical frontier in the sample, and farmer (A)’ technology drawn from information 
concerning his technical efficiency level 
Figure 7.1 shows the DEA frontier drawn for the entire sample in addition to the technology of 
the farmer (A). Figure 7.1 also shows how the farmer (A) will change his position on the isoquant 
when input prices (p1 and/or p2) change. 
The input price ratio is represented in Figure 7.2 by the line RR’. By running the model (4), we 
will look for a position on the isoquant of farmer (A) which minimizes the farmer’s input cost 
taking into account the new input price ratio. This minimization is equivalent to a maximization 
of the allocative efficiency of the farmer. Farmer (A) will try to minimize his input cost until a 
level where his technical production function doesn’t allow any lower input cost.  
x2/y  
x1/y  
Efficient DEA frontier drawn 
from the sample 
Technology of farmer (A) 
estimated from DEA 
CHAPTER 7                                                                                                                                          Pricing Policies 
 169 
 
Fig 7. 2. Minimization of the input cost in model (4) 
The model (4) used for irrigation water pricing assumes that the input combination of the farmers 
can change when irrigation prices go up. However, a constraint was added to this model in order 
to keep the total simulated cultivated area less than the initially cropped surface currently 
observed for each farmer. This constraint excludes any possibility for farmers to use more land 
than what they are currently holding. The following numerical example provides a validation of 
the model (4).   
7.2.3. Validation  
Suppose a sample of 5 DMUs which use two inputs (x1, x2) to produce a unique output (y). Let p1 
and p2 be the prices of inputs 1 and 2 respectively.  Inputs and outputs of the 5 DMUs as well as 
their technical, allocative and economic efficiencies (calculated from standard DEA models) are 
presented in Table 7.1. p1 =0.1 and p2= 0.03 are considered for the calculation of these latter 
efficiencies. 
Table 7.  1. Numerical example: Inputs, outputs and various efficiencies of the DMUs sample 
 y x1 x2 p1 p2 θ  AE CE 
DMU1 1 1 2 0.01 0.03 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DMU2 2 6 2 0.01 0.03 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DMU3 2 7 9 0.01 0.03 0.857 0.412 0.353 
DMU4 1 6 4 0.01 0.03 0.500 0.778 0.389 
DMU5 2 7 2 0.01 0.03 1.000 0.923 0.923 
AE and CE denote allocative and cost efficiencies respectively. 
R 
x2 
x1 
R’ 
A 
A’ 
A’’ 
Isoquant of farmer (A) 
Best minimizing cost input vector, given a 
fixed technology 
CHAPTER 7                                                                                                                                          Pricing Policies 
 170 
Now suppose that prices p1 and p2 will change from (0.01, 0.03) to (0.05, 0.01). By including this 
new price vector in model (4) and running it for the DMU (3) we obtained the following 
input/output combination: (y’= 1.711 x’1=5.315 and x’2=2.334). Using this latter combination in 
addition to the initial data of the rest of DMUs (Y’, x’1, x’2), we run the standard DEA models and 
we obtain the following results.  
Table 7.  2. New inputs, outputs and efficiencies of the DMUs after changing the relative price ratio 
 Y’ x’1 x’2 P’1 P’2 θ ’ AE’ CE’ 
DMU1 1 1 2 0.05 0.01 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DMU2 2 6 2 0.05 0.01 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DMU3 1.711 5.315 2.334 0.05 0.01 0.857 1.000 0.857 
DMU4 1 6 4 0.05 0.01 0.500 0.412 0.206 
DMU5 2 7 2 0.05 0.01 1.000 0.865 0.865 
Table 7.2 shows that technical efficiencies calculated for all DMUs (based on the new input 
combination of DMU 3) do not change. The results of model (4) show also that DMU3, not being 
able to improve its technical efficiency in the short run, will try to allocate the inputs more 
efficiently when the relative prices of these inputs change. 
7.2.4. Limits of the model 
Model (4) is calibrated using the technology information hidden in the observed technical 
inefficiency term θ . This allows simulating the management capacity of each farmer, estimated 
relatively to the best manager of the sample. However, the main limitation of model 4 is related 
to the fact that the output (revenue in our case) elasticity is only based on the reductions of the 
input use induced by the increases in irrigation prices. This limitation could be resolved by 
specifying a more flexible output function which, for instance, accounts for some other attributes 
or integrates the risk behavior of the farmer. Unfortunately, such information is not available. 
However, the calculation of the output elasticity in our model is not our main interest. Moreover, 
in model 4 the impact of an increase in irrigation rates on the input combinations is not related to 
the output behavior. Therefore we believe we can use model (4) for estimating water and inputs 
demand.  
Another limitation of the model is related to its normative nature: the model maximizes the 
allocative efficiency of the farmers since the beginning of the simulation. In fact, given the 
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technical capacity of each farmer, the margin for improving his allocative efficiency is limited. In 
reality, not all farmers are maximizing their allocative efficiency given their current technical 
capacity. This limitation could be surmounted by providing a positive version of the model (4).      
7.2.5. Data  
The data set used in this chapter is the same one collected from FJ and Lb WUA. However, due 
to the specific empirical validation needed in this chapter, farmers will be grouped according to: 
• their technical efficiency level: three groups were selected in order to emphasize the 
differences in water demand elasticity between the most and least efficient farmers,  
• their size: farmers of the sample were also grouped into three size-groups in order to show 
the differences in water demand elasticity between the largest and the smallest farms, and 
• their WUA: farmers were finally grouped into two groups, according to the WUA to 
which they belong, allowing the comparison between both irrigated areas. 
It is important to mention that both public and groundwater were aggregated into an unique input 
vector when simulating demand functions for efficiency and size-based groups. However, these 
two types of water were considered as separate vectors when calculating the input demand 
functions for FJ WUA. For this area, we then derived both public and groundwater demands. 
7.3. Results 
7.3.1. Input demand functions per efficiency-group 
In order to distinguish the differential impact of the increasing water pricing on various farmers-
groups by technical efficiency level, we divided the 62 farmers of our sample into three groups 
defined as following: (i) group1: farmers with an efficiency score between 0-50%; group2: 
farmers in the efficiency range of 51%-75%; and group3: farmers who’s the efficiency level is on 
the 76%-100% interval. By running the model (4) for each farmers and summing the new water 
demands (corresponding to each of the tested prices) of farmers in each group, we obtained the 
irrigation demand functions represented in Figure 7.3.   
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It is clear from Figure 7.3 that the group which will be affected the most by an increasing 
irrigation water prices is the less efficient one. Water use per ha for this last group passed from 
2083.5 m3/ha to 1757 m3/ha (-15.5 %) when irrigation water prices changes from 0.048 TND/m3 
to a price of 0.448 TND/m3 supposed to cover all variable and fixed production costs of the 
irrigation water. This could be interpreted by a shift toward more water-valorizing crops or 
simply by allocating more surfaces in the farm to rain feed crops.  
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Fig 7. 3. Average water use per hectare for each efficiency-group 
Water demand per ha in the second and third groups were reduced by 11% and 1.3% 
respectively. The most efficient group will almost not react to irrigation water prices. 
Concerning fertilizers use, all efficiency-groups show a downward sloping demand functions 
when the irrigation prices increases. This decrease however is not significant for the case of the 
most efficient group while it can reach around 200Kg/ha for groups 1 and 2.   Figure 7.4 also 
shows that for the most efficient farmers, water and labor are substitutable. In fact, labor demand 
increased for this latter group while it decreased for the less efficient framer groups.   
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Fig 7. 4. Average Labor (a) and fertilizers (b) use per ha for different efficiency-group 
 
7.3.2. Input demand functions per size-category group 
In order to see if the irrigation pricing policy has any differential impact on various farm-size-
groups, we selected the following three groups of farmers based on their size (Table 7.3). For 
each size-group and irrigation price, individual inputs demand were summed and represented in 
the Figures 7.5 and 7.6.    
Table 7.  3. Different farm size groups selected in Cap Bon region 
Groups Percentage in the 
sample 
average surface/farm 
(ha) 
average Technical 
efficiency 
Size> 6 ha 20% 23.7 0.85 
2 ha< size<= 6 ha 36% 3.3 0.59 
0 < size<= 2 ha 43% 1.2 0.69 
Figure 7.5 shows that small-size farms will be the most affected by higher irrigation prices. Their 
water demand decreases by 33% when the price of water equals a full cost recovery price. Our 
calculations also show that the total land use, of all farmers in this group, will increase with 
15.3% for this same price change. In contrats, the large-size group (which is more efficient, Table 
7.3)  decreases its total water use by 13% and the cropped area by 17%. In fact this  interaction 
explain that water demand/ha is rather inelastic for this group of farms. 
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Fig 7. 5. Average per hectare water use for each size-group 
The largest farmers will neither reduce the level of labor and fertilizers use per ha. This proves 
that these farmers are close to the maximum intensification level permitted by the currently 
available technology in the region. By keeping their level of water and other inputs use/ha 
constant and reducing their cropped area at the same time, these farmers are in fact reducing the 
scale of their operation. We also notice that a water price of 0.220 TND/m3 leads to parallel 
jumps in both fertilizers and water demand curves.  
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Fig 7. 6. Average Labor (left) and fertilizers (right) use per ha for different size-goups 
 
7.3.3. Comparison of input demand between FJ and LB areas 
As mentioned above, public and groundwater were considered as two different inputs when 
simulating the water demand functions in FJ. However, they were aggregated in the same input 
vector for the case of LB where all farmers only use public water supplied by the WUA. 
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Figure 7.7 shows the trend of total irrigation water used in both WUA when irrigation prices 
increases.  
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Fig 7. 7. Total water consumption in both FJ and LB 
From Figure 7.7 it appears that public and groundwater are complementary inputs since the 
demand of both decreases with an increase in the irrigation prices of public water. This is 
opposite to the expectation of probable increasing pressure on groundwater aquifer when public 
water prices increase. Despite the fact that current water pumping cost (around 0.033 TND/m3) is 
much lower than the public water price (0.068 TND/m3), farmers in FJ, even those holding a 
well, continue using water from public sources32. This complementary relationship could be due 
to the high salinity of groundwater in the studied region. Farmers may have to mix public and 
groundwater to obtain water with an sufficient average quality at lower price.   
Total water demand in FJ decreased by 14.2% when irrigation prices increased from 0.048 to 
0.440 TND. However, total water consumption in LB decreased with 24% for the same price 
change. Average cropped area per farm and water consumption per ha in both areas are shown in 
Figure 7.8.  
                                                 
32
 According to our survey 
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Fig 7. 8. Irrigation water and land demand functions in both FJ and LB WUAs 
 
At the current water price (0.048 TND/m3), FJ farmers consume on average 2136.6 m3/ha which 
is almost the same optimal level that can be consumed in LB (2099.8 m3/ha) under the 
assumption that farmers are maximizing their allocative efficiencies. However, the response to in 
increase in the irrigation prices is markedly different in the two areas. In FJ, the water demand/ha 
was found to be inelastic while demand decreased considerably in case of LB. In this second 
area, an inelastic price segment of the water demand curves was recorded. This segment 
coincides with prices at which farmers are insensitive to water price increases. When irrigation 
price reaches 0.228 TND/m3 (almost triple of the current price), LB farmers suddenly decreased 
their irrigation water demand. This decrease is accompanied with an increase in the average 
cropped area from 2 ha to 2.3 ha per farm. This shows that a substitutability relationship exists 
between water and land factors in LB.  
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Fig 7. 9. Comparison between water demand functions estimated (using the same data sample) from a multi-
attribute utility function (Chebil et al., 2008) and from inverse DEA model 
 
The increases of irrigation prices results in a loss of agricultural employment in LB (Figure 7.10). 
According to the findings in the latter section, the small-size farms reduced their level of labor 
use as a reaction to the price change. The fertilizers demand is again similar to the water demand 
functions. The increase of irrigation prices will not affect the use of fertilizers in FJ. By contrast, 
LB farmers will reduce the use of this input by 26% in average. 
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Fig 7. 10. Labor and fertilizers demands for various irrigation prices in both WUA 
 
7.4. Discussions 
This result that water demand elasticity is higly dependent on technical efficiency/technology is 
in line with findings of Varela-Ortega et al. (1998) who compare the price elasticity of water 
demand in three regions in Spain. They conclude that in the ‘old’ irrigation schemes where water 
application techniques are relatively inefficient, the response to increasing water charges is much 
higher than in the modern systems with drip irrigation technique. The authors conclude that the 
technical endowment in an agricultural district has a major effect on its response to water pricing. 
Albiac et al. (2007), Gómez-Limón & Riesgo (2004), and Berbel & Gómez-Limón also report 
very low elasticities of irrigation demand in some case studies from Spanish irrigated systems. 
For their study on the Tunisian case (Kairouan region in the central part of Tunisia), Poussin el 
al., (2008) found as well that a major increase (50%) in the cost of water affected only a minority 
of farms (in terms of revenue), who are consuming only 17% of the total irrigation water in the 
region. 
Fertilizers and irrigation water demands show a very similar trend in all demand functions 
estimated. According to these observations, a complementary relationship between the latter two 
factors exists in the studied area. We also found in our results that water and labor are likely to be 
substitutable inputs; such was the case for the most efficient and the largest farmers in our 
sample. These results are consistent with empirical studies that examine inputs interactions in 
irrigated agriculture both through field experiments (e.g., Prihar et al., 1989; Thompson et al., 
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2000) and modeling analysis (e.g., Bartolini et al., 2007; Chebil et al., 2004; Cai et al., 2008). 
Complementary relationship between water and fertilizers in Tunisia was reported by Chebil et 
al. (2004) when they studied the technical progress of the irrigated systems in Teboulba region. 
The latter authors also found substitutable relationship between water and labor factors. Besides, 
Cai et al. (2008), in their study of the substitution between water and other agricultural inputs 
when irrigation prices increases in the Maipo River basin in Chile, found monotonous 
substitution relationships between water and irrigation investment, labor, machinery and 
pesticides, respectively. In this latter study, a clear complementary relationship between water 
and fertilizers was also demonstrated.    
The irrigation demand functions obtained for FJ and LB are in line with the simulation results of 
Chebil et al., (2008) using a multi-objective programming model at the aggregated level using the 
same data used in this study (Figure 7.9). Their objective function integrates the risk behavior 
(calculated from secondary data about regional yields and prices) in addition to profit maximizing 
objective. Our inverse-DEA model is able to reproduce an almost identical pattern without prior 
functional or parametric specifications of farm behaviour. Also, our model used a minimum 
amount of data. Moreover, optimal results obtained from the inverse-DEA model for each farm 
are not optimal in an absolute sense but relatively to the best performer in the sample, which is a 
clear advantage compared to other normative models.   
Comparison of the trend in inputs demand functions between FJ and LB, when a similar 
irrigation pricing policy is applied in both regions, reveal many important findings. A first remark 
concerns the conjunctive use of public and groundwater in FJ area. In fact, these two types of 
water were unexpectedly found to be complementary. Currently, the average pumping cost in FJ 
is around 0.033 TND/m3. Despite the fact that this cost is much lower than the cost of public 
water distributed by WUA (0.068 TND/m3), most of the farmers are presently combining both 
resources. According to our survey, 98% of farmers in FJ district have a well in their farms and 
32.3% of these wells provide salty water (more than 1.5 g/liter). 36% of farmers in FJ consider 
the quality of water as the main irrigation constraint. According to this, the complementary 
relationship between both types of water looks to be justified and specific to the context of our 
study area. This result could not be generalized.    
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Another remark concerns the changes in land structure in both regions as consequence of the 
pricing policy. In FJ, the average cropped area per farm decreased with 13% (from 5.4 ha/farm to 
4.7 ha/farm) when irrigation price changed from the current situation to a cost recovery price 
level. This decrease of the land use is also accompanied with a decrease in the water and labor 
demand. All of this shows clearly that, in average, FJ farmers will reduces their scale of operation 
as response to the irrigation pricing policy simulated. By contrast, farmers in LB increased their 
land use while reducing their irrigation water, fertilizers and labor demands. As argued before, 
this trend can only be explained by a shift toward less water consuming crops, or by devoting a 
largest part of the farm for extensive rainfall crops. As presented in Figure 5, smaller farmers 
(less than 2 ha), currently use around 2102 m3/ha of irrigation water reduce their consumption to 
1180 m3/ha (56% of current optimal consumption) when irrigation prices reach the cost recovery 
level. For the same price change, small farmers also reduced their fertilizers and labor use by 
43% and 8%, respectively. However, their average cultivated land per farm increased by 15%. 
This implies a shift toward a more extensive agricultural pattern.  
Knowing that in average FJ farmers are more efficient and larger than LB farmers, the previous 
remark emphasises the probable threat for the irrigated activity in Tunisia of an increasing of 
water prices beyond a certain limit. The smallest and less efficient farmers will in fact shift 
toward more extensive systems while the most efficient and the largest farmers will starts to 
reduce the scale of their operation. We also have to remark that these changes are supposed to 
happen when farmers are maximizing their allocative efficiency, which is not always the case in 
real contexts.  
7.5. Conclusions 
The main results of our study can be summarized as follows:  
• Results of our simulations show that farms’ technical efficiency level is important factor 
deeply affecting the elasticity of their water demand. The advantage of the inverse DEA 
model developed in this study is its capacity to estimate individual demand functions by 
using the information hidden in the technical efficiency score of a particular farmer. We 
used this model in order to estimate water and other inputs demand functions for farmer 
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groups distinguished by their technical efficiency level. 
• Under the assumption of allocative efficiency for a given available technology, farmers 
who are most technically efficient will have the least elastic irrigation water demand. The 
most efficient farmers are better at valorizing water resources. Thus they are able to afford 
higher irrigation prices than their less efficient colleagues.  
• A full cost recovery strategy will threat the livelihood of the small irrigated schemes if 
their technical efficiency will not improve (small farmers were found to be the less 
efficient and most elastic to water prices). These farmers will shift toward a cropping 
pattern using less water and more land when the price of water increases. More facilities 
such credit access, training programs, market integration, etc. are needed to support these 
small-size farmers which are generally more constrained to improve their technical 
efficiency. These facilities will have also to support farmers shifting toward more 
productive patterns of production (benchmark in a region), and non toward an extensive 
less productive one. A shift toward more productive patterns is however not always easy 
especially for the small size farmers due to constraints they face. If latter farmers will not 
be able to “jump” on the best performing frontier, then their financial sustainability will 
be in real threat.   
• If the technical efficiency of these farmers could improve, then water saving objectives 
will be difficult to reach since their demand will become highly inelastic. This could in 
fact threat the sustainability of the irrigated activity which is crucial for the national 
development and food safety. This last conclusion does not assume any technological 
improvement in the long run for the most efficient farmers. However, if the currently 
most efficient farmer would have access to an advanced water-saving technology, then his 
efficient frontier could shift towards another more efficient pattern to ensure both water 
saving and irrigation intensification. 
 The implications of these main result are very important for the Tunisian context. As discussed 
in the introduction, the Tunisian water policy has three main objectives: full cost recovery, 
continuity of the irrigation activity, and water saving at the national level. Our empirical findings 
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suggest that the current water pricing plus education policy is not suited to achieving these three 
objectives simultaneously. Specifically, according to our results improvement of technical 
efficiency and the currently available technologies will make water demand functions more and 
more inelastic.  
Further research will address farmers adjustment opportunities in more detail. Gardner (1983, 
cited in Ray, 2001) states that if water prices rise to reflect its opportunity cost, a rational farmer 
will have any or all of the four following responses: the farmer demands less water and leaves 
land fallow; applies less water to the crop accepting some yield loss; switches to less-water-
demanding crops; and/or invests in more efficient irrigation techniques. The changes in the inputs 
use combinations in our study show that farmers are indeed moving toward different cropping 
patterns but these are not necessary more water-valorizing patterns. More investigations have to 
be done in order to find toward which system farmers are shifting. The revenue function and the 
“normative” quality of the inverse DEA model would have to be reconsidered in order to reflect 
this reality in a more positive sense.  
• Also, due to its normative nature, the model assumes maximum allocative efficiency of 
the farmers. But in fact, given the management capacity of each farmer, the margin for 
improving his allocative efficiency might be restricted. Thus in reality, not all farmers are 
maximizing their allocative efficiency given their current technical capacity. This 
limitation can be overcome by providing a positive version of model (4) by specifying a 
more flexible output function which, for instance, accounts some other attributes such as 
the farmer’s risk attitude.  
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Chapter 8. Contingent Valuation for institutional efficiency 
on changes to water property rights and farmers’ willingness 
to pay (WTP) for water 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter assesses the economic value of changes to the characteristics of farmers’ property 
rights for irrigation water in Tunisia. Changes to the characteristics of the “water access right” 
and “water delivery right” were integrated into three scenarios: better “allocation reliability”, 
“quantification of the right” (quotas system), and “transferability of the right” (market system). 
The valuation was conducted using the Contingent Valuation Method through the elicitation of 
individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP). Results show positive willingness to pay values for all 
scenarios.  However, farmers in the studied region appear willing to pay more for changes to the 
“water access right”, and more specifically, for the transferability option. Furthermore, their 
perceptions concerning the organization and functioning of the water users’ association, to which 
they belong, in addition to their own productivity, appear to significantly affect their willingness 
to pay. The probability of accepting higher water prices in LB, if water reliability improves, was 
found to be higher than in the FJ area. This could be due to the low engineering performance of 
LB WUA.  
 
Parts of this chapter are accepted as 
Frija A, Chebil A, Speelman S, Van Huylenbroeck G. 2008. Effect of changes in the institutional 
structure of irrigation water property rights on the willingness to pay of farmers for water: case of 
Tunisia. XIIth Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economics (EAAE-2008), 
Ghent, 26-29 August 2008, Belgium. 
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8.1. Introduction  
Few studies have reviewed the relationship between legal rights and the economic allocation of 
goods (Levy and Friedman, 1994; Runge, 1986; Platteau, 2000; 2003). In fact, it is interesting to 
explain how different kinds of property right systems affect individual behaviour as well as the 
functioning and efficiency of the economic system. Property rights can be defined as “the claims, 
entitlements and related obligations among people regarding the use and disposition of a scarce 
resource” (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972). In general, the importance, definition and enforcement 
of property rights increase in relation to the scarcity of a given resource. As a resource becomes 
scarcer and competition increases, property rights can clarify expectations and thereby reduce 
conflict and interaction between users over the resource. Demsetz (1967) notes that the primary 
function of property rights is to guide incentives towards the achievement of better internalization 
of externalities. Where incentives are absent, or not well defined, uncertainty arises, and this 
affects decision making by the property right holder. 
Property rights can, however, be better understood as overlapping “bundles” of rights (Meinzen-
Dick et al., 2004). These bundles of rights can be broadly defined as rights of use, access and 
withdrawal, control or decision-making rights to manage the resource, exclude others from its 
use, or transfer the resource to others (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). This latter definition provides 
an important set of descriptive criteria for property rights that will be further used in this chapter. 
Property rights for a specific resource can be less complete than described above. For example, 
owners may derive only some value from an asset, exclude only some people from using it, or 
transfer only certain uses of it for a specified time period. Often, irrigation water property rights 
belong to this type of incomplete property right (Libecap, 2005).  
On the other hand, a very consistent approach for classifying property right regimes is based on 
the nature of the decision-making entity holding the right to use a particular resource (Challen, 
2000). Thus, private property corresponds to a single decision-making entity, such as an 
individual person or firm; common property to a finite collective entity such as a cooperative 
group; state property to a government entity; and open access to the absence of any entity with 
decision-making power over the resource. It is also possible to encounter situations where 
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multiple entities simultaneously hold decision-making power over a resource. Ostrom (1990) 
defines this property right hierarchy as a system of nested institutions.  
When devolution programmes do transfer rights over irrigation water to users’ groups or local 
government, that institution becomes the gatekeeper determining individuals’ rights over the 
resource (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). In the case of irrigation water, after failing to effectively 
manage irrigation systems centrally, many governments are now undertaking decentralization and 
devolution programmes to transfer management responsibility to local government and users’ 
groups. Taking into account the fact that these groups, generally known as Water Users’ 
Associations, become the gatekeepers who determines individuals’ irrigation property rights, two 
important aspects relating to property rights in irrigation management decentralization 
programmes should then be analyzed. The first one concerns the composition and 
characterization of the property rights transferred. In other words what exactly is transferred in 
terms of the water resource and the services relating to that resource (“Water access right” and its 
characterization)? The second aspect relates to the operation of the transfer itself: how well are 
the property rights transferred from the collective to the individual level (“Water delivery right” 
and its characterization)? The response to these questions identifies the individual’s property 
right for irrigation water and, consequently, their decision making, which is a function of the set 
of incentives provided by this right.  
Characteristics of the “water access right” are generally defined and enforced through legal 
constitutional rules. Specification as to the transferability of the right, the duration, frequency and 
quantification of the right can be considered as examples of such characteristics. On the other 
hand, performance of the water delivery system is the main determining factor for the “water 
delivery right”33 specification. Various performance indicators were proposed in the literature 
(Bos, 1997; Molden et al., 1998; Perry, 1996; Rao, 1993; Sakthivadial et al., 1999). Adequacy, 
efficiency, supply reliability and equity are performance objectives considered when evaluating 
                                                 
33
 This terminology on “water access right” and “water delivery right” is acquired from the Australian Water  Act 
2007 (NO. 137, 2007) - SECT 4: available on line on 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/wa200783/s4.html . This terminology is also used in some research 
papers; see Shi, T. (2006).  
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irrigation water delivery systems. For example, the reliability criterion expresses the ability to 
provide water at the right time and in the right place. Unreliable water delivery is quoted as a 
major reason for the low performance of irrigation systems (Unal et al., 2004). A similar 
conclusion can be drawn for the other performance criteria. Low levels for these indices may 
cause confusion and conflict between farmers, leading to a low economic return from water.  
8.2. Context and motivation for the study 
In Tunisia, the “water access right” is simply a usage right for a certain water volume relative to 
the size of land owned (Al Atiri, 2007). This institutional change happened during a period of 
fundamental institutional reforms in the Tunisian water sector. The objective of this PR shifting 
was to give the public authorities full rights for water allocation between users. After a period of 
central water resource management, where public administration was directly responsible for 
water allocation, the resource began to be allocated through local decisions made by WUAs34. 
Water PR is then typically transferred from the public to the local level, and then to the 
individuals who use it for irrigation. WUAs do not have the right to hold water resources, but 
only to reallocate the resource within their localities.  
According to this scheme, we can distinguish two main components of the PR system currently 
applied in Tunisia. These are:  
• “Water access right”: defined at the constitutional level, as described above; it relates 
water property to the public authority. From an individual perspective, this component 
mainly concerns the security of the right (e.g. ownership, tenure, quantification of the 
right, etc.) and includes any legal definition in relation to the taking or use of water as 
prescribed by the Tunisian regulations.  
• “Water delivery right”: defined as a right to have water delivered via an infrastructure 
operator, represented in our case by the WUAs, which have the legal right in Tunisia to 
                                                 
34
 In most of the regions  
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use irrigation infrastructure at the local level. This component relates to water supply 
reliability and WUA performance. 
Considering the first component, the Tunisian PR system does not allow for any trading of 
entitlements or allocations. Water entitlements generally relate to the size of land owned, but in 
practice, it is not possible for farmers to have a clear idea as to the quantification of their right35 
(quota). Given the water shortages being faced by the country, and taking into account the 
benefits (economic and environmental) of such secured (quotas) and transferable (market) 
entitlements, we sought in this study to investigate the possible benefits of shifting the current 
“water access right” in Tunisia towards a more flexible right based on an individual transferable 
quota system. It is well known that water markets constitute an incentive to farmers, as they can 
expect potential benefits from selling or buying water between them. As proved by a number of 
studies around the world, water markets are seen by many policy makers as an important tool in 
improving the efficiency of water resource allocation. For irrigated agriculture in Tunisia, the 
study of water market benefits shows different results. In fact, Zekri and Easter (2004) find that 
water trading has only a minor effect on farmers’ income whilst Bachta et al. (2004) show that 
water trading between farmers will result in improvements to the productive efficiency of water 
and therefore higher overall revenue36. Hamdane (2002) argues that water markets are suitable in 
the case of Tunisia where water shortages and high demand occur. However, he also mentions 
that this alternative requires fundamental and costly institutional reforms for it to be 
implemented.  
It is thus interesting to gain information on farmers’ willingness to pay for such institutional 
changes, because this information should be integrated into the cost-benefit calculation for 
institutional alternatives. Nevertheless, in cases where competitive markets for property rights are 
absent, no information is available as to the economic value of specific rights, nor on the 
associated marginal return. In such situations, stakeholder preferences for change could be 
indirectly estimated using non-market methods (by the creation of a hypothetical market) (Garrod 
                                                 
35
 Quantification of the right is also called “entitlement security” 
36
 These two studies were done for two different regions in Tunisia. 
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and Willis, 1999).  Contingent Valuation (CV) using the concept of willingness to pay (WTP) 
and/or willingness to accept (WTA) is such a method often used to elucidate the outcome of 
policy reforms and changes. Based on hypothetical scenarios, we used the WTP estimation of 
farmers for a transferable quota system in Tunisia (instead of the current usage right) in order to 
elucidate the potential gains that might arise from such institutional change. The main assumption 
here is that this institutional change corresponds to an increase in the utility of the irrigators 
(more secure rights from which they can draw benefits even if they do not use it for their own 
purposes) as well as the overall benefit for society (economic value and optimal allocation of 
water). The evaluation criterion consists of comparing the resulting economic value with the 
price currently charged to irrigators. Any deviation is considered as economic rent which is 
wasted.    
Concerning the “water delivery right”, the earlier literature review presented in chapter 3 and 4, 
in addition to the results identified in chapters 5 and 6, show that technical and organizational 
problems, with regard to the functioning of the WUA, still occur and affect the perceptions of the 
irrigators (Makkaoui, 2006; Ben Salem, 2005; Chraga and Chemakh 2003). We also show that a 
significant relationship exists between farmers’ perceptions concerning the functioning of their 
WUA, and their level of irrigation water use efficiency. This latter result could be implicitly 
understood as an expected positive willingness to pay, by farmers, for a better “supply reliability” 
for their water delivery right, over time. Thus, in this study, our objective is also to investigate 
the possible economic gains, in terms of farmers’ utility and social welfare, that could be 
generated by improving supply reliability. We assume that low supply reliability performance 
negatively affects the perceptions of farmers (as is the case for the LB area, cf. chapter 6) and 
thereby impacts on their efficient use of the resource. We also assume that WUAs can charge 
higher rates for water if this delivery right could be improved. The evaluation criterion here is 
also based on the deviation between the current water price charged to farmers and their WTP for 
such improvements. More details as to the specific institutional scenarios that will be tested in 
this study will be presented in the next methodological section.   
8.3. Methodology 
The economic value of particular, less substitutable goods or resources, including various public 
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goods, differs according to the property right regime specified for it. The WTA/WTP ratio, for 
environmental and natural resources, depends on the individual’s perception concerning the 
property regime for these resources (Garrod and Willis, 1999; Horowitz and McConnell., 2002). 
People’s willingness to pay is higher when their property right over a given resource is clearer 
and more stable (Levy and Friedman, 1994; Arcuri, 2002, Herrera et al., 2004). In this study we 
assume that the opportunity for property right enhancement can be evaluated by non-market 
methods and assessed by estimating and aggregating individual preferences. The CV method is 
used to assess farmers’ WTP. In the past, few studies have applied CV for assessing the effects of 
property right improvements in cases where markets for such rights are non-existent. To our 
knowledge, the most important one is that of Herrera et al. (2004) who undertook an efficiency 
analysis of property rights in Ecuador and found that the WTP of farmers is positive when 
improvements to their rights are proposed. Stated preference methods were also applied by 
Chebil et al. (2007) to assess the efficiency of an irrigation delivery system in Tunisia. They 
found that irrigators were willing to pay more than current water rates if the stability of their 
rights were to be improved. Also, Speelman (2009) tried to reveal how efficient the current water 
right regime in South Africa is by economically valuing possible improvements in the definition 
of water rights. However, they used Contingent Ranking (CR) method, a form of choice 
experiment belonging also to stated preferences techniques, to value the possible outcome of 
policies intended to improve water rights. CR is a survey-based technique for modelling 
preferences for goods, where goods are described in terms of their attributes and the level these 
take. By including price as one of the attributes of the good, willingness to pay can be indirectly 
calculated from people’s rankings (Speelman et al. 2009). Their results indicate that for the 
smallholders, there are significant economic gains attached to a possible improvement of the 
water rights. 
In this paper, we hypothesize that an institutional change to the characteristics of irrigation water 
property rights increases farmers’ willingness to pay for the water resource. We hereby propose 
that in the case of Tunisia, the current water property right bundle is inefficient and that an 
improvement in the characteristics of water usage rights, can generate an additional economic 
rent. The evaluation criterion consists of comparing the resulting water economic value with the 
current price paid by irrigators. Any positive deviation from the price is considered as a potential 
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economic rent. 
8.3.1. Contingent Valuation Method 
8.3.1.1. Description of the method 
Contingent Valuation is a questionnaire based valuation technique that allows respondents to 
express their preferences for goods and services (Garrod and Willis 1999). It allows the creation 
of a hypothetical (contingent) market environment to simulate transactions for a given non-
market good or service. Willingness to pay and willingness to accept compensation with respect 
to a specific good are directly obtained from the respondents. CV is conceptually based on the 
theory of economic welfare, which assumes that the behaviour of rational individuals towards a 
change in their environment can be assessed through observed changes to their individual 
utilities.  
Principal techniques used to design questions concerning WTP (or WTA) include: the open 
ended format; dichotomous choice; bidding games; and payment card forms. In this study the 
single bounded dichotomous choice format is used. The single-bounded approach is, in fact, the 
same as the close-ended format first introduced by Bishop and Heberlein in 1979, where pre-
tested values of WTP are used to ask people to accept or reject proposed values for the resource 
in a hypothetical market. 
Despite its potential usefulness, the application of CV is still regarded with scepticism, perhaps 
because of the hypothetical nature of the exercise, as well as the biased estimates that sometimes 
result from this method (e.g., Zendehdel, 2008; Horowitz and McConnel, 2002; Diamond and 
Hausman, 1994). Zendehdel (2008) summarize general drawbacks of individualistic valuation 
methods including stated preferences methods (mainly CV and choice experiment) and revealed 
preferences methods (mainly travel cost and hedonic pricing methods). These drawbacks were 
according to him mostly related to (i) the individual nature of questions related to goods qualified 
as public, (ii) the complexity of environmental criteria and social groups, (iii) the plurality of 
environmental values, while we try to assess only a value related to some specific attributes of the 
good, and to (iv) the ordinality of stakeholders’ preferences towards environmental services. 
Mitchell and Carson (1989) point out some specific common drawbacks to most of the 
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studies using CV methods, such as inadequate attention paid to substitutes, budget constraints of 
the respondent, embedding effect and strategic bias. Similarly, other key failures result from the 
elicitation method used, question position, and information provision (see e.g. Diamond, et al., 
1993 and O’Doherty, 1996; Tisdell, 1999), which can influence responses. However, precautions 
can be taken to reduce bias. In particular it is recommended that the WTP surveys pay specific 
attention to explanatory variables such as income, price of substitutes, environmental attitudes, 
etc. (for more details see Barton, 1998).   
8.3.1.2. Elicitation of WTP value from dichotomous answers: Theoretical model 
Estimation of WTP using a contingent valuation survey involves the choice of elicitation format, 
as well as an empirical model that can be applied according to any assumptions about the nature 
of the distribution of WTP. It has been argued that dichotomous choice question formats used in 
this study are superior to open-ended ones (e.g. see the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Panel, Arrow et al., 1993) although they need more sophisticated econometric techniques to 
estimate WTP (Carson, 1997). Moreover, assumptions concerning the distribution of WTP are 
crucial when inferring the required welfare measure (Kriström, 1990). According to Clinch and 
Murphy (2001), and Hanemann and Kanninen (1996), different econometric specifications for 
WTP can generate very different results.  
Using Random Utility Theory (RUT), Hanemann (1984) demonstrates that it is possible to obtain 
social welfare measures (mean and median WTP) from a dichotomous choice elicitation format. 
According to Hanemann, the main assumption is that the utility function has some components, 
which are unobservable and are treated as stochastic. The individual utility function can be 
written as:  
ε+),,( QSYU           (1) 
where Y is individual income, S is a vector of socio-economic indicators; Q is the current set of 
characteristics of the environmental asset and ε  is a random disturbance term.  
The consumer will accept paying a given amount of money (A) for a change in one or some of the 
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current characteristics of the environmental assets if: 
0011 ),,(),,( εε +≥+− QSYUQSAYU                  (2) 
where 1ε and 0ε are identically and independently distributed random variables with zero means.  
The actual amount that the respondent is willing to pay is not observed directly. The assumption 
is that if the individual states he is willing to accept the bid amount, then his WTP must be greater 
than the bid, or, when the answer for the stated amount is ‘no’ his WTP is assumed to be lower 
than the bid. Let WTP* represent the unobserved willingness to pay, which is assumed to follow 
a distribution F(θ ), whereθ  is a vector of parameters, and form an indicator (I) that takes a value 
of ‘1’ for ‘yes’ responses and ‘0’ for ‘no’ responses. The probability of observing a ‘yes’ 
response ( )1( =IP ) when the interviewee has been offered a bid equal to Ai is:  
),(1)*()1( θiii AFAWTPPIP −=>==                (3) 
 
Whereas the probability of observing a ‘no’ answer is:  
 
),()*()0( θiii AFAWTPPIP =<== .               (4) 
 
With respect to this structure, only the bid amount and the answer given by the respondent (yes or 
no) are needed for the analysis. Either a logit or a probit model - both of which are binary choice 
models – can then be constructed in which the dependent variable is the answer given by the 
individual and the explanatory variables are a constant and the WTP bid.  
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The logit37 model assumes that the probability function F(.) is logistic. This function can be 
presented as following by equation (5): 
β'1
1)1(
ix
ii
e
IP
−+
==               (5) 
Assuming linearity for the utility function, the expected WTP equals the median, and Hanemann 
(1994) demonstrates that this value can be expressed as: 
βα /)( −=WTPE              (6) 
Where α and β are the coefficients estimated in the logit model corresponding respectively to the 
constant term and the explanatory variable containing the proposed bid. This Hanemann model 
has been tested and used extensively in CV research (see Kriström, 1993). 
8.3.2. Simulated scenarios 
Three scenarios have been identified, making assumptions concerning the two main components 
of irrigation water property rights, as defined in the introduction. These are the “water access 
right” and the “water delivery right”. Enhancement of the “water delivery right”, through 
improvement of water reliability, in addition to a shift in the current usage right towards a clearer 
and transferable “water access right” are the guiding principles for our three scenarios (Table8.1).  
The reliability could be enhanced through improvements in WUA efficiency and functioning. 
This characteristic is formulated in a separate scenario termed “allocation reliability”. This 
scenario is relevant as most farmers are worried by irregularities in water delivery at times when 
they need water urgently38.  
                                                 
37
 A generalized logit model will be used in our work. In fact, this model specification allows us to model the 
respondent choices according to their individual characteristics.   
38
 Given that WUAs performances differ, the PR attributes and the results can be different from one sample of users 
to another, according to the WUA performance. Thus, our study and results are specific for the region and the WUAs 
studied.  
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The second scenario is called the “clarity” scenario, and assumes that the “water access right” 
will be quantified.  This will ensure better security for farmers’ current entitlements to water. We 
propose that farmers are allowed in advance to have an idea as to the quantity of water available 
to them during the irrigation season.   
The third scenario relates to the transferability of the access right. However, a right that is not 
quantifiable cannot also be transferable. For this reason, this third scenario assumes a 
transferability option that can be added to the second scenario. It will be called the “clarity + 
transferability” scenario.   
For each scenario, different price bids (0.02 TND/m3; 0.04 TND/m3; 0.06 TND/m3; 0.08 TND/m3 
and 0.1 TND/m3) are proposed to the farmer, who has to accept or reject them.  
Table 8. 1. Property rights and attributes used for building CV scenarios 
PR component Attribute of the component Name of the scenario 
“Water access right” 
• “security of the entitlement”: 
quantification  
 
• “transferability of the entitlement”: 
market 
• “clarity scenario” 
 
• “clarity + transferability” 
“Water delivery right” • “supply reliability” • “allocation reliability” 
8.3.3. Data  
The dataset used in this chapter is the same one collected from farmers of the FJ and LB WUAs. 
However, responses for all 62 farmers were considered in the same set when deriving the WTP 
values for institutional changes. However, a dummy variable was integrated into the extended 
logit model in order to detect the effect of the WUA to which farmers belong, on their WTP. This 
variable is expected to have a significant effect on WTP for improvements to the “water delivery 
right” of LB farmers. Table 8.2 presents the main descriptive statistics from the survey data, 
including the demographic and economic characteristics used as explanatory variables in the 
extended logit model.  
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Table 8. 2. Explanatory variables of WTP 
Variables Mean S.D. 
- Age in years 49.31 13.05 
- Years of formal schooling 8 5.86 
- Gross Margin/hectares (TND/ha) 1788.44 1274.12 
- Irrigated Area in hectares 5.42 11.78 
- Water consumption in cubic meters 5818.6 4534.05 
- Satisfaction concerning the functioning of WUA 
(percentage of yes responses) 56 - 
Source: survey 
8.4. Results and discussion 
8.4.1. Willingness to pay 
The estimation of the dichotomous question was made using Stata 9 software. Table 8.3 shows 
the coefficients of the estimated Hanemann models. These coefficients permit calculation of the 
mean for the willingness to pay for each scenario using equation (7). Table 8.3 shows that the 
WTP for an improvement in the reliability of irrigation water provision in the studied area is 
around 0.0143 TND/m3 (29.7% and 21% of current water prices in FJ and LB respectively). The 
value obtained shows that water delivery reliability is a problem that affects farmers in the 
studied areas. However, this is still a very low value compared to what water prices would be if 
the government plans to increase rates as a means of recovering water costs.  
Table 8. 3. Estimation of the Hanemann model with only the bid price as independent variable 
Dependent Variable: Willingness to pay (binary choice) 
 
“Allocation reliability” 
model (1) 
“Clarity”  
model (2) 
“Clarity + transferability”  
model (3) 
Independent Variables 
Constant 0.7677 (0.30) 
0.3426 
(0.46) 
1.6661 
(2.54)** 
Bid price -53.66 (-2.86)*** 
-50.4143 
(-2.51)** 
-45.7663 
(-3.59)*** 
WTP (TND) 0.0143 0.0068 0.0364 
Log-likelihood 
LR 
-25.80 
11.37*** 
-23.40 
9.66*** 
-34.39 
17.40*** 
*, **, ***
 = significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Most of the positive WTP for better stability in the usage PR, were recorded in the LB area, 
where the current price of water is higher compared to FJ. This could be explained by the 
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descriptive characteristics of both studied areas. In fact, it should be remembered that 98% of 
farmers in the FJ district have a well which they are able to exploit, whilst this proportion is only 
around 2% in LB. In cases where water is needed urgently, some of the farmers in the FJ region 
can pump water from their aquifers whilst those in LB have no such option.  
Quantification of water access rights at the beginning of the irrigation season looks to be a non-
acceptable change for farmers. Recorded WTP for this scenario was positive but very low (0.0068 
TND/m3). New aggregated prices become 0.054 TND/m3 and 0.074 TND/m3 respectively in the 
FJ and LB areas, which corresponds only to an increase of 14.1% and 10% respectively in the 
current price charged to farmers.  
Finally, relevant results concerning WTP for farmers were recorded after adding the 
transferability option for their water access rights to the second scenario. WTP for this scenario 
was around 0.0372 TND/m3 (77.5% of the current price in FJ and 54.7% of current prices 
charged in the LB area); aggregated price results in both regions become 0.083 TND/m3 and 
0.105 TND/m3 in FJ and LB respectively. This last value indicates that an institutional change to 
improve the usage right characteristics corresponds to an increase in the utility for the consumer. 
Positive gaps between the resulting economic value of the WTP for transferable water rights and 
the price currently charged to irrigators can be considered as a potential economic rent. However, 
this economic rent is again considered to be of low value compared to the expected trend for 
prices in Tunisia.   
8.4.2. Reasons for WTP responses 
In order to identify which characteristics affect the farmers’ WTP, an extended logit model, 
regressing a set of explanatory variables, was estimated. The explanatory variables chosen were: 
age of the farmer (in years), schooling (number of years), Gross Margin (GM) per hectare (in 
TND), irrigated area (in hectares), the Water Users’ Association to which the farmer belongs 
(dummy variable), satisfaction with the WUA to which the farmer belongs (dummy variable), 
and total consumption of water (cubic metres).  
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Table 8. 4. Results of the estimated extended logit model 
Dependent variable: Willingness to pay (binary choice) 
 
“Allocation 
reliability” model  (1) 
“Clarity” 
model (2) 
“Clarity+transferability” 
model (3) 
Independent Variables 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -8.635 (-1.76)* 
-5.678 
(-1.60) 
-7.96 
(-2.09)** 
Bid price -103.006 (-2.30)** 
-92.655 
(-2.78)*** 
-71.92 
(-2.15)** 
AGE (years) 0.064 (0.83) 
0.054 
(0.91) 
0.037 
(0.73) 
SCHOOLING (N° of years)   0.438 (2.27)** 
Gross Margin /Ha (Productivity) 0.00145 (2.45)** 
0.0014 
(2.50)** 
0.0017 
(2.69)*** 
IRRIGATED AREA (ha) -0.377 (-2.00)** 
-0.416 
(-1.92)* 
0.057 
(0.64) 
WUA (dummy variable: 1: Lebna 
Barrage; 0: Fondok Jdid)  
3.21 
(1.66)* 
1.621 
(0.98) 
-2.25 
(-1.03) 
SATGIC (satisfaction about the 
internal functioning of the WUA) 
6.797 
(2.87)*** 
3.94 
(2.55)**  
CEAU (total water consumption m3)   0.0004 (2.28)** 
- Log-likelihood  
- LR 
- MC Fadden R-squared 
- Percentage of correct predictions 
Info Criterion (minimum values): 
- Akaike 
- Schwarz  
-11.62 
39.74*** 
0.36101 
94.02 % 
 
0.5558 
0.5267 
-23.405 
9.66*** 
0.51497 
89.55 % 
 
0.6177 
0.5682 
-34.39 
17.40*** 
0.83952 
91.04 % 
 
0.63003 
0.5984 
*, **, ***
 = significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Table 8.4 shows the effect of each explanatory variable, cited above, on the acceptance of the bid 
price in each model. As predicted by theory, the bid price is negatively correlated to the WTP 
value for all models. Total aggregated Gross Margin (GM) per ha is positively and highly 
correlated to the WTP value for all models. An important finding concerns the negative and 
significant correlation between total irrigated area and WTP in the allocation reliability and 
clarity models (models 1 and 2). This suggests that when irrigated areas are larger, farmers’ WTP 
for an improvement to the reliability of the water supply and for clarification of their property 
right at the beginning of the irrigation season, decreases. This finding indicates that larger 
farmers seem to have no problem with water provision or water property rights in general. This 
reinforces a result found by Chraga and Chemakh (2003) concerning the special treatment of 
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larger farmers’ demand within WUAs, because of their social standing and power. On the other 
hand, this variable positively affects the WTP for institutional change towards a water market, 
but this effect is not significant.  
The dummy variable relating to the satisfaction of farmers, concerning the internal functioning of 
their WUA, affects their WTP for the first two scenarios, both significantly and positively. This 
variable could be implicitly interpreted as the trust and confidence farmers have towards the 
managers of their associations. If a farmer is not satisfied with the internal functioning of his 
WUA, he will not be willing to pay higher water rates, even for an improvement in water supply 
reliability. Total water consumption and the number of years of schooling are two variables 
which positively and significantly affect WTP in the third model, implying that high water 
consumers and the most educated farmers are willing to pay more for transferable water access 
rights. Also, one can argue that in FJ water is available through wells which makes that a water 
market is not significant in these circumstances. However, we found in previous results that even 
in FJ, all of the farmers who have a well, also use public water provided by their WUA. We also 
show that most farmers in this area use public and groundwater complementarily due to water 
quality problems. Thus, from a water quality perspective, a water market could still be of interest 
in FJ.  
8.4.3. Analysis of the probability of acceptance  
In this section we seek to analyze the effect of relevant explanatory variables regressed in the 
extended logit model, on the probability of acceptance of higher prices for irrigation water in the 
studied areas. Two sub-scenarios (increase in the gross margin per ha, and imporvement in 
satisfaction concerning the functioning of the WUA) were evaluated under each of the main 
scenarios presented in section 3.2. The initial mean values for the studied sample, described in 
Table 8.2, are taken as the initial situation, and then equation (5) is calculated for the following 
changes:  
i) Initial situation plus changes in satisfaction dummy variable (from 0 to 1) for farmers in 
the FJ area. We have indicated that only 26.4% of FJ farmers are satisfied as to the 
internal functioning of their WUA, whilst this rate is around 84.5% in LB. For this reason, 
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the initial situation in the FJ area is regarded as unsatisfactory while it is regarded as 
satisfactory in LB.    
ii) Initial situation plus an increase of 10, 20 and 50% in the gross margin per hectare, 
reflecting an increase in the farmers’ productivity after the development of a national 
agricultural policy intended to improve this index. The current subsidy provided for the 
adoption of water saving technology in Tunisia is an example of such a policy. This latter 
policy improved water use efficiency in addition to the total productivity of the main 
irrigated crops in Tunisia during the last decade (Al Atiri, 2007).  
Figure 8.1 shows some interactions in terms of the probability of accepting a bid against the price 
bid in TND per cubic meter (additional price increases are represented in the Figure) for the 
different sub-scenarios mentioned above. This Figure confirms the results found in the previous 
section by showing that there are always higher probabilities of accepting scenario 1 than 2, in 
both regions. It also shows that an improvement in the perception of farmers concerning the 
internal organization and functioning of their WUA and improvements in productivity are 
important factors to consider by policy maker when increasing the price of irrigation water.  
Considering both regions under the first two scenarios, it is clear that there is more chance that 
higher water prices would be accepted in the LB area than in FJ. It is interesting to note that, 
under the “allocation reliability” scenario, a change in the satisfaction variable for farmers in the 
region of FJ increases the probability of accepting a price increase of 0.02 TND from near 0 to 
more than 40%. When productivity would also increase with 20% on average this further 
increases the probability of accepting a price level of 0.02 TND to around 60 %. The descriptive 
results of the survey could explain this difference. About 36.4% of farmers in LB are 
complaining about the WUA’s irrigation network, whilst this rate is only around 7% in FJ. 
Furthermore, 15% of farmers in LB consider a lack of water at times when they need it urgently, 
as the main irrigation constraint. In FJ however, 36% of farmers consider the quality of water as 
the main irrigation constraint. In fact, 98% of farmers in the FJ district have a well which they are 
able to exploit, whilst this proportion is only around 2% in LB. In cases where water is needed 
urgently, some of the farmers in the FJ region can pump water from their aquifers whilst those in 
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LB do not have this option.  
 
Fig 8. 1. Effect of productivity and organizational environment on the predicted probability of accepting the 
bid prices. (IS: Initial Situation; GM/Ha: Gross margin per hectare) 
In the third scenario (clarity + transferability of the right) explicative variables of WTP, different 
from those regressed in models 1 and 2, were used (see Table 8.4). The same former set of 
variables was also used in this section in order to calculate the probability of acceptance of 
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transferable rights. This means that a comparison between trends for curves in the first two 
scenarios (a and b in Figure 8.1) and the trends in the last scenario (c, in Figure 8.1) is not valid. 
However, comparison between both regions is always possible. By contrast to the probability of 
acceptance of first both scenarios, Figure 8.1.c shows that the transferability option is most likely 
to be accepted in FJ than in LB.  The same effect of productivity on the probability of acceptance 
of a certain water price was also proved for the third scenario, where improvements in 
productivity generate a higher probability of farmers’ accepting higher water rates for 
transferable rights.  
It is important to point out that, despite the fact that in this section distinctions and differences 
between willingness to pay in the two studied regions were shown, the results could have been 
still better if we had derived the willingness-to-pay separately for each group of farmers. This 
option may better reflect the effect of some specific conditions on farmers’ decision making. 
However, this study was limited by the size of the sample and the absence of a large dataset by 
region.   
8.5. Conclusion and policy implications 
From the analysis of farmers’ WTP for changes to irrigation property rights, the following points 
were identified:  
• The value of improving irrigation water access and delivery rights in terms of allocation 
reliability, clarity and transferability in the Cap Bon region in Tunisia is respectively 
25%, 12%, and 65% higher than the current average water rates. The Contingent 
Valuation Method has been shown to be reliable for assessing the value of property rights 
for irrigation water. The findings from this research39 shed light on the importance of 
analysis of opportunity costs for any institutional policy change before making the 
decision to change.  
                                                 
39
 In addition to the research done by Herrera et al. 2004 and by Speelman et al. 2009 
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• The current system of irrigation property rights in Tunisia can actually be considered as 
relatively inefficient. Improved systems containing more efficient attributes of property 
rights could help to achieve higher rates of cost recovery. However, a cost-benefit 
exercise would always be necessary before confirming this conclusion.  
• In terms of WTP, transferable water rights were found to be the most attractive for 
farmers in our study area. However, it should be emphasized that, for market forces to 
work, water PR must be legally defined and enforceable, fully specified, exclusive, and 
transferable. Nevertheless, trading is only one way to provide incentives to water users, 
and not all water property rights encourage trading to the same degree. More importantly, 
as water problems involve such diverse interests, uses, and values, resolving them relies 
on legal and political institutions more than markets alone. 
• Many factors were found to be explicative of the farmers’ WTP. The bid price, gross 
margin per hectare, total irrigated area, water consumption level per hectare, and 
satisfaction concerning the organization and functioning of the WUA are some of the 
most important ones. This proves that farmers’ perceptions concerning their local water 
governance strongly affects their willingness to pay higher rates for water and to accept 
changes. It is therefore necessary to improve the confidence, transparency and 
accountability inside WUAs before proposing pricing policies.  
The test for the probability of acceptance reveals the following important points:  
• Comparing the trend for curves a and b (Fig 8.1), it appears that farmers in the LB area 
are more willing to pay for improvements in water supply reliability and for a 
quantification of their right than FJ farmers. This is in line with results found in chapter 6, 
and shows that improvements in WUA performance in terms of water delivery is an 
important factor inciting farmers to accept higher irrigation rates.  It is clear that the 
perfection of this process leads to a higher valuation of irrigation water by farmers. This 
result confirms results found by Chebil et al. (2007) in the case of the Teboulba irrigation 
system in Tunisia. The latter authors also derived a positive WTP by farmers for an 
improvement in the services and reliability of the irrigation water allocation provided by 
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their local WUA.  
• The satisfaction (concerning the internal functioning of the WUA) variable strongly 
affects the probability of higher price acceptance in the FJ area. Also, improvements in 
productivity have a more positive effect on the probability of acceptance in LB than in FJ 
(see the trend for the curves in Fig 8.1, a and b). This is a logical result which confirms 
results found in the other chapters of the dissertation. In fact, LB farmers are less efficient 
in terms of their production processes than FJ farmers. In addition, their level of GM/ha is 
lower than for FJ farmers.  
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Chapter 9. General Conclusion  
 
9.1. Introduction 
Tunisia suffers from seasonal and annual aridity. Some of the most important challenges that the 
country has to face during the 21st century are: population migration, increasing urbanization, and 
rising water demand. Together with increases in per capita income, these three factors increase 
demand for water for food production and domestic purposes. During the past four decades, these 
changes have already put immense pressure on water institutions, as water demands have 
increased heavily in all sectors and particularly in agriculture. Consequently, many water 
institutions have effectively operated in “supply mode” for much of the second half of the 20th 
century. Their main objective has been to provide as much water as possible to meet the growing 
demand. Fortunately, Tunisian policy makers have, since the beginning of the seventies, been 
aware about the future risk of imbalance between water supply and demand (around 2030). A 
water demand management strategy has been integrated in all national development plans since 
the early 1970’s. The objective since then was to establish a more rational and efficient use of 
water resources in all sectors. Many water demand laws, policies and administrations were 
instituted for this purpose. Currently, a wide variety of institutions are operating in place - at 
different levels, and with different fields of operation - and need to be coordinated throughout the 
water sector in Tunisia.  
Our general objective in this dissertation was to show that, not only do the existence and 
functioning of institutions for water demand management matter, but also their performance and 
effectiveness. According to this, we sought to prove that by designing and implementing high 
performing institutions, and by improving the functioning of existing ones, Tunisia can greatly 
improve the efficiency of agricultural water use. We assumed that the performance of irrigation 
institutions can be assessed using the “institutional decomposition” and “comparative 
institutional analysis” frameworks developed among others by Saleth and Dinar (1999, 2004)..   
Our approach for decomposing irrigation water institutions in Tunisia was based on the IDA 
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framework (Saleth and Dinar, 1999, 2004) which distinguish three main components of water 
institutions: components relating to constitutional choice rules: water laws; components relating 
to collective-choice rules: water policies; and components relating to operational rules: water 
administrations. In addition to this decomposition, in our analysis we also distinguished between 
the three layers of institutions according to the scheme proposed by Williamson (1996) who 
differentiated between the “governance framework”, “governance structure”, and “individual 
level”. In this dissertation, we mainly focused on the individual level, as we believed that the final 
outcomes of irrigation institutions could be assessed.  
According to the IAD framework, each of the three above mentioned components can be divided 
further into many inter-related aspects. For our empirical evaluation, we only selected the 
following aspects: water property rights, water pricing policies and cost recovery strategy, and 
functional, regulatory and accountability capacities of the local water organizations (from the 
components - water laws, water policies, and water administrations, respectively). 
With regard to the methodology applied, we typically identified and used indirect evaluation 
approaches to assess the comparative efficiency of irrigation water’ institutional aspects. In each 
empirical application we mainly relied on one (or more) of the three following gaps: (i) gap 
between current institutional aspects and other hypothetical ones (that have to be realistic and 
already applied in other contexts: regions or countries, e.g. comparison between quantifiable and 
non-quantifiable “water access rights”). It is however clear that contrasting the performance of an 
institutional setting currently in place with another desired structure, says nothing about how to 
put the alternative in place, (ii) gap between the best and the worst performing: comparing the 
same existing institutional structures that are applied in different contexts to each other (e.g. 
performant and non-performant associations). Here, the effect of some relevant environmental 
factors on the functioning of water institutions could be identified, and (iii) gap between actual 
and future options: comparing actual institutional options to some future options that are already 
planned for implementation as part of government strategy (e.g. current pricing system to a 
planned future pricing option). 
9.2. Governance framework 
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At the macro level, the descriptive analysis of the water “governance framework” in Tunisia 
indicates the following:   
• Despite the creation and implementation of many institutions oriented towards irrigation 
demand management, the demand for irrigation continued to increase for the past three 
decades. Benefits recorded following the creation of these institutions were mainly 
observed in the relative improvement in water use efficiency at plot level, in addition to 
increases in yield for irrigated crops. The potential for improvements in the intensification 
rate and development of new irrigated areas are some of the factors relevant to the 
growing demand for irrigation water.  
• Theoretically, the downward arrow from “institutional environment” to “governance 
structure” (Fig 2.6, Williamson, 1996) indicates that shifts in the broad parameters of the 
institutional environment (e.g., changes to the constitutional rules and norms) result in 
alterations to relative prices and will induce changes in governance structures. According 
to this citation, and based on our literature review, we argue that water management 
transfer in Tunisia (set of transferred rights and responsibilities) was the main determinant 
of the currently observed water governance performance. In fact, many responsibilities 
with limited rights were transferred to the WUAs, - organisations created at a local level 
to manage irrigation and to collect water fees. The role of the WUAs was only a 
reallocation role, based on usage right for a given infrastructure. In many cases, the 
regional administration intervenes - even in the nomination of the WUAs’ directors.  
• Moreover, feedback from governance to the institutional environment could be considered 
as a lobbying operation executed by the governance structure on the governance 
framework (Fig 2.5). This pressure is executed in order to achieve some adjustments at 
the constitutional level that favour the organizations operating at the governance level 
(e.g. WUAs in our case study). According to our research, this strategic behaviour was 
not recorded in the institutional scheme for the water sector in Tunisia.  
• More studies based on deep census are needed in order to qualify the role of the water 
users’ associations (WUA) in Tunisia. In fact, these can be considered as micro-
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institutions working in the interests of government to implement policy, or as 
organizations of farmers regrouped for a common interest. According to our own 
interpretation, WUAs look to be more a governmental tool than a farmers’ association.  
9.3. Governance structure 
Two decades after the creation of WUAs in Tunisia, some of them do not yet cover their O&M 
costs. Their analysis reveals social, technical and organizational problems with regard to their 
functional performance (cost recovery, rate of adherents, investments, etc.). Also, a statistical 
overview identifies a number of differences between them, in terms of performance, despite the 
fact that they operate under the same basic judicial and functional form.  
In this dissertation, we considered that “governance can be defined as the body of rules, 
enforcement mechanisms and corresponding interactive processes that coordinate and bring into 
line the activities of the involved persons with regard to a common outcome” (Huppert et al., 
2003). In other words, governance structure is a set of systems that controls decision making with 
regard to water management and water service delivery (Moriarty et al., 2007). It comprises the 
technical, economic, administrative, financial and social aspects of local irrigation water 
management (Brooks, 2004). Thus, we assumed that this governance level can be analyzed 
through the performance of water users’ associations, as these organisations are supposed to 
apply “the rules settled at an institutional environment”, at a local level. WUAs are, in fact, 
considered in lieu of interaction between government choices and individual preferences.  
By comparing the overall, management, and engineering efficiencies for a set of WUAs 
representing all associations involved in the management of irrigation water for the Cap Bon 
region in Tunisia, we obtained some relevant indicators as to the levels and determinants of their 
performance:  
• Average overall efficiency of the WUAs operating in our study area was found to be 
relatively high. However, low efficiency levels concerning the organizational, managerial, 
technical, and scale attributes of WUAs were observed. We also identified a high level of 
variability in performance between WUAs in the study area. Thus, improvements in 
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WUA functioning and performance are still possible  and could be of significant benefit 
for the irrigation sector for two main reasons:  
o Additional savings in financial resources are possible and can be used for 
development purposes. These savings could, for instance, be reflected in the 
irrigation water price; 
o Low WUA performance could have a negative effect on farmers’ perceptions, 
attitudes, and decision making. This effect was the purpose of the investigation 
into further applications, as undertaken in this dissertation.   
• Overall WUA efficiency was found to be significantly correlated to the engineering and 
managerial efficiency levels of the association. Also, engineering and managerial 
efficiency levels of WUAs were found to be significantly correlated.   
Further research could be proposed at this governance level, concerning the functioning and 
performance of WUAs: suggestions are as follows -  
• A negative correlation between the number of years in operation and the calculated WUA 
efficiency was observed in this dissertation. However, we were not able to provide an 
explanation as to the causes of this negative relationship. More studies using dynamic 
methodologies for the evaluation of WUA performance are needed in order to further 
investigate the financial and social sustainability of these associations. 
• In the case of irrigation resources, the productivity and durability of the irrigated systems, 
in addition to their observed governance structure, could be related to the social norms of 
the group holding and managing the water property rights. Through further research using 
various quantitative and qualitative methodologies, this assumption could be verified in 
order to improve our understanding as to the influence of social capital on WUA 
performance. 
• Results found in this dissertation regarding WUA performance only concern the region of 
Nabeul, which is one of the main consumers of irrigation water in Tunisia. However, 
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similar efficiency evaluations for other regions in the country would also be useful. 
Specific regional determinants of WUA efficiency/inefficiency could then be drawn by 
comparing regional results.   
• From our study, it was also clear that the number of members in the administrative 
council negatively affects the scale efficiency of the WUA, in addition to its management 
performance. This could be due to a coordination problem between the WUA’s council 
members. A deeper analysis of the social and organizational interactions inside WUAs is 
necessary. Elucidation of these points could provide guidance to policy makers as to 
potential reforms that might be more appropriate for improving the functioning of these 
associations (e.g. adjustment of the council members’ number according to the size of 
WUA, better accountability systems, set of incentives for these members, etc.)  
From results found at the governance level concerning technical and organizational attributes of 
WUAs, we draw the following conclusions that have been tested using individual quantitative 
and perceptional data.  
• We believe that insecurity in the water supply, due to low WUA engineering efficiency, 
stimulates farmers to overuse water when they gain access to it. Thus, improvements to 
the technical attributes of the WUA in order to enhance its water delivery performance 
should have a direct effect on water use efficiency at farm level. In addition, WUAs in 
Tunisia now have a new legal statute calling upon them to contribute to the technical 
extension of farmers in their regions. Accordingly, WUAs can play a crucial role in 
enhancing the efficient use of water at plot level by providing more practical advice to 
farmers in their area, regarding optimal timings and doses for irrigation. 
• Given that water fees are calculated on the basis of WUA expenses, a reduction in these 
expenses (through an improvement in WUA performance) will then result either in lower 
water prices (affecting the water demand functions of farmers) or higher irrigation cost 
recovery rates.   
• Farmers realizing that their managers are wasting WUA resources will not be motivated 
to contribute to various collective actions. Thus, improving WUA efficiency can 
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make farmers more willing to pay higher water rates in order to contribute to the 
recovery cost.  
9.4. Effect of the local governance structure on irrigation water use efficiency at 
farm level 
Our calculation of the level of irrigation water use efficiency (IWUE) in the two regions studied 
in Tunisia, confirms the results found in other research, that IWUE is still very low compared to 
the efforts to improve it (i.e. subsidies for the adoption of water saving technology, charging 
higher water prices, development of infrastructure, etc.). According to Al Atiri, 2004, the 
“National Irrigation Water Saving Programme”, introduced in 1995 to encourage irrigators to 
invest in water saving technology, generated higher IWUE and improved farmers’ incomes in 
Tunisia. This encouragement strategy resulted in high benefits at the national level, as a result of 
an increased irrigation rate , as well as at the farm level, where yield and revenue levels for some 
crops increased remarkably. However, more studies are needed in order to investigate the 
determinants of adoption and constraints limiting the access to water saving technologies. For 
instance, Fouzai, (2007) point out that the adoption of more recent water saving technology is 
still limited to certain high-value crops that are mainly produced by large farms who are well 
integrated into the food market chain. Also, national statistics stress the high percentage (28.7 %) 
of areas equipped with “improved gravity techniques” at the national level. Using this technique, 
water is not pumped in pipes but distributed through gravity flows, which do not completely 
eliminate water losses. This result also raises the hope that significant quantities of water could 
be saved by the agricultural sector if the calculated IWUE can be improved. 
As revealed in chapter 5, IWUE is, on the other hand, highly correlated with the overall farming 
performance of individual farmers. Consequently, improvements in IWUE will have a positive 
effect, not only on water conservation but also on the overall competitiveness of Tunisian 
agriculture.  
Measures other than technological ones can also enhance the IWUE. In this dissertation, we 
elucidated the relationship between local irrigation governance and IWUE. Distinct from other 
studies regarding the levels and determinants of IWUE at farm level, our work shows that IWUE 
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is partially dependent on the local governance context. IWUE was found to be significantly 
variable between groups of farmers who differ in terms of the governance context in which they 
operate.   
Perception-based information used in our statistical tests reveal main local irrigation governance 
attributes which explain the variability of farming and IWU efficiency between farmers (in our 
sample). In fact, considering our sample, we found that the average IWUE is highly and 
significantly different between the satisfied and the non-satisfied farmers concerning the 
technical functioning of the irrigation network managed by their WUA. Also, when considering 
the group of farmers belonging to the WUA with weak level of management efficiency, our tests 
reveal that the average IWUE for farmers belonging to this WUA significantly differ according to 
the farmers’ satisfaction as to the internal functioning and organization of the WUA. These 
results are highly interesting since they prove the importance of “good governance” on irrigation 
water management performance. 
Also, in chapter 4, we found that the technical and managerial performance of WUAs is 
correlated. Thus, both types of managerial and technical skills in WUAs have to be framed and 
improved by policy makers due to their significant implications for farmers. This will surely have 
a positive impact on resource conservation and on the improvement of IWUE at farm level. 
However, the relationship between IWUE and WUA performance need further to be investigated. 
It would be interesting to further explain the causality effect between farmers’ perceptions and 
their performance on the one hand, and the WUA performance on the other.  
9.5. Pricing policy and cost recovery strategy 
Irrigation water pricing is one of the main institutional aspects used by the Tunisian government 
since the 1970’s, for developing irrigated areas and managing the demand for water resources. 
Tunisia has succeeded in recovering the O&M costs at a national level in a relatively short time 
and is planning to recover the full cost of irrigation water in the next few years. Water meters, 
necessary for the implementation of volumetric pricing (the main pricing method used in the 
country) are also being installed in all remaining areas. Generalization of the pricing tool across 
all irrigated areas in the country was accompanied by a strategy for subsidizing the adoption 
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of water saving technology at farm level. The principal aim was to enhance the productivity of 
farmers in order to enable them to pay higher irrigation rates.  
However, despite the increases in water prices observed during past decades, total irrigation 
water demand in Tunisia is still increasing. In this dissertation, we estimated irrigation water 
demand functions for our study area in order to test whether the current pricing policy, based on 
improvements in farmers’ technical capacity in parallel to increases in irrigation prices, can 
simultaneously lead to full cost recovery, financial sustainability of irrigation activity, and water 
conservation at the national level. These three objectives are the main guidelines for government 
policy on pricing for irrigation water. 
It has been empirically verified in this dissertation that the current policy for increasing prices 
will not permit the three above mentioned objectives to be achieved together. In fact, cost 
recovery strategy, water conservation, and sustainability of irrigation activity are not likely to 
happen simultaneously in Tunisia for the following reasons:  
• Small farmers were found to be the least efficient but most elastic regarding water prices. 
According to our results, when the price of water increases, these farmers will shift 
towards a cropping pattern for which less water, variable inputs and more land is 
necessary. Small-size farmers are generally more constrained in terms of improving their 
technical efficiency. Thus, the full cost recovery objective will threaten the financial 
sustainability of small irrigated schemes if their technical efficiency cannot be improved. 
More facilities such as credit access, training programmes, market integration, etc. are 
needed to support them  
• In the same sense, if technical efficiency for these small-size farmers can be improved, 
then, the water saving objective will be difficult to achieve since farmers’ demand 
become then highly inelastic, as found in this dissertation. Efficient farmers will only 
reduce the scale of their operation as a reaction to increases in the irrigation prices. 
However, if the farmers who are currently most efficient have access to advanced 
technology, then the efficient frontier can be drawn by other more efficient patterns which 
would ensure both water conservation and irrigation intensification.  
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The governance structure, which was found to be significantly correlated to the IWUE, has also 
an indirect effect on the effectiveness of pricing policy and water demand functions. In fact, 
improvements to the governance structure (i.e., WUA performance) could help farmers to use 
water more efficiently and thus make their water demand functions more inelastic and increase 
their ability to pay higher water rates. From another viewpoint, the waste of financial resources, 
due to low WUA efficiency, could be reflected in the unitary water price, since irrigation rates 
are based on the financial balance of the WUA. Thus, by adjusting these inefficiencies, full water 
cost recovery can be achieved with lower pressure on farmers’ budgets.  
9.6. Changes to water property rights and farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for 
water 
Finally, the efficiency of “water access” and “water delivery” rights considered as two aspects of 
the water laws’ institutional component have been also assessed in this dissertation. It was 
hypothesized that “by improving WUA efficiency farmers will be more willing to pay higher 
water rates. Farmers realizing that their managers are wasting the WUA resources will be less 
motivated to contribute”. It was also assumed that “constitutional laws concerning the 
qualification of water access rights can be a source of inefficiency. A change towards more 
flexible and tradable access rights can generate higher economic value for the resource”. 
Accordingly, changes in attributes relating to the “water access right” and “water delivery right” 
were integrated into three scenarios in order to evaluate farmers’ willingness to pay for them. The 
three selected scenarios are as follows: better “allocation reliability”, “quantification of the right” 
(quotas system), and “transferability of the right” (market system).  
Our results show positive willingness to pay values for all scenarios.  However, farmers in the 
studied region were found to be more willing to pay for changes in the “water access right”, and 
more specifically for the transferability option. Furthermore, their perceptions concerning the 
organization and functioning of the WUA, to which they belong, in addition to their productivity, 
significantly affected their willingness to pay. The probability of accepting higher water prices in 
areas, where water reliability performance is low, was found to be high.  
These results stress the following main points that need special attention from policy makers in 
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Tunisia:  
• Improvements in the technical capacity of WUAs enabling them to provide a more 
reliable water supply, can have a positive effect on the cost recovery strategy and the 
acceptance of farmers to paying higher water rates. In the same sense, improvements in 
the internal organization and functioning of WUAs can also increase the probability of 
acceptance of higher water charges by farmers. 
• Adjustments to the constitutional attributes concerning the “water access right” can also 
have some positive repercussions on the economic valuation of water by farmers. 
However, more studies are needed to identify the relevant characteristics of access rights 
that can be implemented in Tunisia. Furthermore, cost benefit valuation of institutional 
changes, taking into account the implementation cost of any institutional alternative, has 
to be undertaken before any decision can be made to change the current water right 
system.   
• Pricing policies and cost recovery, willingness to pay for higher irrigation water, and the 
IWUE at farm level are all highly dependent on the functioning and performance of 
WUAs in a given irrigated area. Local irrigation governance resulting from the 
performance of WUAs at the local level is also partially dependent on institutional aspects 
agreed at the macro level: “governance framework”.  
9.7. Concluding remarks 
Despite the arid climate and the scarcity of water resources in Tunisia, policy makers succeeded 
at an early stage in establishing a rational strategy for the mobilization of resources and efficiency 
improvements in water use. This strategy was based on fundamental reforms to water institutions 
starting from the early 1970’s, with the aim of decentralizing water demand management to a 
local level. Currently, much progress has been made in Tunisia with regard to the transfer of 
irrigation management, private participation; O&M cost recovery, and water use efficiency at 
farm level. However, in this dissertation, we showed that significant benefits could still be 
achieved by improving the coordination and functioning of the implemented irrigation 
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institutions.    
Technical and managerial capacities of WUAs are often low, and insufficient training is offered 
during their establishment process. However, these capacities will generate a local irrigation 
governance context which could strongly affect farmers’ behaviour and decision making. Thus, 
promotion of good local governance has to be undertaken prior to efforts made at the individual 
level.  
Finally, much more attention has to be given to the irrigation water demand management in 
Tunisia in order to reduce the volume of water used in this sector. Potential savings are possible 
since there is wide scope to improve the irrigation water use efficiency, as shown in this 
dissertation. However, the orientation of the Tunisian society toward a consumption society and 
the free trade agreements signed by the Tunisian government can be breaks for irrigation water 
use reduction in the near future.   
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SUMMARY 
 
This PhD dissertation is studying the efficiency of irrigation water management institutions in 
Tunisia. Our general objective is to show that, not only do the existence and functioning of 
institutions for water demand management matter, but also their performance and effectiveness. 
According to this, we sought to prove that by designing and implementing high performing 
institutions, and by improving the functioning of existing ones, Tunisia can greatly improve the 
efficiency of agricultural water use. We assumed that the performance of irrigation institutions 
can be assessed using the “institutional decomposition” and “comparative institutional analysis” 
frameworks developed among others by Saleth and Dinar (1999, 2004).  
Our approach for decomposing irrigation water institutions in Tunisia was based on the 
Institutional Decomposition and Analysis framework which distinguish three main components 
of water institutions: components relating to constitutional choice rules: water laws; components 
relating to collective-choice rules: water policies; and components relating to operational rules: 
water administrations. In addition to this decomposition, in our analysis we also distinguished 
between the three layers of institutions according to the scheme proposed by Williamson (1996) 
who differentiated between the “governance framework”, “governance structure”, and 
“individual level”. In this dissertation, we mainly focused on the individual level, as we believed 
that the final outcomes of irrigation institutions could be assessed. 
First part of this dissertation, which is designated to the description of the water sector’ 
institutional environment, shows that serious shortage problems can occur in the near future if 
water demand continues to grow like it is currently. In fact, despite the creation and 
implementation of many institutions oriented towards irrigation demand management, the 
demand for irrigation has continued to increase for the past three decades. This was mainly due to 
the creation of new irrigated areas and to the intensification of the existed ones. Also, at this 
institutional level, feedbacks from governance structures (Water Users’ Associations: WUA) on 
the institutional environment was not recorded in the institutional scheme of Tunisian water 
sector. These feedbacks are considered as pressure executed in order to achieve some adjustments 
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at the constitutional level that favour the organizations operating at the governance level. This 
gives the impression that WUA in Tunisia can be defined as micro-institutions rather than users’ 
associations.  
At the governance level, a comparative efficiency analysis of WUAs sample shows that still some 
inefficiency related to their functioning occur. Additional savings in financial resources (spent by 
these associations) are possible and can be used for other local irrigation development purposes. 
These savings could for instance be reflected in the irrigation water price and cost recovery 
levels. Also, low WUA performance could have a negative effect on farmers’ perceptions, 
attitudes, and decision making. This effect was the purpose of the investigation into further 
applications undertaken at the individual level. 
At the individual level, we confirm that significant relationship exists between the quality of the 
local irrigation governance and the irrigation water use efficiency (IWUE) at the farm level. We 
also found that current irrigation pricing policies can have different impacts on farmers according 
to their farming efficiency levels. More efficient farmers have a more inelastic water demand 
functions. Thus, the Tunisian pricing policy aiming to enhance the technical efficiency of farmers 
in addition to charging higher irrigation rates could fail in generating additional water saving at 
the national level. Moreover, the study of the efficiency of current irrigation usage right in 
Tunisia shows that additional economic gains could be collected from farmers if various 
attributes of the right could be improved. More precisely, we found that farmers are willing to 
pay higher water prices for more reliable and for transferable irrigation rights.  
It is then clear according to this dissertation that water institutions are important elements 
affecting the performances of water sector at national level. Improvements of their functioning 
and performances have deep effect on social as well as individual welfare. A performing 
irrigation institution will be the one which generates a “good governance” context providing 
more motivation and incitation for individual irrigators.  
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Deze doctoraatsthesis onderzoekt de efficiëntie van de instituties voor beheer van irrigatiewater 
Tunesië. De algemene doelstelling is om aan te tonen dat naast het bestaan en het functioneren 
van deze instituties ook hun efficiëntie en doeltreffendheid een rol spelen. Daarom werd getracht 
aan te tonen dat door het opstellen en invoeren van sterk prestatiegerichte instituties en door het 
verbeteren van het functioneren van de reeds bestaande instituties, Tunesië de efficiëntie van het 
watergebruik voor landbouwkundige doeleinden sterk kan verhogen.   
De aanpak van het ontleden van de Tunesische instituties voor beheer van irrigatiewater is 
gebaseerd op het kader voor institutionele decompositie en analyse waarbij onderscheid wordt 
gemaakt tussen drie belangrijke karakteristieken van deze instituties: i) karakteristieken 
gerelateerd aan het constitutionele niveau zoals de water wetgeving, ii) karakteristieken  
gerelateerd aan het gemeenschapsniveau zoals waterbeleid en iii) karakteristieken gerelateerd aan 
het operationele niveau zoals water administratie. Bovenop deze indeling is in de gebruikte 
analyse tevens onderscheid gemaakt tussen de drie institutionele lagen volgens het schema van 
Williamson (1996). Hierbij wordt onderscheid gemaakt is tussen het bestuurskader, de 
bestuurstructuur en de individuele beslissingsmaker. In deze verhandeling wordt hoofdzakelijk 
gefocust op de individuele beslissingsmaker, omdat we denken dat deze het meest invloed kan 
hebben op het eindresultaat.   
Het eerste deel van deze verhandeling beschrijft de institutionele omgeving waarin  de 
Tunesische watersector zich bevindt. Hierbij wordt aangetoond dat bij een gelijkblijvende groei 
in de vraag naar water, ernstige tekorten aan water kunnen optreden in de nabije toekomst. 
Ondanks het ontstaan van vele nieuwe instellingen omtrent irrigatiebeheer bleef de vraag naar 
irrigatiewater toenemen gedurende de laatste 30 jaar. Dit is hoofdzakelijk te wijten aan het 
ontstaan van nieuwe irrigatiegebieden en een intensifiëring van de reeds bestaande. Bovendien 
werden in het institutioneel kader van de Tunesische water sector geen terugkoppelingen 
geconstateerd van de bestuurstructuur (Water gebruikers associaties: WGAs) naar de 
institutionele omgeving. Deze terugkoppelingen vormen een druk om aanpassingen te bekomen 
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op institutioneel niveau die positief kunnen zijn voor organisaties op operationeel niveau. Dit 
geeft de indruk dat WGAs in Tunesië eerder micro-instituties zijn dan gebruiksassociaties.     
Op het operationeel niveau toont een vergelijkende efficiëntie analyse van WGAs een  
inefficiëntie in de functionering aan. Bijkomende besparingen in de financiële middelen (gebruikt 
door deze associaties) zijn mogelijk en kunnen gebruikt worden voor andere lokale irrigatie 
ontwikkelingsdoeleinden. De besparingen kunnen dan voor een verlaging van de irrigatieprijs of 
voor een betere kostendekking zorgen. De lage efficiëntie van WGAs kunnen een negatief effect 
uitoefenen op de perceptie van de landbouwers, hun gedrag en de uiteindelijke beslissingen. Dit 
effect leidde tot het verder onderzoeken van deze toepassingen op landbouwersniveau. 
Op dit landbouwersniveau zien we dat er een significante relatie bestaat tussen de kwaliteit van 
het lokale irrigatiebeleid en de gebruiksefficiëntie van het irrigatiewater op bedrijfsniveau. 
Bovendien blijkt dat het huidig prijsbeleid omtrent irrigatie een andere impact kan hebben 
naargelang de efficiëntie van het bedrijf. Meer efficiëntie  bedrijven hebben een meer inelastische 
vraag naar water. Bijgevolg blijkt dat het Tunesische prijsbeleid waarbij getracht wordt de 
technische efficiëntie op bedrijfsniveau te verhogen d.m.v. prijsverhogingen niet gegarandeerd 
zal leiden tot extra water besparingen. Bovendien toont de efficiëntiestudie naar 
watergebruiksrechten aan dat er economische winsten kunnen gehaald worden bij de 
landbouwers indien verschillende attributen van de waterrechten kunnen verbeterd worden. Meer 
precies is aangetoond dat landbouwers bereid zijn een hogere prijs te betalen voor meer 
betrouwbare en verhandelbare irrigatierechten. 
Deze doctoraatstheses toont aan dat de waterinstituties een belangrijke invloed uitoefenen op de 
efficiëntie van de water sector op nationaal niveau. Verbeteringen in het functioneren van deze 
instellingen hebben een groot effect op zowel de maatschappelijke als op de individuele welvaart. 
Een goed functionerende instellingen voor beheer van irrigatiewater zal door een goed eigen 
beleid zorgen voor motivatie en impulsen voor de individuele gebruikers van irrigatiewater. 
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